

THE SAME SPAN OF TIME



The Major Works Of
THOMAS COOPER, MD
Cassius Amicus

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—
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Thomas Cooper, M.D.

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“The same span of time includes both the beginning and the termination of the greatest good.”

Epicurus, Vatican Saying 42, as translated by Norman DeWitt

... I cannot help exclaiming with Lucretius, “Tantum haec religio potuit suadere malorum.”

Thomas Cooper, letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 18, 1822.

Table of Contents

[Introduction by Cassius Amicus](#)

[Introduction By Thomas Cooper](#)

[The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism](#)

[Appendix on the Clergy](#)

[Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, December 11, 1823.](#)

[A View of the Metaphysical and Physiological Arguments in Favor of Materialism](#)

[Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, March 29, 1824](#)

[To Any Member of Congress](#)

[Letter of Thomas Cooper To Thomas Jefferson, October 18, 1822.](#)

[Consolidation](#)

Introduction by Cassius Amicus

Of all the Principal Doctrines which the ancient Epicureans held to be crucial for living life happily, two ranked above all the rest:

- 1. Any perfect being has no trouble of its own, nor does it cause trouble to anyone else; and such a being has no emotions of anger or gratitude, as those emotions exist only in beings that are weak;***
- 2. Death is nothing to us, because that which is dead has no sensations, and that which cannot be sensed is nothing to us.***

These Doctrines have far-reaching application, but their most immediate effect is to explode all common religious superstitions at their root: If these doctrines are true, *the affairs of men are not controlled by supernatural gods, and men do not possess immortal souls whom the priests may threaten with the punishment of the gods – or reward after death – for their worldly actions.*

For two thousand years these two Doctrines have been the special target of all who fought to suppress the ideas of Epicurus, and in the main those efforts have largely prevailed. Even though priests have offered no proof for their claims, few men have been willing to stand publicly against the false threat of eternal punishment in hell and the false promise of eternal reward in heaven. Even in our modern world, those who reject the superstitions of ages past cling to the hope of some kind of life after death or find the thought that their consciousness ends at death too horrible to contemplate. Not every man, however, has stood aside from challenging these false promises and threats. This volume contains the major works of one such man.

Thomas Cooper was born in Westminster, England, in 1759. Educated at (but not graduated from) Oxford, he pursued a multi-tracked career in law, medicine, and education, but his real interest was clearly philosophic and political reform. Cooper traveled to Europe to participate in the French Revolution, and then, in 1794, migrated to the United States with his friend Joseph Priestley, who is credited with the discovery of oxygen. Throughout his life, Cooper fought the forces of political and religious oppression, and in the process he befriended Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and many other luminaries of the period.

Although he was well known in his day, memory of Cooper has largely faded from common view. One place, ironically, where his name evokes a glint of recognition is within the confines of the University of South Carolina, where he served as that institution's second president (from 1821 to 1834) and where the school's library is named for him today. It was during those years that the forces of religious oppression that had dogged Cooper throughout his adult life engaged his most direct attention. In the end, those forces obtained his removal as president of the university, but during his stay in Columbia Cooper found new fame in political affairs – as an eloquent opponent of the growing power of the federal government. This fame allowed him to remain active through the end of his life, and during that time he published (or in some cases republished) the works collected here. The writing collected here will endure to Cooper's everlasting credit – and will be remembered far longer than his religious enemies, who Thomas Jefferson aptly described as "conjurers."

Unlike Jefferson, Cooper never claimed – at least in any writing preserved today – to be an Epicurean himself, but most of his most memorable writing was devoted (or conformable) to the ideas first popularized by Epicurus almost two thousand years before – especially in his first two Doctrines.¹ Cooper's most significant articles on these subjects are preserved here in this volume.

The first section of this volume is devoted to Cooper's *The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism*. The

meaning of the word “materialism” today is muddled at best, and certainly conveys a negative aura in the minds of most people. In Cooper’s time, however, to call oneself a materialist was to state very specifically and clearly that one believed that man’s soul (or consciousness) is a property of “matter”, and did not exist outside or apart from the material of the human body. The important observation to make first in this regard is that those who held Cooper’s view did not purport to be able to explain the detail of the type of matter of which the soul consists. Rather, their point was that in whatever form it exists, it is *natural*, and not a supernatural or otherworld ghost that continues to exist after the death of the body, in the sense commonly held to be true by most religions.

In *The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism*, Cooper turns words the Gospels against the religion-for-profit churches of his own day. Cooper points out that if one consults the words of *Jesus and his apostles*, rather than those who came after and sought to “explain” them later, the views stated or implied by Jesus’ own words and actions supports the view that – in general – consciousness ends at death. Cooper persuasively argues that Jesus preached a *bodily* resurrection, akin to that which He himself allegedly achieved, and thus even for a Christian the correct view should be that the soul dies with the death of the body, only to be resurrected on “the last day” in the case of those who accepted the promised salvation while living. *The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism* is interesting to us today mainly for the same reason that Cooper likely intended – as a “foot in the door” to encourage those Christians who had never considered the matter to open their minds to the views supported by the evidence of Nature.

The *Appendix on the Clergy* is a broadside against the occupation that bedeviled Cooper throughout his career. Cooper detested the Clergy, and in turn they detested him. The clergy of South Carolina repeatedly attacked Cooper’s livelihood as president of the University, and he responded in kind, summarizing his views as follows: “*The priesthood in every age, in every country, forbid discussion, frowned down all investigation; they require, like other tyrants, passive obedience and non-resistance. They denounce every man who opposes their views: not merely their spiritual, but their temporal views. Their intent here, as elsewhere, is to fetter your minds first, and your bodies afterwards; and finally, to command your pockets.*”

Earlier in his life, Cooper had composed the more technical “*A View Of The Metaphysical And Physiological Arguments In Favor Of Materialism.*” This work, more technical in nature in addressing the connections of Soul to Body, was dedicated to “The Medical Gentlemen Of The United States, As The Most Competent Judges Of The Arguments Contained In Them.” Rather than appealing to the masses by way of citations to Jesus and the Bible, here Cooper surveyed the latest medical research of his day in setting out the dependency of consciousness on the body for its existence. There are many parallels in this work to the arguments of Lucretius in *De Rerum Natura*, so this work is of special interests to Epicureans.²

Annexed to both of Cooper’s works on materialism are two fascinating letters to Cooper from Thomas Jefferson. Cooper had forwarded copies of both works for Jefferson’s personal use, and these letters make clear the high regard for Cooper and his ideas.

After a lifetime of feuding with the religious institutions of his day (of which group the Presbyterians were his special nemesis) Cooper published *To Any Member of Congress*, a broadside volley of arguments against the increasing tendency of the clergy in the United States to seek special privileges for themselves, and to drive from public life all who refused to worship at their altars.

The final work in this volume is not religious or philosophical, but was perhaps the most famous of Cooper’s work in his own day – a history of political affairs in the United States since the Revolution entitled “*Consolidation.*” Here the reader who might be tempted to romanticize the founding period of America as a world full of Thomas Jeffersons will be surprised to read just how closely the devotees of centralized power came to turning the United States into a hereditary monarchy. The dividing line on the issues had already been drawn geographically in Cooper’s time, with the Northern industrialists seeking

to use the powers of central government to tax the farming and mercantile interests of the rest of the country to support themselves. Despite his geographic allegiances, Cooper pointed out the deficiencies even in such Southern leaders as John C. Calhoun, who had shown themselves too ready to accept the idea of redistribution (in the form of national funding for “internal improvements”) so long as they were themselves included in the ranks of the distributees. *Consolidation* shows how the ideas of Jefferson and Madison that the Union was composed of Sovereign States who retained the power to veto unconstitutional legislation had been eroded to the point of non-existence, and the tragedy to which that erosion was bound to lead.

Consolidation, dealing as it does with political issues, is less reliable as a reflection of Epicurean ideas, but even here it would be well to refer back to the Principal Doctrines. As shown by the famous example of Cassius resistance to Caesar’s consolidation of power in the Roman Republic, ancient Epicureans can most certainly be classified as in favor of limited government. Consider, for example, Doctrine Thirty-Nine:

He who desires to live tranquilly without having anything to fear from other men ought to make them his friends. Those whom he cannot make friends he should at least avoid rendering enemies, and if that is not in his power, he should avoid all dealings with them as much as possible, and keep away from them as far as it is in his interest to do so.

Although not stated in political terms, this Doctrine is a nothing if not a prescription for keeping governmental units limited to those who share bonds of friendship, for no doubt those bonds would serve to unite the members of such union in voluntary agreements of the strongest force. But for those who cannot be made friends – those who disagree on fundamental issues – it is proper to *withdraw from contact*, not seek to change their minds or attitudes by force.

Some readers may seek out this present volume solely for the sake of *Consolidation*. So be it – I strongly suspect that Cooper would be happy to expand the audience for the views that he himself considered most important by use of such a device as including that essay here. And not least of all would he be pleased to know that his writings are finally freely available to everyone – even in his adopted home state of South Carolina.

SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE

OF

MATERIALISM

BY A LAYMAN

PHILADELPHIA

182

Introduction by Thomas Cooper

(From the Appendix by Thomas Cooper, MD, to his translation of the text *On Irritation and Insanity* by F.J.V. Broussais)

In the year 1787, (44 years ago) I published in England the first volume of Tracts, Ethical, Theological and Political; Warrington printed. Among these tracts was one containing a view in defense of the doctrine of Materialism, first read at the Manchester literary and philosophical Society; the same in all essential respects with that here presented, and which last is in fact abridged from my early publication. The addition of those tracts was well-received and soon sold off; but owing to other avocations I never republished or continued them.

In the year 1822, a clamor was raised in this state (South Carolina) among some well-meaning but not well informed people, against the heterodox opinions which it was supposed I entertained; as if it were not allowable in republican America for any man to entertain any opinions which on due consideration he conscientiously believed to be well-founded. The vague and general accusation preferred to the Legislature by two Grand Juries from a distant part of the state, instigated by some of the clergy, was referred to a committee of the House of Representatives who reported in substance that whatever opinions I was presumed to entertain now were well known before I was appointed to the Presidency of the College, and being deduced from the Christian Scriptures, ought to form no objection to me at this time. The report was adopted and the committee discharged.

In the recklessness of accusation at that time it was asserted in some of the newspapers of the state that Mr. Jefferson had been compelled to procure my dismissal from the honorable situation to which I had been appointed in the Virginia University (the joint professorships of Chemistry and Law). It became proper for me therefore to be prepared to show, if necessary, that my opinions on the subject alluded to were neither inconsistent with the Christian doctrines of the New Testament or with sound philosophy. In the year 1823, I drew up the tracts here published, and sent them to Philadelphia as the place to most likely to afford their confirmation or confutation; and I published them anonymously that they might stand or fall by the intrinsic merit or demerit of the arguments employed.

I adopted this course also from a disinclination to publish anything of a theological character in this state. I have from the time I came here to the present moment conscientiously abstained from the expression of any theological opinion whatever, before or in the presence of any student of this college: my deliberate advice and direction having always been, and now is, that they ought to adopt and profess the religious creed of their parents till the laws of the land set them free from parental control. It will be time enough then for them to investigate the subjects if they shall be inclined to do so. Young as they are, and while students, they have not the preliminary requisites to do so fully, finally, and beneficially. For this reason, I shall send the present translation of Broussais to a distance, nor shall I publish it in South Carolina.

I cannot help thinking it a great disgrace to the country that any objection should be made to the publication and free discussion of any opinion whatever; for I know of no means of settling truth on a firm basis but the perfect freedom allowed to every body of presenting to the public every view that can be taken of a controverted doctrine. Surely we cannot see the clearer for allowing one of our eyes to be closed, or be the wiser for looking at one side only of a disputed question and obstinately refusing to consider any other. When the gentlemen of the clerical profession show such morbid irritability at the discussion of metaphysical or theological doctrines which they would fain persuade us are too sacred to be disputed, they give rise by so doing to the strong suspicion that they themselves are not fully persuaded that the doctrines they inculcate are clear of all doubt and liable to no overthrow. Else why this irritation

when some orthodox tenets is modestly doubted? Why not confute their opponents instead of abusing them, and exhibit to the world their own superiority by the mildness and calmness of their conduct and manner and the temperate force of their arguments?

But I fear this is not to be expected from men who regard a doubt of their doctrines as an attack upon themselves. A priesthood, claiming to be a separate and sacred order of men, *hired and paid* to teach and preach certain doctrines and opinions, and adopting this mode of life as a trade -- a profession -- as the sure road to comfort and consideration, if not affluence, and strictly imbued with the *esprit de corps*, the corporation spirit of the clerical order, cannot be expected to come into the field of argument without a strong bias in favor of the tenets by which they obtained their living, or without irritation and anger against those people who in any manner oppose their influence over the people. If truth interferes with their interest, they can hardly be expected to look at it but with a jealous eye. This will happen even to wise, learned, and well disposed men, as many of them really are, when thus placed and situated: and the objection lays, not against the individual, but the order to which he belongs, and the trade by which he gets his living; often forced upon him by circumstances over which he has had little or no control.

Hence has arisen the mischievous interference of the clergy in astronomy, geology, zoology, physiology, and medicine; and the check constantly pressing upon the friends of truth, who would willingly discuss all the questions connected with these branches of knowledge fully, freely, and fairly. Bigotry is a continual spy upon science, and restrains that perfect freedom of discussion which the cause of truth and the good of the public absolutely requires upon every contested question.

As to the doctrine of Materialism, I run no risk in prophesying that twenty years hence it will be the prevailing doctrine among Physiologists and Physicians, not only in Europe but in this country. The views of the question taken by Priestley, Cabanis, Gall, Lawrence, and Broussais, I consider as pregnant with arguments impossible to be confuted: if they can be successfully opposed, it is high time the attempt should be made by the advocates of ancient opinions. Men of science begin now to revolt at the fetters which their clerical guides would willingly fix upon them; and something more is required by public opinion than outcries of heterodoxy and infidelity and dread lest the enormous influence of the clergy should be exposed to danger. By what ever opprobrious terms truth may be designated, those gentlemen may rely on it that error is no longer sacred, and if they wish to preserve a reasonable influence upon men of sense, they must resort more to argument and less to abuse.

Being in the habit of transmitting to Mr. Jefferson my publications, I sent him the two tracks that follow: and I think my readers will not be displeased to peruse his opinion respecting them which I have accordingly subjoined.

T.C.

The Scripture Doctrine of Materialism

By THOMAS COOPER, M.D.

Philadelphia

1823

Preface

There are only two doctrines of a religious nature that appear to me to have any bearing on the welfare of society; because they alone furnish a sanction and incitement to moral conduct:

(1) The belief in an all wise, good, and powerful Being, who superintends the moral government of the universe;

(2) the belief in a state of future existence after the death of the body, wherein every human creature shall be punished or rewarded according to his good or bad conduct and habits during the present life.

Whether we shall be punished or rewarded by means of the *soul*, or as in this life by means of our living *bodies*, seems to me to be a point of no practical consequence. The sanction -- the incitement, consists in our persuasion of the reality of the punishment and if the reward; whether it be by the one means or by the other. Accordingly, there are good and wise men in abundance -- pious and learned Christians, who are of the one opinion and of the other: nor all any good man to believe that his neighbor is the worse for adopting either.

Circumstances, unnecessary to be detailed, have induced me to draw up my own opinions on the subject, and the arguments on which I rely; the reader will judge for himself; I have no right to judge for him, or he for me.

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE
SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF
MATERIALISM

Two opinions are entertained respecting thought, intelligence, and the phenomena termed mental, or intellectual. One is that they are to be ascribed to a being distinct from the body, having no property in common with matter (immaterial, spiritual) incapable of corruption like the matter of our bodies, and in consequence thereof, immortal. This being, naturally distinct from the body, is the human *soul*; united to the body during its life, set free from the body at death, and without whose union with the body there would be nothing like thought, volition, or action. As the soul alone can act and suffer, this opinion of its separate existence is essentially connected with the Christian doctrine of a future state. Such is the prevailing opinion adopted by all the clergy; and by them inculcated as an article of faith essential to Christianity.

The other is that all of the phenomenon termed mental or intellectual are to be ascribed not to any soul, distinct or separate from the body, but to the properties which God Almighty has been pleased to connect with the human frame -- with the human system of organized matter. So that thought, volition, action, or the results of the circumstances to which God has been pleased that man, as an organized being, should be exposed during his continuance in this life. It is also said that there are manifest appearances of thought, volition, and, consequently, action, in brute animals; inferior greatly in complication and perfection to those that are observed in man, but not different in kind. The organization of brute animals being in many essential respects inferior to that of man.

According to the first doctrine, man is a compound animal consisting of a soul immaterial, immortal, invisible, and other body such as we see: this is *Immaterialism*. According to the second doctrine, man is not a compound animal, but consists merely of the parts and their properties, which are visible and apparent, and which can be made known to us by our senses: this is *Materialism*. According to the first doctrine, when the body dies the soul survives; according to the second doctrine, when the body dies, the whole man dies.

The present inquiry is, which of these two doctrines is most conformable to Christianity as delivered to us in the four Gospels that furnish the details of the life, death, and precepts of Jesus Christ. If it shall appear on the balance of evidence that Jesus Christ supported in precepts and in practice the one opinion or the other, then is it a Christian duty to embrace that opinion which has received his sanction.

I propose to show that the opinion denominated *Materialism* is -- and the opinion denominated *Immaterialism* is not -- consistent with Christianity.

It will be prudent at the outset to settle the question --

WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY?

The Christianity of the Romish church is one thing: of the Greek church another. The Christianity of an Athanasian, of a Sabellian, of an Arian, of a Socinian, of a Priestleyan, are all different: the variances relate to the essential points. The Christianity of Calvin and the Synod of Dort was one thing: the Christianity of James Harmens (Arminius) was another. The Christianity of George Whitfield, like the

thirty-nine articles of the church of England, admits the doctrine of election and reprobation; and Whitfield held the final perseverance of the saints. The Christianity of John Wesley, and of the present church of England, from the bench and in the pulpit, excludes both the one and the other. The opinion of a Trinitarian appears to an Unitarian to be polytheism and idolatry. The opinion of an Unitarian seems to a Trinitarian; little, if anything, short of blasphemy.

To a rigid Calvinist, mere morality, and the slightest value or efficacy allowed to good works, is setting up the works of the law over the precepts of the Gospel, and the pretensions of good conduct and benevolent actions over faith in Christ, and redeeming grace. To a Calvinist, all good works proceeding merely from the voluntary disposition, the kind affections, the due regard for character, and sense of social duty in a person not yet called through grace, and justified in Jesus, "doubtless (in the language of the thirty-nine articles) have in them the nature of sin." While to a man who professes to be governed in his conduct by a sense of moral rectitude, of obedience to the laws, and respect for his own standing in society, among the good and the wise with whom he lives, the Calvinistic decision of the quinquarticular controversy, or the five points, as they are called -- the doctrine of final perseverance, election and reprobation, independent of moral conduct -- and the efficacy of a deathbed repentance -- assume the character of temptations and provocatives to all manner of crime, and are subversive (where they really operate) of all the bonds of civil and domestic society. That a life of crime may be fully expiated by few minutes of repentance may be Calvin's religion, but it is not a tenet that society ought to encourage. Amid the dissonance of opinion, where are the genuine doctrines of Christianity to be found? In the Bible? Alas! All sects and all parties appeal indiscriminately to the Bible. Each constitutes himself sole authorized interpreter for, and infallible judge of his neighbor; and sets up the piling of exclusive salvation within the narrow limits of his own creed.

I have searched so much, so long, so ardently, so anxiously to arrive at *truth* on these subjects that I am sensibly alive to all the difficulties that surround it; to the dangers of discussing it; and a certain punishment that awaits every man who opposes predominant opinions. Hence I do not pretend that my opinions are true; I can only say that I believe they are. Hence I have full charity for all seekers after truth who differ from me in opinion. Let them hold their opinions; they have as much right to them as I have to mine; their belief is as obligatory upon them as mine on me.

But I hope I ask not too much if I require that the toleration shall be mutual. Whatever my own opinions may be, they have been the result of laborious inquiry -- they have never conduced to my interests, but far otherwise -- I have never taken them up as a trade -- I have no motive of interest to adopt or avow them -- I do not get my living by professing them. In saying this, I blame not those who do, but it manifestly furnishes a drawback from their authority. Hence I object to the interference, and much more to the decision of men, who being hired and paid to propagate certain opinions, will of course maintain the doctrines by which they live and thrive.

The motto of a hired and paid priesthood is in all ages and in all countries the same: "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" and the worldly-minded among them will hoot out of society if they can all those who interfere with their trade. I know *many* worthy men of the clerical order to whom this will not apply; men whose sound learning, good sense, and kind dispositions, make them estimable exceptions to a general rule. But the general rule is as I have stated it; and my reader knows it is so.

If I state this strongly, it is because I have felt it deeply. Suppose an architect, a painter, a physician, called upon in a court of justice to give his professional opinion upon a professional point in litigation: suppose it should appear on the cross examination that he was hired and paid for giving currency to the opinions he had advanced before the court -- would do the jury believe him? Would the court allow any weight to his testimony? But the clergy consider this objection almost as blasphemy: for they have always and everywhere arrogated exclusive privileges that their fellow citizens dare not claim.

In answering the question "What is Christianity?" I presume not therefore to do more than submit to the

reader my own opinion, with the reasons on which it is founded; leaving him to judge of the one and of the other. Requesting only, that until he can discover a probable and reasonable motive why I, a layman, should embrace opinions so unpopular, unless it be the truth of them according to the lights I possess, he will impute to me error of the understanding only; and to this I shall willingly submit. It is with great reluctance I engage in this controversy, but the events of my neighborhood have rendered it a measure of defense.

I lay it down as a known and acknowledged rule of evidence that in ascertaining any fact we are to require and resort to the highest and best evidence that the nature of the case will admit. We are not allowed to proceed upon hearsay testimony, where the original witness can be produced; we must not produce a copy of the deed, when the deed itself is at our command; we must not aver against a record; we must not bring the fleeting recollection of verbal assertion in opposition to declarations deliberately written and acknowledged; and so on.

I lay down also as known and acknowledged rules of evidence:

That we cannot contradict or modify superior evidence by inferior. If the testimony of B depend upon the evidence of A, it can neither add to nor detract from the value of A's evidence.

That we need not resort to inferior evidence if the superior be adequate to our purposes.

That we are to rest our fact and all our conclusions from it on the *best* evidence that can be produced to establish it, and on no other.

That if the evidence thus admitted be clear in the main, and ambiguous in some parts, we are to construe the parts that seem ambiguous in conformity with the main object and intention about which there is no ambiguity.

Lastly, that Christianity, being intended for all mankind, must necessarily consist of few propositions, and those plain and intelligible to any man of common learning and common understanding.

And now to the application:

Christianity is to be found in the doctrines and facts promulgated in the New Testament.

The New Testament consists of the doctrines and facts of Christ's ministry contained in the four Gospels; and of the doctrines and facts related of the apostles after his resurrection.

The doctrines and facts related to Christ himself, as delivered to us by the four evangelists, are the highest and best evidence we possess of what Christianity is.

1. Because Jesus Christ was the founder of Christianity. It rests upon what he said and did.
2. Because all Christians acknowledge that Jesus Christ could not be deceived. He was not fallible like common men.
3. Because his apostles, deriving all their knowledge from him, can neither add to, or diminish the authority of his doctrines.

Hence, I hold that no comments, apostolic or other, upon the doctrines of Jesus are in themselves obligatory on his disciples. I rest exclusively on the best evidence the nature of the case will admit -- on what Jesus Christ said and did; -- and I seek for Christianity in the four evangelists, and in them only. A Christian is bound by all the precepts and doctrines of Christ Jesus; he acknowledges no other master and needs no other teacher.

The reader is acquainted with the four Gospels of the evangelists; appealing then to the reader I say that the only doctrines of Christianity plainly and clearly delivered by Christ himself, and which his apostles

were enjoyed to propagate, are these:

1. The doctrine of one God; God the father as the only object of adoration, and is the only creator, preserver, and moral Governor of the universe; in opposition to the absurd notions of polytheism prevalent all over the world when Christ appeared.
2. The resurrection from the dead, and a state of future rewards and punishments distributed according to the past conduct, habits, and dispositions of the dead person who shall for this purpose be called up before the judgment seat at the great day.

This doctrine is rendered necessary to complete the plan of the moral government of the universe; and to rectify the apparent inequalities of good and evil in the present life by the distributive justice of a future state of existence. This doctrine was not prevalent among the learned of the heathen world; and it renders Christianity of unspeakable value to a Christian, because it puts a doctrine of the very highest importance and of the most salutary influence upon sure and certain foundations, resting upon evidence nowhere to be found but in the Christian scriptures.

3. That Jesus was a person sent of God, divinely commissioned to teach these most salutary doctrines, to confirm them by miracles while living, and by his own predicted resurrection after death: and he did so.

Thus far all sects and orders of Christians agree: and I defy the reader to show me any other opinion delivered in the four Gospels in which Christians do so agree. Surely those doctrines which large portions of good and wise and pious and learned men differ about, after eighteen centuries of laborious discussion, may well be considered as dubious.

Do they agree in the nature and character of Christ himself whether he was equal with the father or inferior -- co-eternal or of subsequent production? Are the doctrines of transubstantiation, of the immaculate conception, of original sin, of collection and reprobation, of vicarious suffering, clearly and explicitly taught in language plain and free from the figurative ambiguity of Eastern metaphor? Are any of the five points so laboriously and abstrusely handled at the Synod of Dort clearly and explicitly laid down in the holy Gospels? No! They are not.

It is notorious that they are even at this day, as in former days, disputed in every part of Christendom by learned and grave men. As I consider the Christian dispensation intended for the benefit of no part of mankind exclusively, but introduced for the present and eternal welfare of the poor, the meek, the unlettered, at least as much as for the learned and the wise; I cannot consider any doctrine essential to Christianity that is not clear and intelligible to an unlearned man of common understanding. Hence I throw out of the catalog of Christian doctrines all those abstruse points that occupied the pens of learned theologians of the present day.

What! Shall a doctrine be deemed essential that has been a subject of controversy for near 2000 years and not yet settled? What! Shall a doctrine be deemed essential which none but learned men are capable of discussing? God forbid. Jesus Christ loved little children, he comforted the poor in spirit and the brokenhearted, he honored the widows mite. Would he mock his followers with doctrines too abstruse for the comprehension of the great mass of mankind -- of the very class he was accustomed to address?

Moreover I consider no tenet as essential that does not bear directly on our moral conduct; that does not make us better men; that does not furnish a motive and a sanction to abstain from evil and do good; that does not tend to make each member of society more valuable to each other. The doctrines of one supreme God, the moral Governor of the universe and a state of future rewards and punishments in another life, according to our conduct and acquired habits in the present, have manifestly this good tendency.

To Christians, there is no sufficient evidence of a future state out of the Christian scriptures and

independent of Jesus Christ, who brought life and immortality to light. The Christian therefore rests upon the Gospel facts with peculiar satisfaction. But what direct bearing on morality can we find in such questions asked -- whether the three persons of the Trinity be three separate persons, distinct intelligent agents, or three modes wherein the supreme being exhibits his power and characters; -- whether the generation of the Son be eternal or not; -- whether the Holy Ghost be a person or an attribute; -- whether the Holy Ghost proceeded from the father only or from the father and the son; -- whether the son be *omoousion* or *omoioision* (of the same or similar substance) with the father; -- whether all mankind deserved to be consigned to eternal torments because Eve tempted Adam to eat the forbidden fruit; -- whether we are to bear the pains and penalties of our own misconduct, or whether Christ bore them for us;³ -- whether the terms of redemption are unfailing for the benefit of all men, or for the benefit of the elect only; -- whether the electorate were chosen because God foreknew how they would act, or whether their actions are guided and determined by God's predetermination; -- whether, in the quaint phraseology of Gale, God predetermined man's volition or gave only "his predeterminate concurrence to the entitative act?" -- whether a saint may fall from grace not only foully but finally; -- whether good actions, performed before a sinner be called through saving grace to repentance, have in them the nature of sin, etc. etc. I ask, "Is the *great cause of morality* furthered by these questions?"

I acknowledge therefore no disputations or disputable Christianity. I know nothing beyond the points I have mentioned as essential to the belief of a Christian. I see that all sects acknowledge these doctrines so far as they are here laid down; and as I know of no other theological opinion undisputed among Christians, I adhere to these and these only.

If then it be asked, is Christ equal with God, or coeval with God, or inferior to him in power, was his generation from eternity or in time; is he an object of adoration equally with the father; is he *omoousion* or *omoioision*? I cannot tell; none of these points seem to be settled by an uniform series of plain and unconflicting text that leave no room for hesitation.

I content myself therefore with what is plain, clear, and indisputable. Jesus Christ was divinely commissioned for the duties he fulfilled on earth, or he could not have worked miracles in proof of his doctrine. I understand this far, and there I stop.

Well, but the resurrection from the dead: this is not so plain as to be free from doubts and difficulties even to a materialist. What kind of body is it that will rise? The corrupted and corruptible mass of matter thrown into the grave? Or some body more fit for the enjoyment of immortality? To all this I reply that Jesus Christ having preached the resurrection of the body, *I take it as he preached it*.

If I cannot explain all the difficulties that attend this opinion and resolve all the curious questions that can be raised on it, I am content. I am content to believe Jesus Christ on his own terms, and after his own fashion, and no other. Had all these curious questions required explanation, he would have given it: if he has not given it, we need it not.

Such is my notion of Christianity. If I think that others believe too much, and if they think I believe too little, I cannot help it. By the use we have made of the lights that have been afforded us, must we stand or fall; and may God forgive, as I hope and believe he will, the involuntary errors on the one side and the other of those who seek after the truth.

I shall now attempt to show that

THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION IS WHAT IS NOW CALLED
MATERIALISM, AND THAT IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NOTION OF A SEPARATE,
IMMATERIAL, AND IMMORTAL SOUL.

The plainest account of the resurrection seems to be that delivered by Jesus Christ in the fifth chapter of John, 24, etc. "Verily, verily I say unto you, he that heareth my word and believe on him that sent me

have everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily I say unto you, that the hour is coming and now is when the *dead* shall hear the voice of the son of God, and they that hear shall live. For as the father hath life in himself, so has he given to the son to have life in himself; and had given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the son of man. Marvel not at this, for the hour cometh in which *all that are in the graves* shall hear his voice, and come forth; they that have done good to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation" (condemnation).

The resurrection of the Gospels, whether of Christ or others, is always spoken of as a resurrection of the dead: Luke 24:46, "this it behooved Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead on the third day." John 20:9, that he must rise from the dead, and so on. I need not multiply passages on this point, which cannot be disputed.

But on the modern hypothesis of an immaterial soul that survives the body and never dies -- which is to be the future object of reward and punishment -- *the resurrection of the dead* is not merely an absurdity, but a falsehood.

Again, if this supposed seat of thought, intelligence, volition, of all the passions and affections, do really exist as is supposed, then is a resurrection useless and unnecessary. That being needs not be revived from the dead which never dies.

An immaterialist -- a deist, needs not this manifestation of divine justice first revealed by Jesus Christ. Our body (they may say) is the passive instrument of the soul which is confined to it during this life; it is meant to serve the purposes of this life only: when the body dies, then is our nobler and most essential part set at liberty; and exerts its powers, free and untrammelled by the fleshy load to which it was conjoined. As it is of itself, and essentially immaterial and immortal, no future resurrection is necessary to its future existence.

These are the fair and inevitable conclusions from what it pleases the priesthood to call orthodoxy.

Again: If it were true that the human being consisted of a material body incapable of thought, volition, feeling, intelligence -- and of an immaterial and immortal soul conjoined to it during life, and set free from it at death -- and if this were one of the essential doctrines of the Christian religion, then would the declaration of Jesus Christ to this purpose have been plain, unambiguous, and explicit: but we have no such description of human nature laid down by Christ. He has nowhere adopted or declared this opinion; he has nowhere described us as consisting of an immortal soul conjoined to a mortal body, or inculcated any thing like it as an article of faith. He has uniformly declared that the resurrection he preached was the resurrection, not of the compound creature man, consisting of body and soul -- not of the human soul which is described as immortal -- but of *the human body* which died and was buried. I hope the expressions of Jesus Christ will be accepted as good authority for what is Christianity on this point; I have no better to offer.

I repeat that when Jesus Christ talks of the resurrection of the dead, it must be the resurrection of that which is liable to death; and it cannot mean the resurrection of that which is not liable to death, but being immortal, never dies. Matthew 22:23; Mark 12:18; Luke 20:33. The Sadducees put to him a question of matrimony under the Jewish law. They asked, "therefore, in the resurrection, whose wife shalt she be of the seven?" Here was a fair opportunity for Jesus Christ to have explained the modern doctrine of immaterialism, and to have shown that the institution of marriage was a corporeal rite and had reference to the body only, and that the marriage of two immaterial souls was an absurdity and an impossibility. But he gives no hint whatever of the soul; only that, *at the resurrection of the dead*, there is neither marrying or giving in marriage.

Luke 24:46: And he said unto them, thus it is written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to *rise from the dead* on the third day.

John 20:9: For as yet they knew not the Scriptures, that he must rise again from *the dead*.

John 2:21: But he spake of the temple of his *body*.

When Jesus had risen, the women who went to search for his body found it not in the sepulchre, for *the body* had risen from the dead. Luke 24:6, Why seek you the living among the dead? He is not here but is risen.

When Christ died upon the cross, many *bodies* of saints that slept arose. Matthew 27:52. Is it not strange that in none of these passages relating to the resurrection from the dead have we *any* reference to the soul?

Again: The resurrection from the dead promise by Jesus was exemplified by his own death, burial, and resurrection, such as was *his* resurrection, such will be *ours*; or he died to no purpose. If *his* personal exemplification of the resurrection from the dead, to which he appealed, was different in its kind and nature from that which mankind are to undergo, it becomes no longer a type, an exemplification, and a proof of *our* resurrection. He arose expressly after predicting that he would do so to make manifest and illustrate by fact the doctrine he had been preaching. Let us then consider the Scripture account of Christ's own resurrection.

John 20:24: But Thomas (one of the twelve), called Didymus, was not with him when Jesus came. The other disciples said unto him, we have seen the Lord: but he said unto them, except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my fingers into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe. And after eight days again, the disciples were within, and Thomas was with them. Then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, peace be unto you. Then saith he to Thomas, reach hither thy finger and to hold my hands; and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side; and be not faithless, but believing. And Thomas answered in saith unto him my Lord and my God! Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed; Blessed are they who have not seen me, and yet have believed.

Other circumstances are mentioned by Luke 24:38, in giving an account of Jesus appearing to disciples after his resurrection. "And he said unto them, why are you troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts. The hold my hands and my feet, that it is I, myself: handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me have. And when he had just spoken, he showed them his hands and his feet. And while they believed not for joy, but wondered, he said unto them, have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of broiled fish and a honeycomb, and he took it, and did eat before them." See the parallel passages, Matthew 28; Mark 16; Luke 24:39.

This is the only account the Scriptures give us of the great and important proof, and manifestation of the resurrection of the dead, produced by Christ himself, as an example of that future miraculous destination of the human kind.

If the belief in the separate existence of a soul which dies not with the body, and its liability to reward and punishment at the great day, be an article of Christianity, was not this the proper, the last, the only occasion to explain it?

Is there one word of the human soul in this account?

And when Christ appeals to his disciples, and describes what constitutes himself; does he not appeal to his visible, tangible body, and to that only; does he mention or allude to the soul?

Does this account furnish a proof of any resurrection but the resurrection of the body and the body only?

Does not Christ in effect negative the existence of any separate soul when, exhibiting his body, he says, here, "this is I, myself"?

Is anyone required to believe in the existence of a separate soul, when it is no more noticed on this solemn occasion than if it did not exist at all?

And why is it not noticed? Because it does not exist. Would such an occasion of explaining and inculcating the doctrine have been passed by?

Again: Matthew 27:53 "And the graves were opened, and many *bodies* of saints that slept arose, and came out of their graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many." This is again a type and an exemplar of man's resurrection: but not one word of the soul.

How is it, some may ask, that this corrupt, mortal, and putrefying body can be the object of the resurrection and inherit immortality? I answer that in Luke 22:36 Christ says, "the dead who are raised shall die no more." Of course some change will take place after the resurrection to fit them for immortality. What change, or how it is to be affected, as Christ has not explained, neither do I; and with the promise as he has made it a Christian should be content.

The only passage in the Gospels from which the existence of a separate an immortal soul can apparently be inferred is Matthew 10:28, which in the translation runs thus: "fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." To this I reply that the word here translated soul (a) is translated in very many other places indiscriminately, "life" and "soul." Meaning always the life of the body, and never exclusively the soul. Thus, a little way before in Matthew 6:25, it is translated life: "to take no more thought for your life." To the same purpose, Luke 12:22. So in Mark 3:4: "To save life or to kill." So in Luke 12:23 "the life more than raiment." Matthew 6:23; Matthew 10:39; Matthew 6:27; Mark 8:36,37, and in upwards of twenty passages more. In all of these passages, the word translated indiscriminately "soul" and "life" is one and the same word. So in Revelation 16:3, "and every living soul died in the sea."

The meaning of the passage is therefore that Christ, who was appointed to teach and to preach the resurrection unto life, says, "fear not them who can kill the body, but him who cannot annihilate life itself, and is short all your hopes of resurrection and a future existence."

I do not know any other passage in the Gospels that can be plausibly dragged in aid of the immaterial hypothesis; and I will venture to say there is not one passage in the Bible so strongly in favor of that opinion as the passage I have just considered: which is manifestly a translation, made by men whose heads were full of the doctrines of the soul, and made with a view to that very opinion.

Again: The following passages all tend to show that there shall be no resurrection whatever, but it is a miraculous interposition of God Almighty, *through Jesus Christ*, who shall call the dead from their graves, at his own appointed time; until when there shall be no day of judgment: and of course that without the promise of Christian resurrection, the dead would forever remain dead. This is utterly inconsistent with the notion of the most essential and active part of man, immortal in itself, subsisting in a state of superior intelligence and activity when free from the burden and clog of the human body. When freed from the prison of the body, why, by miraculous interposition, raise up the body to imprison it again? Matthew 13:30-49; Matthew 26:27; Matthew 19:28; Matthew 24:31,32; Mark 13:26,27; John 6:40,44,54; John 26:22. I could add many more passages from the acts and epistles, but I purposely confine myself to the Evangelists.

So far as the plain fact, universal experience, and the declarations of the Scriptures will bear us out, there is no pleasure and no suffering independent of the animated body, either in this life or in the life to come. Animation ceases when the body dies; and it will be restored when the body is called up from the grave at the great day in conformity with the promises made to us in the Gospels of Christ. Without those promises, confined to the human race -- as a beast dieth so dieth man; without further hope of sentient existence. At least, the arguments for a future state are barely probable, independent of the Gospel, and

Christ's example. So that to a materialist, the value of a Christian Gospel is unspeakable; to the immaterialist it is superfluous and even contradictory.

One other argument I will urge that seems to me to have great weight. The Jews were divided into two sects; the Sadducees who taught that there would be no resurrection and the Pharisees, who held that there would be one. The inculcations and objectives of Christ against the Pharisees are vehement, and frequent. Not so against the Sadducees. Among the various conversations and disputes he had with the Sadducees on the subject of the resurrection from the dead, he not only never makes any use of the argument from the immaterial and immortal nature of the human soul, but he never introduces it at all -- not a word is to be found on the subject: its existence is not hinted at.

After this, can it be said that the separate existence of an immortal soul is the doctrine of Christ? I am lost in utter astonishment at the presumptuous hardihood that can state this doctrine as an essential article of the Christian faith! -- at the impudent intolerance that can cry down a man's character and standing in society -- can interdict him like the banished of old, from fire, water, and shelter -- because examining Scripture for himself, he cannot conscientiously accept as divine truth the metaphysical reveries of Calvinistic theology!

The doctrine of a future state stands on a much firmer basis on the supposition of the resurrection of the body, and the body only, then on the resurrection of the soul (if indeed this last be not, as I take it to be, a manifest contradiction in terms.) That being whom it shall please God, through Jesus Christ to raise from the dead -- from the grave -- will be the object of future rewards and punishments in another life for its deeds or misdeeds transacted in this life. I know of no Christian materialist who denies this, and I believe it is considered a doctrine probable, but not certain, independent of Scripture, from considerations connected with the moral government of the universe but rendered certain by the Christian scriptures only. To a materialist, the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection is superfluous; for *his* man is essentially immortal in his immortal soul! To a materialist, is everything; for it contains the only sure and certain proof of the resurrection that is to be found within the compass of human knowledge.

And here I take my stand. I hold it useless to urge any further argument. It would be an anticlimax in ratiocination. That which is not Jesus Christ's Christianity is not my Christianity. The opinions of the apostles, of the fathers of the Church, of grave and learned divines, can add no force to Gospel authority. You cannot fortify stronger evidence by weaker. If you say it may explain or illustrate what is dubious, I deny that any of the essential articles of Christianity that I have stated are dubious. You may dispute as much as you please about the human soul, which is not mentioned once in the Gospels, but you cannot deny the resurrection of the body. You may dispute about the nature and grade of Christ's character, but you cannot as a Christian dispute his divine mission. I require no other proof that any doctrine is unessential to Christianity than that it is dubious. Jesus Christ does not require us on pain of eternal damnation to believe on doubtful evidence -- although the priesthood does. Could the unlettered audience present at the sermon on the Mount have understood a sentence of the Assembly's Catechism?

The sum and substance of my argument is this:

- (a) All that is essential to Christianity is contained in the four Gospels that give us an account of what Jesus taught and did; who certainly would omit nothing essential to his own plan. The doctrine of an immaterial, immortal soul is nowhere to be found promulgated, explained, or hinted at, in any part of the four Gospels, except in one solitary text where the ambiguity arises from the translation.
- (b) The resurrection everywhere spoken of is the resurrection of the dead -- the resurrection of the body, not of the soul.

- (c) This avoiding any notice of the doctrine in question is more extraordinary as frequent opportunities and occasions occurred that seem to have required, if this doctrine were true, that it should be enforced and explained.
- (d) This doctrine of a separate and immortal soul renders unnecessary any miraculous interposition to produce the resurrection of the dead for the purpose of future reward and punishment; inasmuch as the soul never dies. It may therefore be a very good tenet for a Deist, but not for a Christian.
- (e) This doctrine of an immaterial immortal soul is to the doctrine of the resurrection a positive and unequivocal denial; for there can be no resurrection of that which never dies.
- (f) The example and illustration presented to us by Christ's own resurrection is a resurrection of the *body* only: not a syllable is said about the soul.

Here ends my argument: but for the sake of those who have a higher opinion of human comments on the doctrines of Christ than I have, I had the following brief observations, tending to show:

- 1. That the doctrine of materialism is the doctrine of the apostles.
- 2. That the doctrine of materialism was the doctrine of the fathers of the Christian Church during four hundred years until the time of St. Augustine.
- 3. That it is yet considered as a dubious point in the Church of England among the dignitaries eminent for learning in that church.
- 4. That the doctrine of a separate soul has given rise to great errors and deplorable abuses.

If I should find it necessary (which I hope will not be the case) to come out again on the subject, I will treat these points more at large; at present, my object is condensation and brevity.

Let us now see *what the Apostles say*:

Acts 23:6, Paul cried out, Of the hope and resurrection of the *dead* am I called in question.

Acts 24:15. That there shall be a resurrection of the *dead* both of the just and unjust.

2 Cor 1:9, But we had the sentence of death in ourselves, that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God who raiseth the *dead*. If any declaration can be adverse to the existence of a separate soul, this is.

2 Cor. 4:10. Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in *our body*.

v. 14. Knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus shall *raise us up also* by Jesus. This implies similarity in the general resurrection of the human race, and that of our Lord.

So in 1 Peter 1 1-5, Blessed be God, which according to his abundant mercy hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, that fadeth not away.

Romans 4:17, God who quickeneth the dead, and called those things that be not, as though they were.

1 Corinthians 15:42, So also is the resurrection of the *dead*. It is sown in corruption – it is raised in incorruption. What died? The Soul? No: the body died. What then is raised? The Soul? No: that which died, the body. When the body being raised from the dead is endowed with incorruptibility, to fit it for its new state of being, it still remains the same body, only no longer subject to death. St. Paul calls

the body thus changed a heavenly body, a spiritual body: still it is the body; and all essential respects, the very body that died; for no other is ever spoken of.

2 Corinthians 10 (a) for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that everyone may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done whether good or bad. The literal and true version of this passage is “may receive bodily” (*ta dia tou somatos*.) Hence, it is the body that is to receive reward or punishment, according to what the body hath deserved while alive. Not a word of soul.

Ephesians 23, Christ is the savior of the body.

Philip. 3:21, who shall change our vile body (vile as being mortal incorruptible) and fashioned like unto his glorious body. Not a word of the soul: all relates to the body.

I have looked into the original Greek of all the passages translated soul, from acts to revelations, inclusively, and I find the word is *psyche*. In *most* of these passages, it necessarily means life; except, as some may think, in 1 Thessalonians 23, “that your whole spirit, and soul, and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord.”

The general meaning of the word here translated spirit, when applied to man, his disposition, inclination: thus,

Matthew 26:41. The spirit truly is willing, but the flesh is weak. That is they have a desire to keep awake, but they are overcome with fatigue.

Luke 6:55. Her spirit came again, and she arose straightway. That is, her life.

John 4:23. Shall worship the father in spirit and in truth. That is, in reality, with willingness and unfeignedly.

John 11:33. He groaned in spirit: John 13:21, he was troubled in spirit.

Frequently it is put for beings intermediate between men and angels that only appear occasionally, that being a popular opinion of the day: as when the disciples said he had seen a spirit were an angel – the Sadducees say there is no angel or spirit -- and the Spirit said unto Philip, go near and join.

It is sometimes put for the power and operation of God.

So the word translated “soul” is far more frequently translated “life” which is its true meaning.

Hence, the meaning would be, God preserve your disposition, your life, and your body to the time of his coming. That is, I hope you will not change your character or quit this life till the coming of our Lord Jesus; which some of the apostles mistakenly expected to be very soon. But holding myself down by the highest authority, I am bound by that only. Nor is the main doctrine of Christ in the Gospels to be shaken by a few figurative or pleonastic forms of expression among his disciples. The question is not, is there any text of the Bible that seems to countenance the notion of a soul (for the Bible was translated by persons who took that doctrine for granted) -- the question is, what is the general tenor of the doctrine on the subject laid down by Jesus Christ: does *he* countenance it? The apostles wrote and spoke very figuratively, and frequently in conformity and allusion to the previous notions of those they were addressing. To establish the doctrine of the soul as a Christian doctrine, do not refer me to a few texts that *seem* to countenance it; you must show at me plainly, clearly, and undoubtedly laid down, explained, and urged by Christ himself: and that I am sure cannot be done from the Evangelists. All else is evidence so inferior as to have little weight on the question.

All persons conversant with the Scripture know that the various and discordant tenets of metaphysical Christianity are founded, assorted, and denied on the license of figurative expression used by the apostles,

and principally St. Paul. In this war of words I desire to take no part, and I therefore appeal exclusively to the Gospels.

OF THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT FATHERS

I am not yet possessed of the means of examining and referring to the original works of the fathers, as they are called. I must therefore be content with referring to some summary. Such a one Dr. Priestley has given, but I am aware his authority may be objected to. Lewis Ellis Dupin, and Lardner have not attended to this subject as a separate question, and Lardner's quotations are very partial. The only author of repute who has examined all the writings of the Christian fathers with this view is Beausobre, in his history of Manicheism; an author universally regarded as among the fairest and best qualified of modern days. He too is cited by Priestley, by Rees, and others.

To avoid all reasonable objection I referred to the article "Immaterialism" in the larger French Encyclopedia, manifestly written by one who is not a materialist. I translate briefly from that article; stating however, that his representation will coincide with that of M. Beausobre.

"Some moderns suspect that as Anathagoras admitted a spirit in the formation of the universe, he was acquainted with spirituality, and did not admit a corporeal deity, like almost all the other philosophers. But by the word spirit (*pneuma*) the Greek and Romans equally understood a subtle matter, extremely dilated, intelligent indeed, but extended, and consisting of parts. In effect, how can they believe that the Greek philosophers had any idea of a substance purely spiritual, when it is clear that all primitive fathers of the Church made even God Almighty corporeal; and their doctrine was perpetuated in the Greek church even to later times, and was never renounced by the Roman Church till the time of St. Augustine" (about six hundred years after Christ).

The author of the article proceeds, by means of quotations from their works, to show that the following fathers were materialists, viz; Origen, whom Jerome reproaches for his notion that God himself was material; Tertullian, who wrote a book *De Anima* expressly to prove the mortality and materiality of the human soul; Arnobius; St. Justin; Tatian; St. Clement of Alexandria; Lactantius; St. Hilarius; St. Gregory Nazianzenus; St. Gregory Nyssenus; St. Ambrose; Cassian; and finally John of Thessalonica, who, at the Seventh Council, pronounced it as an opinion traditionally delivered by St. Anathansius, St. Basil, and St. Methodius, that neither angels, demons, nor human souls were disengaged from matter. The writer forgot Melito, bishop of Sardis; but here the list is quite long enough. It proves nothing except that in the early ages of the Christian Church, and for near 600 years, Materialism was not heresy, but quite otherwise. Indeed St. Austin says that he himself was for a long time of this opinion; owing to his difficulty of conceiving the pure spirituality of God himself -- Are these metaphysics of any use or value to a Christian on the one side or the other? I consider them as vain speculations, unproductive of practical benefit.

The Apostles' Creed, of uncertain composition, but ancient, requires us to hold as an essential article of the Christian faith, What? The resurrection of the soul? No, "the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting." Amen.

THAT THE DOCTRINE OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE IMMATERIAL SOUL, DISTINCT FROM THE HUMAN BODY, AND DISJOINED FROM IT AT DEATH, IS A DOCTRINE PUBLISHED AND AVOWED BY DIGNITARIES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

I apply this to the well meaning, but not well instructed portion of my fellow citizens. I am not about to prove my point by an appeal to the bench of bishops. But I say that the doctrine is not Atheism, Deism, or Infidelity, which some of the bench of bishops avow, which others doubt about, and which none complain of as heretical or dangerous.

Dr. Edmund Law,⁴ Arch Deacon of Carlisle, Master of Peter's College in the University of Cambridge (a seminary for finishing the education of young men) wrote a treatise on the nature and end of death. To the third edition of this work, now before me, published in 1775, he added an appendix on the meaning of the original words translated *soul and spirit* in the holy Scripture; showing that no part of the Bible gave countenance to the doctrine of a separate soul, or of an intermediate state of being between death and judgment. He refers to Bishop Sherlock, the Rev. Mr. Taylor of Norwich, and Mr. Hallet, in the following passage closing that appendix.

Extract from the Appendix to Considerations on the Theory of Religion. By Edmund Law, D.D. Archdeacon of Carlisle, and Master of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, third edition, 1755 – with an appendix concerning the use of the word SOUL in the Holy Scripture, and the state of death there described.

“The intent of this appendix, containing an examination of all the meanings of the words translated SOUL, in the Old or New Testament, appears to have, is to show that the doctrine of a separate, immaterial, immortal soul is not a Christian doctrine: that it is not fairly deducible from the Christian Scriptures; and is contrary to their general tenor.” Dr. Law, after this summary, goes on to say, page 398, “This may serve for a specimen of such texts as are usually alleged on the other side of the question; (*viz.* by the Immaterialists) all which will, I believe, appear, even from these short remarks upon them, to be either quite foreign to the point, or purely figurative; or lastly, capable of a clear and easy solution on the principles above-mentioned. Nor can such even fairly be opposed to the constant obvious tenor of the sacred writings, and that number of plain express passages already cited.” Page 400. -- Give me leave, says Dr. Law, to subjoin the sentiments of a very pious and worthy person, eminently skilled in Scripture language, the Rev. Mr. Taylor of Norwich, who is pleased to write as follows: “I have perused your papers, etc. They comprehend two points, one upon *the nature of the human soul or spirit*, so far as revelation give us any light; the other concerning *the state to which death reduces us*. From the collection of scriptures under the first of these points, I think it appears, that no man can prove from Scripture, that the human soul is a principle which lives, and acts, and thinks, independent of the body. Whatever the metaphysical nature, essence, or substance of the soul may be (which is altogether unknown to us) it is demonstratively certain that its existence, both in the manner and duration of it, must be wholly dependent on the will and pleasure of God. God must appoint its connection with, and dependence on any other substance, both in its operations, powers, and duration. All arguments, therefore, for the natural immortality of the soul, taken from the nature of its substance or essence, as if it *must* exist and act separate from the body, because it is of such a substance, etc. are manifestly vain. If indeed we do find anything in the faculties and operations of the mind to which we are conscious, that doth show it is the *will of God* we should exist in the future state, those arguments will stand good. But we can never prove that the soul of man is of such a nature that it can and must exist, live, think, act, and enjoy, etc. separate from and independent of the body. All our present experience shows the contrary. The operations of the mind depend constantly and invariably upon the state of the body, of the brain in particular. If some dying persons have a lively use of their rational faculties to the very last, it is because death has invaded some other part, and the brain remains a sound and vigorous. But what is the sense of REVELATION? You have given a noble collection of texts that show it very clearly. The subject yields many practical remarks, and the warmest and strongest incitements to piety.”

After this extract from Mr. Taylor's letter, Dr. Law closes his appendix in these words: “but it might look like begging the question should I draw out all these in for together with the consequences of this doctrine in regard to either Papist or Deist, till the doctrine itself so long decried by the one, and so often disgraced by the other, shall appear free from the prejudices attending it, and be at last understood to have a fair foundation in Scripture, by which we Protestants profess to be determined: and when we have duly examined them, may possibly discern *that the natural immortality of the human mind, is neither necessarily connected with, nor to a Christian any proper proof of, a future state of rewards and punishments.*

After this, Dr. Law was raised to the See of Carlisle.

Dr. Watson, Bishop of Landaff, published a collection of tracts for the use of young clergyman. The following is an extract from his Preface.

Extract from the preface to a collection of Theological Tracts in six volumes. By Richard Watson, D. D. Bishop of Landaff, and Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, 1785. Dedicated to the Queen.

Page 14, 15 – “Want of genuine moderation towards those who differ from us and religious opinions seems to be the most unaccountable thing in the world. Any man who has any religion at all feels within himself stronger motives to judge right than you can possibly suggest to him; and if he judges wrong, what is that to you? To his own master he standeth or falleth: his wrong judgment, if it affect his own salvation, cannot affect yours! For in the words of Tertullian, *nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio*. Still you will probably rejoin, there must be many truths in the Christian religion, concerning which no one ought to hesitate, and this much is without a belief in them, he cannot be reputed a Christian -- reputed! By whom? By Jesus Christ his Lord and God, or by you? Rash expositors of points of doubtful disputation; intolerant fabricators of metaphysical creeds, and incongruous systems of Theology! Do you undertake to measure the extent of any man's understanding except your own; to estimate the strength and origin of his habits of thinking; to appreciate his merit or demerit in the use of the talent that God has given him, so unerringly, as to pronounce that the belief of this or that doctrine is necessary to *his* salvation?”

Page 16 – “But there are subjects on which the *academicorum epoche* (a) may be admitted, I apprehend, without injuring the foundations of our religion. Such are the questions which relate to the power of evil spirits to suspend the laws of nature, or to actuate the minds of men; *to the materiality or immateriality of the human soul; to the state of the dead before the general resurrection; the resurrection of the same body; the duration of future punishments; and many others of the same kind.*

THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A SEPARATE SOUL HAS GIVEN RISE TO ERRORS AND ABUSES.

The vulgar notion of apparitions -- the worship of Saints -- the doctrine of purgatory until the day of judgment -- prayers for the dead, etc. -- Had the opinion been credited, that when the man dies, he will remain dead till it shall please God at the great day to reanimate him, none of these opinions could have prevailed, nor could any of the abuses founded upon them have existed.

I omit the many difficulties attending this opinion, as -- how is an immaterial and immortal soul corporeally propagated; when did it begin to exist; how would you account for the undeniable marks of memory, intelligence, and volition, in dogs and other brute animals; have *they* souls also; how can the soul act upon matter if it have no property in common with matters; how does the soul differ from the *life* of the body; can you account for the life of a blade of grass by mere matter and motion, any more than the life or intellect of a human being; do not vegetable and animal life depend on organization; what real evidence can be had of a being, which is in no respect the object of any sense we possess, only known by metaphysical conjecture as an hypothesis to account for thought, etc.?

To all this the Immaterialists say that no mode or combination of matter and motion *can* produce thought: and this being impossible, there is an end of the question. But we see life connected with, and arising from a modification of matter and motion as in vegetables; what is life? We see life, sensation, thought, volition, arising from a combination of matter and motion as in elephants, dogs, horses, etc. If phenomena exactly the same kind require a soul in the animal man, so they do when observed in an inferior degree in inferior animals. Where will you stop? Will you assign a soul to an opossum or an

oyster? To a mite or a flea? All this peremptory dictation of what can be or cannot be, with our limited knowledge, appears to me dreadful arrogance!

I call then upon my opponent and I ask him:

From what source of knowledge is it that *you* who know nothing about matter, but some of its properties, and nothing of its essence -- that *you*, who gaining knowledge by your senses only, cannot possibly know anything of spirit which is not cognizable by the senses -- presume to limit the independence of the Almighty and declare that he is not able to endow matter with the properties of thought?

Worm as you are, is Almighty power to be confined within the outline of your metaphysical creed? Are *you* possessed of infinite intelligence and entitled to say to the Creator of the universe, "thus far shall now go and no further?"

Away with your arrogance, and your intolerance -- with your cruel interdictions and denunciations; and permit a fellow creature to be humble with impunity, though *you* disdain to be so!

Appendix On The Clergy

Civil society is intended to promote the mutual happiness of the members of it while they live together here on earth. It does not extend to a future state of existence, which will take place under such regulations as the Almighty may think fit to appoint.

Religion embraces all the motives to good conduct here and all the means of happiness hereafter. Civil society, therefore, has nothing to do with religion but as it tends to mutual happiness while we live together here on earth. Hence, that religion which makes a man the best citizen is the best religion for society. A religion that makes a man cruel, persecuting, and intolerant, is a bad religion for society; and the teachers and preachers of any religion whatever, who are so, are bad men and bad citizens, whether their opinions be true or false. I wish some one would undertake to show how public morals are promoted by the doctrines of death-bed repentance, election, and reprobation, and the final salvation of backsliding saints.

The wise men who framed the American constitutions well knew the truth could only be discovered and placed on a firm basis by permitting free discussion on every subject. If an opinion be erroneous, it requires discussion, that its errors may be exposed: if it be true, it will gain adherents in proportion as it is examined. Is it an opinion so manifestly wrong that every man must see it as so? It can do no harm. Is it so plausible as to be likely to deceive mankind by its semblance to truth? The more need, then, of open and free discussion to expose fully the fallacy of it.

Moreover, as the American legislators well knew the infirmities of human nature, and that no set of men had any pretensions to infallibility, they put all opinions on the same footing as to each other, and left truth to prevail by its own force and intrinsic evidence. In no other country is the wise toleration established by law so complete as in this. But in no country whatever it is a spirit of persecution for mere opinions more prevalent than in the United States of America. It is a country most tolerant in theory and most bigoted in practice. The laws control no man's opinions; they control his conduct only. They guarantee freedom of conscience, of profession, and discussion to every creed and form of worship; the framers of them, well knowing that the result of conflicting opinion and open discussion can only be truth; and that no opinion deserves to be protected which cannot protect itself.

But the clergy of this country – I hope not of all sects, the Calvinist clergy chiefly – are united in persecuting every man who calls in question any of their metaphysical opinions, or who hints at their views of ambition and aggrandizement. They dare not actually stab him or burn him: but they raise the outcry of *mad dog*; they vilify him; they give him nicknames; they hoot at him as infidel, deist, atheist; they set the ignorant upon him to abuse his person, character, and conduct; they treat him with open revilings; they urge him with clandestine falsehoods, and they interdict him as far as possible from all intercourse with society. Then it is they exult, when their secret lies have blasted his character, and their open denunciations have blasted his prospects in society. There are individual exceptions to this picture, but it is faithful as a representation of the body. I know and have felt their unprovoked hostility, and their rancorous combinations. Cowardly and cruel, their machinations are private, and their enmity unforgiving. What earthly reason can a man have to dread discussion but that his opinion will not bear it? What makes men cruel but their cowardice? Calvin procured Servetus to be burnt to death. Whom did Jesus Christ burn? Yet has that gloomy murderer of Geneva more zealots devoted to his intolerant creed in the United States than in any other part of the globe. Why? Because it is a fit instrument in the hands of the clergy in proportion as it is intolerant and unintelligible. Weak minds have a vast opinion of the knowledge of those who pretend to be familiar with truths that appear so mysterious. It is in the fetters of mystery that the priesthood binds and bends the spirit and the consciences of their ignorant hearers. The religion of the Gospel is too plain and simple for their purposes; hence their ardent efforts to establish their own mysterious creed. In what country has it been that the priesthood as a body have not been cruel, and persecuting, dreading contradiction, hating discussion, and holding every doubter as a concealed enemy? They are so here.

Fellow citizens -- The Presbyterians of these States, the Congregationalists, the Seceders, and in some places the Baptists, dragging after them the timid Episcopalians, have combined and for many years have been steadily prosecuting the following schemes, with a perseverance and devotedness worthy of a better cause.

They are steadily aiming at a CHURCH ESTABLISHMENT; at an alliance between church and state; so as to bring the civil power in aid of their own plans of aggrandizement.

They are steadily aiming in their pamphlets and their preachings to establish the religious obligation of paying TITHES of all you possess; in strong hopes of procuring the system to be established also by law. This will render them not only wealthy, but independent of their congregations, whom they consider as by right dependent upon them; assuming openly the character of God's vice-regents, and branding all opposition to their ambitious designs as blasphemy. They are steadily aiming to obtain the entire control of every seminary of EDUCATION throughout the United States; claiming the exclusive superintendence of them as a matter of right. This is done with a view of infusing into the minds of the rising generation an implicit reverence for the priesthood, and an attachment to the views and interests of the priesthood.

They look with a jealous eye at every *scientific* discussion; prohibiting, so far as they dare, all investigations that do not harmonize with their own theological creed. Their interference has been recent and violent with respect to physiological, zoological, and geological discussions. No printer, no editor of a scientific journal, bear insert and article in favor of any opinion which the clergy have pronounced heterodox. Fanaticism has completely clipped the wings of science in this country. They have organized a stupendous scheme of raising a PECUNIARY FUND to uphold their pretensions by picking the pockets of the people under some or under all of the following pretenses.

The *educating* of pious young men (as they are called) to the ministry. That is, taking those who ought to be tillers of the ground, and hiring them, by theological education, as slaves for life to the propagation of those tenets by which the interest and the views of these sects are best promoted. After having been less educated, *apparently* at the expense of these sectarians, and *really* by means of the funds extracted from the folly, the indolence, the timidity, or the good nature of the public, they hold themselves bound to the doctrines and interests of their preceptors, and become the standing army of the Church militant. The

establishment of *missionary* societies, to furnish the East Indians, the American Indians, the Australasians, and the Africans, with parsons, who can neither speak the language of their hearers, or make themselves understood. The subscribers to these institutions seldom or never look after the sums they subscribe, which are under the absolute control of these manufacturers of missionaries; whose object is not missionaries, so much as men devoted to their interests, when they shall come out in favor of a Church establishment and tithes.

Societies to make *ministers of individual congregations* trustees for life of these missionary societies; and of course, to have a voice in disposing of the sums thus elicited from the people's pockets. What the missionaries are, and how they live when they can get the means, I hope someone will show by exhibiting the style of luxury of the Serampoor missionaries.

Prayer Meeting Societies, which, by means of the weak and credulous females who attend them, furnish the priests with a sure source of influence and information over the domestic concerns of every family.

Female benevolent and missionary societies; female mite societies; for no sum is too small for their acceptance; *Juvenile* societies of children, who are cajoled out of their six cent and twelve cent pieces; cheated out of their gingerbread money, to give to institutions of which they hardly know the name. No sum is too small for acceptance, and no plan too mean to acquire it. *Missionary fields* of corn, wheat and potatoes; missionary hog societies; missionary rag-bag societies, and missionary scrap societies. All means of scraping together money, the most trifling and contemptible, are employed by these men: not individually, but corporately, and *en masse*.

But their most profitable concern is that of becoming authors, printers, and booksellers. Composing, praising, recommending religious tracts, sermons, and almanacs. The Bible Society, interfering with the regular printing trade, cannot have less than 150,000 engaged, which brings a good interest to the persons who conduct it.

Such are the means of satisfying the cravings for *Money, Money, Money* employed by this ambitious, avaricious, and crafty set of men. In all other respects they are more devoid of useful knowledge than any other class of persons in the community. But they act in concert: they have thrown their fetters over the minds of the people -- they have cowed the spirit of the community -- the literary classes are compelled to succumb to them -- they look forward to the day when they show government of the Union in their own manner, and in meantime, take good care to plunge their hands deep in the pockets of those whom they can flatter or frighten into acquiescence and submission.

If the people do not keep the CLERGY under control they will bring the people into abject slavery and keep them there. In every nation upon earth they have done so; what should change their character here? It is in the year 1822, that the clergy of Austria have persuaded the monarch over 40 millions of people to say, "I want no men of science, I want only obedient subjects. I want no education among my subjects but what is given by the priesthood." Look at the priesthood in France, Spain, Italy, Mexico, even in England: is not their general character one and the same? Already has the religious arrogance of this order of men tempted them to assume the character of God's immediate agents and viceregents -- placed at an immense distance from the herd of inferior beings who compose their congregations. Look at New York and Philadelphia papers for instance. "BY DIVINE PERMISSION, on such a day the Rev. Mr. A. will perform divine service at such a place." Latterly (that is, within a few months) this style of annunciation has not been so frequent; but for a twelvemonth it was quite the fashion.

In what part of the New Testament has Christ said you cannot approach the Father but through the agency of men divinely commissioned from among you for the purpose and well paid for their services? Has he not said where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of you? And yet these men scruple not to declare that any religious exhortation by a layman, any usurpation of the functions usually performed by a hired and paid priest, is not only in proper and indefensible but a SIN!

And Dr. Ashbel Green, of Princeton, has recently denounced such persons as presumptuous and sinful intruders on the rights of the priesthood! They claim it as a *right* to be exclusively hired and well paid; and we patiently submit to it! As if the God of love, the kind Father and preserver of the human race, were a gloomy haughty tyrant, not to be approached but through the intervention of these arrogant ministers of state, who take good care to be remunerated for their intercession.

I have no objection to a ministry appointed as a convenient and expedient class of men that the religious business of a district may be conducted decently and in order; but upon no other ground. And although I should prefer well educated and liberal men for this purpose, I see no reason for giving them an exclusive preference. In the purest times of Christianity the elders of the church transacted the religious business of it. Do Jesus Christ choose his disciples whom he nominated to preach the gospel from among the learned and the wise? Mankind are pestered with the *rights of the priesthood*! Rights! What rights? Who pays them, who supports them? Who enables these drones in the hive to fatten on the labors of the industrious bee? Who seem to glory in being ignorant of all useful knowledge, and skills only in the quarrelsome questions and senseless jargon of the metaphysical divinity.

It is the idleness, the pride, the aristocracy of rank and wealth, that has rendered a priesthood necessary. People are too indolent or timid to pray for themselves, and they hire a priest to pray for them! Then too their ears must be tickled by eloquent discourses; as if religion needed eloquence to enforce it! Surely all this is not necessarily and essentially religion! Fellow citizens, you aid these imposters to cheat you by making them necessary to you. Let them know they are your servants; let them know that you hire them and you pay them; and they will not be a whit the less pious for being more humble.

These views of the subject are well worth your consideration. The priesthood in every age, in every country, forbid discussion, frowned down all investigation; they require, like other tyrants, passive obedience and non-resistance. They denounce every man who opposes their views: not merely their spiritual, but their temporal views. Their intent here, as elsewhere, is to fetter your minds first, and your bodies afterwards; and finally, to command your pockets.

It is high time to warn the people that their liberties are in danger; that they are about to be undermined by crafty, persevering, insidious foe in the imposing guard of a heavenly friend. It is high time to call upon the honest citizens of this yet free country and to sound the watchword,

Blow ye the trumpet in Zion!

Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, December 11, 1823.

TO DR. THOMAS COOPER

MONTICELLO, DEC. 11, 1823.

DEAR SIR:

I duly received your favor of the 23rd ult. as also the two pamphlets you were so kind as to send me. That on the tariff, I observed, was soon reprinted in *Ritchie's Enquirer*. I was only sorry he did not postpone it to the meeting of Congress, when it would have got into the hands of all the members, and could not fail to have great effect, perhaps a decisive one. It is really an extraordinary proposition that the agricultural, mercantile, and navigating classes should be taxed to maintain that of manufacturers.

That the doctrine of Materialism was that of Jesus himself was a new idea to me. Yet it *is proved unquestionably*. We all know it was that of some of the early Fathers. I hope the physiological part will follow; in spite of the prevailing fanaticism, reason will make its way. I confess that its reign at present is appalling. General education is the true remedy, and that most happily is now generally encouraged. The story you mention as gotten up by your opponents, of my having advised the Trustees of our University to turn you out as Professor, is quite in their style of barefaced mendacity. They find it so easy to obliterate the reason of mankind that they think they may enterprise safely on his memory also; for it was the winter before the last only, that our annual report to the Legislature, printed in the newspapers, stated the precise ground on which we relinquished your engagement with our Central College. And, if my memory does not deceive me, it was your own proposition that, the time of our setting into operation being postponed indefinitely, it was important to you not to lose an opportunity of fixing yourself permanently; and that they should father on me too, the motion for this dismissal, than whom no man living cherishes a higher estimation of your worth, talents, and information. But so the world goes. Man is fed with fables through life, leaves it in the belief that he has known something of what has been passing, when in truth he has known nothing but what has passed under his own eye. And who are the great deceivers? Those who solemnly pretend to be the depositories of the sacred truths of God himself! I will not believe that the liberality of the State to which you are rendering services of science which no other man in the Union is qualified to render it will suffer you to be in danger from a set of conjurers.

I note what you say of Mr. Finch; but the moment of our Commencement is as indefinite as it ever was. Affectionately and respectfully,

Yours,

TH. JEFFERSON

Mr. Jefferson was not aware of that Materialism is the real doctrine of Jesus Christ until I sent him the preceding tract: See his letter to W. Short. April 13, 1820, in the fourth volume of his correspondence, page 320. "But while this syllabus is meant to place the character of Jesus in its true light as no imposter himself, but a great reformer of the Hebrew code of religion, it is not meant to be understood that I am with him and all his doctrines. I am a MATERIALIST; he takes the side of SPIRITUALISM," etc. etc. See also his letter to Mr. J. Adams, August 15, 1820, same volume, p. 331, 332.

“When once we quit of the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of IMMATERIAL existence is to talk of NOTHINGS. To say that the human Soul, Angels, God, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no God, no Angels, no Soul. I cannot reason otherwise. But I believe I am supported in my creed of Materialism by the LOCKES, the TRACYS, the STEWARTS. At what age of the Christian Church is heresy of IMMATERIALISM or masked Atheism crept in, I do not exactly know; but a heresy it certainly is. Jesus TAUGHT nothing of it. He said, indeed, God is a Spirit, but he has not defined what spirit is, nor has he said it is not MATTER, etc. See also letter to J. Adams, April 11, 1823 – p. 364.

This syllabus he mentions in his letter to W. Short was a brief view of the character, etc. summary of the doctrines, theological and moral, of Jesus Christ, taken from *his own expressions*. It was first sent, I believe, to Dr. Rush. It is worthy of notice how careful he was that it should not get abroad among the public, owing to the rancorous hatred with which he was pursued during a great part of his most useful life by the clergy. It is a melancholy to think that such a man should have reason to fear the publication of such a work in this *enlightened* country! *Pudet haec approbria nobis et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli!*

A View of the Metaphysical And Physiological Arguments In Favor Of Materialism

A VIEW OF THE
METAPHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL
ARGUMENTS
IN FAVOR OF
MATERIALISM

FIRST PUBLISHED AT WARRINGTON, ENGLAND, IN

1781.

BY THOMAS COOPER, M.D.

Grant us day light and fair play. *Homer's Iliad* p. 646.

RE-PUBLISHED WITH SOME ALTERATIONS,
AND SOLD BY A. SMALL,
PHILADELPHIA,
1823.

THESE PAGES
ARE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
TO THE MEDICAL GENTLEMEN OF THE
UNITED STATES,
AS THE MOST COMPETENT JUDGES OF THE
ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN THEM

ON THE SOUL

THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE SEPARATE EXISTENCE OF AN IMMATERIAL SOUL JOINED WITH AND PLACED IN THE HUMAN BODY IS AS FOLLOWS.

Man consists of a body, which, when living, exhibits a peculiar organization, and certain phenomena connected with it, termed intellectual; such as perception, memory, thinking or reasoning, and willing or determining. When the body ceases to live, it becomes decomposed into carbon, azote, hydrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and lime; and perhaps another substance or two: all of them similar to what we find in the inanimate material bodies around us. We differ from them, so far as we can judge by our senses, in no way, but in possessing a peculiar organization which those bodies have not. But as no configuration or disposition of the particles of which our bodies are composed can amount to anything more than varieties of position -- varieties of matter and motion, we have no reason to ascribe perception, memory, thought, or will, to any form of matter and motion, however varied. From matter and motion, nothing but matter and motion can result. The phenomena of intellect are too dissimilar to allow us to consider them as the result of, or as varieties of, matter and motion. We must, therefore, recur to some other principle as the source of intellect; and that cannot be the body. It must be something different from mere matter and motion, something immaterial, something that has no relation to matter: that something, be it a separate being, or a separate principle, is the Soul. Will any arrangement of carbon, azote, hydrogen and oxygen, produce a syllogism? Having no relation to matter, being essentially immaterial, this source of intellect is not, like matter, liable to decomposition and decay: it is therefore immortal: it dies not when the body dies. It puts a future state, therefore, out of doubt, for it lives when the body is no more.

Such are the views generally taken of this question by those who believe in the separate existence of an immaterial *Soul* as the cause and origin of all the phenomena termed mental or intellectual. With them, it is absurd to ascribe the sublime fictions of poetry, or the sublimer disquisitions of Newton and La Place, to a mere arrangement of assimilated particles of the grossest kind; possessing, before their entrance into the body, and when thrown by the exhalent vessels out of it, nothing approaching the nature of intellect under any of its denominations. In the present view of the subject, all arguments of a theological nature are excluded. They can be considered apart: and they are to the full as difficult of solution as the arguments deduced from natural phenomena; and are productive of as much practical discrepancy.

The Immaterialists of modern days are led on still further. They say that the tendency to organization itself, and all the results of that tendency, must have been originally imparted and communicated to inert matter, which could not have assumed this tendency by any effort of its own. That organization, life, and the properties connected with life, as feeding, digestion, assimilation, excretion, &c. as well as the phenomena termed intellectual, cannot arise from any known property of matter as such; and therefore must have been originally impressed by that Being to whom all creation is to be ascribed. That the phenomena termed intellectual are clearly distinguishable from the other phenomena of living organized matter -- they are peculiar to the human species -- not to be accounted for from the common properties of organization or life, and are therefore owing to a separate and distinct communication from the author of our common existence. That not being ascribable to any form of organization, or to be regarded as the result of it, they must of necessity be ascribed to some separate being of a different and superior nature from matter; destined during the present life to act by means of the bodily organs. This separate being is the *Soul*. It is granted that we are not to argue from the possibility of anything to its actual existence, (*a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*,) but when the phenomena cannot be explained by any known

properties of organized or unorganized matter, we are of necessity driven to something else than --something beside matter -- something which is not matter, to explain appearances that are not material.

I do not know how to state better, more fairly, or more forcibly, the views taken of this question by the writers who contend for the separate existence of the Soul, as a being perfectly immaterial, and by consequence incorruptible and immortal.

ON THE OTHER HAND

The *Materialists*, who ascribe all the phenomena termed intellectual to the body; and consider them as the properties of an organized matter, the result of that organization – reason as follows:

Their arguments may be considered as (1) *Metaphysical*, and (2) *Physiological*.

To begin with the FIRST class:

1. The only reason we have for asserting in any case that one thing is a property of another is the certainty or universality with which we always find them accompanying each other. Thus we say gold is ductile because we have always found gold, when pure, to be so. We assert that manure will nourish a plant – that muscular fibers are irritable – that the nerves are the instruments of sensation, &c. for the same reason. Let the reader sit down and describe a mineral by its characters, and he will have no doubt of the truth of this assertion.

Moreover, finding by experience that every thing we see has some *cause* of its existence, we are induced to ascribe the constant concomitance of a substance and any of its properties to some necessary connection between them. Hence, therefore, *certainty and universality of concomitance is the sole ground of asserting or supposing a necessary connection between two phenomena*. And we cannot help believing that like consequences will invariably follow like antecedents under like circumstances. For this we reason: if two circumstances, or things, always present themselves to our observation accompanying each other – the one always preceding, the other always following – there must be some reason in the nature of things why it should be so.

There is a necessary connection between such a structure as the nervous system in animals and the property of sensation, or as it is often called, PERCEPTION⁵ -- the property of feeling, of being conscious of impressions made upon our senses. For there is precisely the same reason for making this assertion as there can be for any other the most incontestable; namely, the certainty and universality wherewith (in a healthy state of the system) we observe perception and the nervous system accompany each other. The seat of perception, so far as we know from the facts of anatomy and physiology, is situated at the internal sentient extremity of the nerve impressed. But be it there or elsewhere, as it manifestly belongs to the nervous system, that is sufficient for the purpose. It must be somewhere. Let the reader, according to his best judgment from known facts, place it where he thinks fit, and it will equally serve the purposes of my argument. Perception, sensation, feeling, consciousness of impressions (for all these terms have been used synonymously; I prefer the first) is a property of the nervous apparatus belonging to animal bodies in health and life. When the sentient extremities of nerves are excited or impressed, perception is the certain instantaneous result, as surely as the peculiar weight, color, ductility, and affinities of gold are the result of gold when obtained pure. These properties are inseparable. You must define gold *by* them: in like manner, you must define the properties of the nervous system by perception – sensation.

I consider this argument as conclusive; unless it can be shown *how* perception results necessarily from something distinct from, and independent of the nervous system; or that, whether this can be shown or not, the assertion that perception does so result implies a contradiction, and therefore is at all events inadmissible. As to the *how* – the mode and manner in which perception results from the stimulation of the nervous system – how or why it is, as we see it to be, a function of the brain – no one can pretend to

show or to explain; any more than we can show or explain how an immaterial soul can act on a material body without having one property in common with it. In the first case we feel in ourselves, and we know by observing others, that perception, feeling, or consciousness is a function of that visible organ; but of the existence of a separate soul, we know nothing except by conjecture. We know that irritability and contractility are properties of the muscular fiber, but beyond the mere fact of it being thus, we know nothing. Can we explain the life and growth of a blade of grass?

That certainty and universality of concomitance is the sole ground for asserting a necessary connection between two phenomena, or that the one is the result of the other, is so true that if this be false, no argument from induction can possibly be true: for all proofs from induction imply the truth of this. And as no direct contradiction has ever been attempted to be shown in the assertion that perception is the result of organization – as the matter of fact, so far as our senses can judge, is plainly so – and as no immaterialist has ever yet pretended to account *how* perception results from an immaterial rather than a material substance – there is nothing more requisite to prove that perception is really and truly the result of our organization.

The argument then stands thus: Certainty and universality of concomitance between two or more phenomena are the only direct reasons we have for asserting or supposing a necessary connection between them. The property of perception and a sound state of the nervous system under excitation are certainly and universally concomitant. Therefore this concomitance furnishes the only direct reason we have for asserting a necessary connection between perception and the nervous system. But this reason is the same that we have for asserting a necessary connection between any other phenomena whatever. Therefore we have the same reason for asserting a necessary connection between the property of perception and a sound state of the nervous system as for asserting the same thing of any other phenomena whatever.

It will be understood, of course, that the nervous system must be excited before the excitement can be perceived; and whether we adopt Hume's phraseology or that of Dr. T. Brown in his Treatise on Cause and Effect, the argument will be exactly the same. In all cases, where the necessary connection between two phenomena is such that the one is denominated a *property* and the other the *subject* of which the first thing is the property, the property is universally deemed to result necessarily from the nature or essence of the subject to which it belongs. But as perception must be a property of something; and as it is uniformly connected with a sound state of the nervous system, perception is a property of that system, and results necessarily from the nature of essence thereof.

Such is the proper and direct proof of the doctrine of *Materialism*; which, so far as I am acquainted with the controversy, REMAINS UNANSWERED. But this doctrine will receive additional support if the opposite doctrine of *Immaterialism* can be shown impossible or improbable. I shall endeavor to do both.

Of the Impossibility of the Existence of an Immaterial, Indiscernible, Immortal Soul.

2 – (a) The Soul hath *all* the properties of matter and no other; or it hath some properties in *common* with matter, and some that matter hath not; or it hath *no* property in common with matter.

In the first case, it is matter, and nothing else.

In the second case, it is partially material.

In the third case, it is in no respect of degree material. This the last case is the only one of the alternatives that the hypothesis of Immaterialism can consistently maintain; for in so far as the soul is material, it will be discernible, mortal, and corruptible, as matter is.

(b) But let the Soul have no property in common with matter. Then I say: Nothing can act upon another but by means of some common property. Of this we have not only all the proof that induction of known and acknowledged cases can furnish, but that the additional proof also which arises from the impossibility of conceiving how the opposite proposition can be true. You cannot erect the Coliseum at Rome by playing Hayden's Rondeau. You cannot impel a ray of light by the mace of a billiard table, and so on. This proposition is every where admitted or assumed in treatises on natural philosophy.

But by the proposition, that the Soul hath no property in common with matter. Whereas by universal acknowledgement of Immaterialists, the Soul acts upon and by means of the material body: and therefore the hypothesis involving this contradiction must fall to the ground.

3.(a) Whatever we know. We know by means of its properties, nor do we in any case know certainly any thing but these. Gold is heavy, yellow, ductile, soluble in aqua regia, &c. Suppose gold deprived for an instant of all these properties – what remains, would it be gold? If it have other properties, it is another substance; if it have no properties remaining, it is nothing; for nothing is that which hath no properties. Hence, if any thing lose all its properties, it becomes nothing; it loses its existence.

(b) Now the existence of the soul is inferred like the existence of everything else, from its supposed properties, which are the intellectual phenomena of the human being, perception,⁶ memory, judgment, volition. But in all cases of *perfect* sleep – of the operation of a strong narcotic -- of apoplexy – of swooning – of drowning where the vital powers are not extinguished – of the effects of a violent blow on the back of the head – and all other leipothymic affections – there is neither perception, memory, judgment or volition; that is, all the properties of the Soul are gone, are extinguished; therefore the Soul itself loses its existence for the time; all evidence and traces of its existence are lost; *pro hac vice*, therefore, and during the continuance of these derangements of the nervous system, the Soul is dead, for all its properties are actually extinguished. The Soul, therefore, is not immortal, and of consequence it is not immaterial.

(c) This disappearance of all intellectual phenomena in consequence of the derangement of the nervous apparatus of the human system is easily accounted for if they be considered (as the Materialists consider them) no other than phenomena dependent upon the nervous system in its usual state of excitement by impressions *ab extra*, or motions dependent on the sensitive surfaces of the internal viscera, and on association originating *ab intra*. On this view of the subject, all is natural and explicable. But if these intellectual phenomena are the evidences and properties of a separate immaterial being (the Soul) then comes the insuperable difficulty – where is the subject itself when all its properties, all evidence of its existence, are annihilated; though but for a day or an hour. A materialist can easily account for returning animation by renewed excitement from the unsuspended action of the functions of organic life.

4. No laws of reasoning will free us from the bondage imposed by matters of fact. It is impossible to deny that all these intellectual phenomena, these peculiar properties of an immaterial Soul, these only evidences of its existence, are also properties of the body: for where there is no nervous apparatus, as in vegetables, they never appear; nor do they appear in the embryo or the infant till the encephalon is developed; where the nervous system is deranged by violence or by disease or by medicine, these phenomena are also deranged, and even disappear; when the body dies and the nervous system with it, all these phenomena cease, and are irrevocably gone; we never possess after death, so far as our senses can inform us, the slightest evidence of the existence of any remaining being which, connected with the body during life, is separated from it at death. This may be asserted, but there is not one solitary fact to prove it: when the body dies, no more perception, no more memory, no more volition. So far as we can see, these die with the body, and exhibit no proof of their subsequent existence. These phenomena are

phenomena of the body: if they be also phenomena of the Soul, then is the Soul also, like the body, material, for it has properties in common.

(b) If it be said the Soul may exist after the body is dead and decomposed, I reply, the Soul may also not exist: one supposition is as good as the other. Remember, it is not allowable in fair argument to take for granted the existence of a thing merely because it may possibly exist. If you assert its existence, you must prove your assertion. *Affirmantis est probare. A posse ad esse non valet consequentia.*

(c) If any one shall say these properties are only suspended for the time, I would desire him to examine what idea he annexes to this suspension; whether it be anything more or less than *they are made not to exist for the time*. Either no more is meant, or it is plainly opposed to matter of fact. Moreover if more be meant, it may easily be proved to involve the archetypical existence of abstract ideas; to approach the Platonic absurdities modified by the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, which, I apprehend, will not be considered defensible at this day. It can also be shown that such ulterior meaning will contradict the maxim *impossible est idem esse et non esse*. It will involve the grammatical absurdity of making a noun adjective stand by itself.

(d) If any one shall say farther, “These mental phenomena are not constituent parts, but acts of the soul, and evidences of its existence; so that the soul may continue to exist when it no longer continues to act, or to act in this manner – that it does not follow that a man’s power of working is annihilated because he has lost the tools or instruments with which he has usually worked.” – I reply: 1. That whenever the evidences of the existence of a thing arise from the nature and structure of the thing itself, they are synonymous with its properties. Such are the phenomena of thinking with respect to the Soul: they are confessedly of its very essence. I cannot give a plainer illustration than I have already given; let my reader, if he be a mineralogist, sit down and describe a mineral; and then let him suppose all its characters annihilated. 2. As these intellectual phenomena are *all* the evidences we have of the Soul’s existence, when these are destroyed or extinguished, so is the conclusion drawn from them. When all the evidences of *life* fail, no one scruples to say that life itself is gone. 3. The instruments with which a man usually works are only *a small part of, not all* the evidences of his power of working. Were he to lose his senses, and his hands, and his powers of volition, and of voluntary motion, which are also conjoint evidences of his power of working, every one would say he had lost that power; that is, it no longer existed. 4. It is equally legitimate to assert of gold, for instance, that what are termed its essential and characteristic properties are nothing more than acts and evidences of the existence of the substance gold, which *may* continue to exist, notwithstanding it no longer continues to exhibit any of those phenomena which are termed its properties, but are in fact only temporary evidences of its existence. Would any reasonable man acknowledge the justness of such an argument? 5. If this conclusion *a posse ad esse – a potentia ad actum* – from the remotest of all possibilities of existence, be allowed – then can any thing whatever be proved to exist in despite of all proof to the contrary. Would not a physician regard that man as a lunatic who was seriously to say of a putrid dead body before them: “to be sure, none of the actions which are evidence of life are exhibited at present, but life may exist notwithstanding?”

5 – (a) All relative terms imply the existence of their correlates: a man cannot be a father without having a child, a husband without a wife, &c. Hence when either of two relatives cease to exist, the other does likewise.

(b) All those ideas which make up our idea of the Soul, or in other words, all those properties from whence we infer its existence, are relative; their correlates are ideas. Thus there can be no *perception* without ideas to be perceived; no *recollection* without ideas to be remembered; no *judgment* without ideas to be compared; no *volition* without ideas of the object on which it is exerted.

(c) Locke has shown that we have no innate ideas; that all our ideas are ideas of sensation or reflection; and that the idea of reflection are no other than the operations of the mind on our ideas of sensation: that is, all our ideas proceed from, and are founded on the impressions made upon our senses.⁷ The doctrine

of the ancient school was the same, *nil unquam fuit in intellectu, quod non prius erat in sensu*, including the internal as well as the external senses; which is not the less true for being acknowledged as true by the wisest men of antiquity.^{8 9} I am aware of the “faculties of the mind,” the numberless brood of the Scotch metaphysicians. I cannot and will not condescend to reply to the dreadful nonsense on this subject assumed as true by Dr. Reid and Dr. Beattie, or to the shallow sophisms of Dr. Gregory, or the prolix pages of inanity of Dr. Dugald Stewart, or the ignorant hardihood of assertion of Dr. Barclay in his late inquiry. We are all before the public, and I am content. In the meantime, let the reader ask himself how he could acquire ideas of vision without the eye and its apparatus – of odor without the nostrils – of taste without the papillae on the tongue and palate, &c. Let him say what ideas a man could have, all those senses were entirely wanting. This is enough.

In fact, people begin to doubt whether a man can by any possibility receive satisfactory evidence of the existence of anything whatever, not cognizable by any of the human senses.

(d) But if all our ideas proceed from impressions made on our senses, as these are entirely corporeal, we never could have attained ideas without the body; that is, there would have been none of the phenomena of perception, recollection, judgment, or volition without the body; that is, there would have been none of those phenomena of thinking from whence we deduce the existence of the Soul – none of the properties of the Soul, without the body: in other words, there would have been no Soul without the body. So that the commencement of the existence of the Soul depends on the commencement of the existence of the body. Such is matter of fact.

(e) But the Immaterialists say that the Soul is distinct from and independent of the body as to its existence; hence, it is both dependent and independent of the body; that is, it does not exist, for contradictions cannot co-exist.

The Immortality, a parte ante, of the Soul, being null, let us examine its Immortality a parte post.

6. (a) All impressions made on our senses can be traced up to the internal sentient extremity of the nerve impressed, and no further.

(b) When an impression has been made on our senses by means of external objects, we have the property of perceiving the effects of that impression at a distance of time, and after the original impression has ceased. This is *memory* and *recollection*. Hence, although all our ideas have been caused by impressions made on our senses originally, we may lose one or two of our senses, and yet remember the ideas which are the effect of the impressions formerly made on them.

(c) But ideas can no more be remembered without the nervous system than they could have been caused originally without the senses. All this is plain matter of fact.

(d) At death, however, not only all our senses are destroyed (the only source of original ideas), but the nervous system itself is destroyed, which is the *sine qua non* to the existence of ideas already caused. At death, therefore, all our ideas of every kind are destroyed.

(e) But there can be none of the properties of the Soul without ideas; for these are relates and correlates; and if all the properties of the Soul are destroyed, the Soul itself is destroyed.

(f) Therefore whatever may be the case during life of the body, the Soul did not exist previous thereto, and is destroyed when that is destroyed.

(g) And when it is considered that many circumstances during the life of the body may totally destroy for a time all the properties of the Soul, the little of existence that remains is hardly worth contending for.

(h) But when it is further considered that the natural immortality of the Soul is supposed a necessary consequence of its immateriality, it will be a necessary consequence that this immaterial soul does not exist at all.

6. If the Soul exist at all, it must exist somewhere, for it is impossible to frame to one's self an idea of any thing existing which exists nowhere, and yet whose operations are limited as to space.

(b) But if the Soul exist somewhere, by the terms it occupies space, and therefore is extended, and therefore has figure or shape in common with matter.

(c) Moreover by the supposition of every Immaterialist (except Malbranche, Leibniz, and Berkley) the Soul acts upon the body, that is upon matter. That is, it attracts and repels, and is attracted and repelled, for there is no conceivable affection of matter but what is founded upon and reducible to attraction and repulsion. If it be attracted and repelled, its reaction must be attraction and repulsion. This implies solidity.

(d) The Soul then possesses extension, figure, solidity, attraction, repulsion. But these comprise all the properties by which matter is characterized, and the Soul therefore, whatever else it is, is a material being.

(e) But it cannot be both material and immaterial at the same time, and therefore it does not exist.

7. Those truths which we derive from the evidence of our senses, carefully observed and sufficiently repeated, are more weighty than such as are mere deductions of reason and argument. If I feel that by beating a large stone with my fist I shall hurt my knuckles, I cannot doubt of that after a sufficient number of trials. If I find that a large quantity of strong wine will render me intoxicated, I cannot disbelieve the result of experience. I *see* that the mental phenomena are in fact connected with the organization of the human body by means of the nervous system which is a part of it. I know by observation and experience that if you destroy that part of the nervous system which supplies any one of the organs of sense, as the optic nerve of the eye, the organs of that sense no longer supply me with the same feelings as before. All this is a matter of fact ascertainable in the same way that we ascertain the effect of a bottle of Madeira, by the use of our senses. About all this we can no more doubt than about our existence. But what evidence can we possibly have of the existence of the Soul? It is not cognizable by any of our senses – by any of the common inlets of knowledge – it is, by the hypothesis, immaterial, it hath no relation to matter. By the very nature of it, we can have no sensible proof of its existence. It is an hypothesis, a supposed being, introduced to account for appearances manifestly connected with our bodily organs, which so far as we know cannot take place without them, whether there be a soul or not. This connection we see, hear, feel, and know to exist, though we do not exactly know how to trace it. But the Soul has no existence for our senses – it is a being whose existence is assumed because the present state of knowledge does not enable us (perhaps) to account for the precise mode of connection between intelligence and our nervous system. I shall by and by show that we are just as much at a loss to account for the growth of a blade of grass, or the life of a tree, as for the reasoning of an animal.

But let the reader reflect a moment, and ask himself if this hypothetical introduction of an immaterial soul to solve the difficulties that our inevitable ignorance produces be not a manifest breach of the acknowledged axiom *a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*? A mere refuge for present ignorance of a connection which future knowledge may or may not unravel.

A THEORY explains unknown facts by the laws and properties of known facts. Newton applied the cause which makes a stone fall to the earth to the tendency of the planets toward the sun. Here was nothing new assumed to aid the reasoning. Had he said that as it was impossible to explain the tendency of the planets toward the sun by any properties of the planets or the sun, and therefore it must be owing to some angel whose duty it was to impel the planets in their proper direction, this would have been HYPOTHESIS: just like our notions of the Soul to account for the phenomena of the body.

So that we not only have no direct and satisfactory evidence of the existence of the Soul, and from the presumed nature of it never can have, but the clear, direct, undeniable evidence of our senses is all the other way.

Is it not singular, moreover, that we cannot talk about this immaterial soul, its existence, its properties, its mode of action, but in language suggested by and borrowed from the bodily senses? Can we think or speak of immaterial beings in any other words or expressions than those which our senses have suggested to us, and which belong to our corporeal senses alone?

“I see” (says Mr. Hallet, in his discourses) “a man move, and hear him speak for some years. From his speech, I certainly infer that he *thinks* as I do. I see, then, that a man is a being who thinks and acts. After some time, the man falls down in my sight, grows cold and stiff. He speaks and acts no more. As the only reason I had to believe that he did think was his motion and speech, so now that they cease, I have lost the only way I had of proving that he had the power of thought. Upon this sudden death, the one visible thing, the one man, is greatly changed. Whence could I infer that the same *he* consists of two parts, and that the inward part continues to live and think, and flies away from the body, while the outward part ceases to live and move? It looks as if the *whole man* was one, and that all his powers cease at the same time. So far as I can discern, his motion and thought die together.

“The powers of thought, speech, and motion equally depend on the body, and run the same fate in case of men’s declining old age. When a man dies of old age, I see his powers of motion and thought decay and die together, and each of them by degrees:¹⁰ the moment he ceases to move and breathe, he appears to cease to think too.

“When I am left to mere reason, it seems to me that my power of thought depends as much on my body as my power of sight and hearing. I could not think in infancy. My powers of thought, of sight, and of feeling are equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on the head has deprived a man of thought who could yet see, and feel, and move. So that naturally the power of thinking seems to belong as much to the body as any power of men whatsoever. Naturally, there appears no more reason to suppose a man can *think* out of the body than that he can hear sounds or feel cold out of the body.”

If this be the case (which cannot be denied) – if there neither be in fact, nor from the nature of the thing ever can be any direct evidence for the existence of an immaterial, distinct, independent soul – still further, if all the direct and positive evidence that there can be of any thing whatever, all that the present case can in the nature of it admit, is *against* the existence of such a soul – how strong, how absolutely irrefragable, how evident ought that reasoning to be by which its existence is inferred! Even the possibility of its being fairly and honestly disputed is a strong presumption against its conclusiveness. Who can fairly and honestly dispute the dependence of thought on the body?

8. I apprehend all the phenomena termed mental or intellectual are explicable as phenomena of the body. Hartley, and Destut Tracey, the one in his first volume on Man, and the other in his *Ideologie*, have done it to my satisfaction. I cannot enter into their reasonings; they must speak for themselves. The public by and by will give to these authors that fair play which the orthodoxy of the moment will not concede to them.

9. We have not the slightest proof of any kind that ideas can arise or can exist independently of corporeal organization. We have never known them to so exist. We know not, nor have we from facts the slightest reason to believe that they can. But the Soul itself has been invented to account for them. They are (by those who believe in a separate Soul) considered as essential to that being – the peculiar property and result of the Soul’s operations. But where is the proof that ideas can exist in the Soul without the body? Where is thought when body dies? Where was thought before the body began to exist? *De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*. All assertions are equally true concerning that which doth not exist, and that of whose existence there is no evidence.

Such are the arguments of an abstract and metaphysical nature on which I ground my opinion that an immaterial, immortal Soul, separate from the body, does not and cannot exist: and it appears to me, from what has been said, that there is the same proof for the truth of the doctrine of *Materialism* as that gold is heavy, ink black, water fluid, or any other indubitable assertion. Also, that there is the same proof that the opposite doctrine *cannot* be true, as that contradictory assertions cannot be both true.

I come now to a class of arguments that assume a physiological rather than a metaphysical character. But before I enter upon this branch of the subject, I beg leave to state some physiological propositions relating to the animal system that bear upon the subject in question.

The objects around us have been conveniently classed into the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. The particles of bodies whereof each kind of substance is composed have peculiar active properties, by which they arrange themselves, when free from the obstacle of pressure by foreign bodies, into some peculiar form.

The particles of a *mineral* substance, when they have full time and room to arrange themselves according to their respective propensities, assume certain figures, usually prismatic, of which the number of sides, and size of the angles, are determined within certain limits by the chemical constitution of the mineral in question. Hence the determination of a mineralogical species has within these twenty years been made to rest on the form of a crystal, particularly by the mineralogists of the French school. The general fact is indubitable, but the limitations and the precise relations between chemical composition and the figure of the mineral nucleus have not yet been accurately determined.

Minerals increase in size by the crystallization of adventitious particles round a crystallized nucleus, producing secondary forms; but they do not devour, decompose, digest, assimilate, secrete, excrete, grow, and propagate. They do not seem to have any property to which the term *life* can fairly be applied, or to suffer any thing like what we call *death*; although it is impossible to doubt that they are endowed with active properties.¹¹ Like all other substances, they are liable to chemical decomposition and consequent disintegration. They are utterly devoid of sensation and volition, and have no apparatus connecting them with surrounding bodies.

Vegetables are substances that have a peculiar organization or arrangement of solid, tubular, cellular, and fluid parts: by means of which they feed, digest, assimilate, secrete, excrete, grow, and propagate their kind. They die of violence, of disease, of old age. They are not locomotive, being fixed by their roots. No nervous apparatus has hitherto been discovered in them, but certain of their fibers are irritable and contractile. Having no nervous apparatus, they have no perception (sensation) or volition; they do not think. No vegetable has hitherto been clearly ascertained to appear but as the offspring of a former vegetable: and though, by process of assimilation, inorganic and lifeless matter is converted into organic and living matter, the vegetable life (so far as we know) must pre-exist. The chief use of vegetables seems to be the furnishing of food for animals, and partially preparing lifeless and inorganic matter to become sentient and capable of pain and pleasure. With the exception of less than one part by weight in a thousand, vegetables are resolvable into carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, with a small portion of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus. The earths found in them do not seem to be essential to their composition.

Animals are substances that have a peculiar organization or arrangement of solid, tubular, cellular, and fluid parts; by means whereof they devour, digest, assimilate, grow, secrete, excrete and propagate. They die of violence, of disease, of old age. When dead, they are decomposed into azote or nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, lime, and phosphorus. They are locomotive. They have a muscular apparatus for that purpose; and they have a nervous apparatus for the purposes of sensation and volition, by which they are connected with surround objects, animate and inanimate. By assimilation, they convert inorganic and lifeless into organic, living, and sentient matter.¹² It has not yet been clearly shown that any animal has arisen unless as a successor to some similar animal, his immediate progenitor. The *nisus formativus* of Blumenbach, the theories of Darwin, and La Marck, are not impossible, but have as yet few converts.

The doctrine of equivocal generation *seems* to have the weight of fact against it. The Zoophytic animals, the animalculae infusoriae, the worms and other parasites that prey on the internal parts of living animals, form difficulties, but perhaps no exceptions; just as the vegetable efflorescences, the mosses, the confervae and other minute vegetables do in Phytology.

Every vertebrus animal has (a) an organic system destined to support the mere life of the animal, and which is analogous to the organic system of the vegetable; (b) a muscular system destined in part for internal action, in part for locomotion; (c) a nervous system in part subservient particularly to sensation and volition, and our relations to other beings.

The involuntary muscles possess, by means of secretion supplied by the organic system and the nervous apparatus appropriated to it, a power of contraction, or of becoming thicker and shorter, on the application of stimulus. Stimulus may be either the natural stimulus of the nervous system, or of the blood, or it may be artificial. The actions of the involuntary muscles go on without being felt or perceived. The voluntary muscles are stimulated naturally by that portion of the nervous system which is appropriated to sensation and volition, viz, by the brain and cerebral innervation: one part of fiber of a nervous fasciculus transmitting innervation to, and another from, the brain. Galvanic processes have to a certain degree been found a substitute for the nervous stimulus of the muscles, voluntary and involuntary.

It has been ascertained that the muscular power resides in the muscles, and is a property of the muscular fiber, and is distinct from the nervous power which acts merely as one of the stimuli to muscular irritability. Muscular irritability and contractility may exist in a separated muscle. It has been ascertained that the nervous power destined to the purposes of involuntary, insentient, organic life is distinct from the nervous power destined to the purposes of sensation and volition; for each can be shown separate from the other. It has been made highly probable that the first mentioned portion of the nervous system is confided to the medulla oblongata and the ganglionic plexuses: the latter and more important portion, to the brain as its center.

I am aware of my friend Dr. Ferriar's collection of cases in the Manchester transactions, in a letter to myself; of Sir Everard Home's collection of cases in the Philosophical Transactions; and of many other cases not included in the papers of these gentlemen, where lesions of the brain have occurred without much apparent injury to intellect. No physiologist regards them as weighing a feather against the supposition of the brain being the center of the nervous system appropriated to sensation and volition: for we do not yet know by experiment what portions of the brain are exclusively so; nor is a general fact established by induction of innumerable particulars to be set aside on account of a few apparent anomalies of difficult explanation. The theory comprises those parts of the brain that *are* essential to sensation and volition; and not the more bulky mass which appears merely as a subservient envelope. The experiments of Sir Everard Home on the connection of memory with the cortical substance, and the more important "Researches" of M. Flourens, promise to throw light on this difficult subject, which only requires patient and pursued investigation. Some internal sentient extremity there must be to each main branch of the nerves of the senses. In relation to the present inquiry, place it where you please, or where the best settled facts point out.

The above views I have taken of the mineral, vegetable, and animal economy, I offer to the reader not as any deductions of theory, but as expressions of separated and ascertained fact, which a well read modern physiologist will hardly venture to gainsay, under the limitations I have used in stating them. I refer to Bichat, Richerand, Magendie, Dr. Wilson Phillips, Sir Everard Home, and the Physical Researches of M. Flourens in p. 229 of vol. XX of Ann. De Chim.

I proceed to my *second* class of arguments.

1. The propensity of the minute particles of quartz to unite together in a six-sided prism terminated by six-sided pyramids – of the zirconite to assume a tetrahedral prism terminated by tetrahedral pyramids –

of the diamond and garnet to appear as duodecahedrons – of pyrites as a cube – of carbonate of lime as a rhomboid, &c. &c. so that their particles seek out a union with adjacent particles, not indiscriminate and promiscuous, but in the peculiar manner proper to form these figures – is either a property of the material particles themselves, or it is owing to some separate being or principle who impresses on the particles the necessary force in the necessary direction on each occasion. No one hitherto, however, has thought of ascribing this propensity but to some property belonging and essential to the particles themselves.

The arrangement of the nutritious matter taken in by a vegetable in the peculiar form which that vegetable affects, and by which it is characterized, has usually been attributed to the effect of vegetable life as connected with vegetable organization. No one hitherto has advanced the hypothesis of a vegetable soul – distinct from the plant, but regulating and governing it – a being superior to, and surviving, the vegetable. Yet there is no more difficulty in supposing perception a property of a nervous system or crystallization of a mineral system. We see them all, like other properties, intimately and essentially connected as antecedents and consequents, with the subject to which they are referred; and we refer to them accordingly as in all other cases of similar connection. How is life of any kind the result of mere matter and motion? Yet the fact is undeniable. Does it not exist by stimulation?

When we see in the human frame a nervous apparatus that is essentially connected with sensation and volition, and from which these properties arise – that serves no other purpose than to give birth to them – we see them in infancy in a state approaching to non-entity; forming gradually and slowly; growing with the growth of the being to which they belong, and improving by degrees – we see them vary in kind and intensity according to our education and the nature of the society in which we are thrown in – we see them dependent for almost all of their characters on the manner in which that part of the nervous system is excited *ab extra*; so that a man born and educated in Constantinople will have one set of impressions and associations, one habit of sensation and volition, and a man with a similar arrangement of nervous apparatus born and educated among the Quakers at Philadelphia will have another. All this is the result of generating causes extraneous to system – owing to specific peculiarities of excitement that causes the nervous apparatus to act in this manner rather than in that, and to assume different habits. I say we see all this to be, in every case, undeniable matter of fact. How then can we deny sensation and volition to be the result of the stimulated nervous system? There is the same connection of phenomena, the same uniform result of that connection, presenting no more difficulty in the case of sensation and volition than in the case of glandular secretion, or animal heat, or muscular motion, or sanguification, or the secretion of resin in the pine, and sugar in the maple from the same intromitted fluid. All the processes are equally inexplicable from any *a priori* arrangement of matter and motion known to us; all of them stand in equal need for explanation of an immaterial principle; for although we see clearly that these are the phenomena of an organized matter in each case, yet in no case can we explain the rationale by any of the known properties of other inorganized matter. Hence according to physiological doctrines we must resort to some distinct and superadded being, to the *anima intellectualis*, the *anima sensitiva*, and the *anima vitalis* of the ancients – or to the separate fictions of the Scotch school of metaphysics, a species of entities most accommodating, ready for all work, and always in waiting – or to some being of analogous existence to the immaterial Soul of the orthodox. For I assert, and appeal to the matter of fact, that,

There is exactly the same evidence that sensation or perception and volition are properties of the nervous apparatus of the human system that there is of contractility being a property of muscular fiber, or sight the property of the eye.

On the truth of this proposition I should (were it necessary) be willing to rest the controversy. In the one case and the other, constant concomitance is the sole foundation for ascribing necessary connection. It if be sufficient in any one of the cases, it is sufficient in all. It is not necessary that we should be able to explain the *quomodo*: it is enough that our senses, under careful observation, assure us of the fact. Future facts and the future improvement of the human intellect may enable our posterity to do that which

our more imperfect knowledge will not enable us to accomplish; just as the present generation are able to explain what remained an enigma to their forefathers.

2. I have said above that our perception, volition, and in fact our other intellectual faculties, begin from nothing in infancy, grow with our growth, improve with our experience, vary with our education, and differ, not merely as to the nervous systems excited, but in consequence of the habitual differences in the stimuli applied. Suppose the original intellect of two infants exactly the same; educate the one among the thieves of broad St. Giles in London, and the other among the best class of Philadelphian Quakers; would their intellect be the same at one and twenty? But is the soul thus moldable and changeable? Is the Soul infantile as well as the body?

3. If the intellectual phenomena depended entirely on the soul, then we should be unable to produce, annihilate, alter, or modify them by any mere mode of action operating merely on the body. But:

Our ideas are frequently produced and commonly modified by the internal state of our bodily organs, particularly of the internal viscera – and by the state and condition of our organic life: hence the phenomena of dreaming, of delirium, and the hallucinations of hypochondria; and the alterations produced in our sensations and ideas by our state of internal health. Our ideas also are produced and modified by substances exhibited to us acting medicinally; as by wine, by opium, by cantharides, &c. But as Judge Cooper has said in his Medical Jurisprudence, how can you exhibit a dose of glauber salts to the Soul?

If then sensations, ideas, reasonings, and volitions are produced, modified, or extinguished by the condition of the involuntary parts of our organic system – by disease – by medicine: if they be (as we know they are) greatly under the command of the physician who acts only on the body – are not these effects thus produced by means of the body, bodily effects? What has the Soul to do with them? Are not these effects, however, the only evidence of the Soul's existence – the essential, incommunicable properties of the Soul, according to the Immaterialists? Yet are they manifestly produced on the body; and so far as we can see, on the body alone, by means of material stimuli calculated to act solely on the body?

If it be said that body is no more than the instrument of the Soul, which can only act according to the condition of that body with which it is connected, and when the body is altered, the intellectual phenomena which it is calculated to exhibit or altered also – then it follows, from the evidences of what takes place, that the very nature of the Soul is altered by altering the condition of the body, and the Soul therefore is under the control of accident, of disease, of medicine, and may be just what the physician chooses to make it. For if a physician can control the intellectual phenomena of sensation, memory, judgment, and volition (as he can) then all are the *essential* properties of the Soul itself subject to the articles of the Materia Medica, and slaves of the Pharmacopeia.

4. I have already said that no phenomena of mere matter and motion -- no principle of mechanical or chemical philosophy can account for the phenomena of life and stimulus -- for digestion, assimilation, secretion, reproduction. These are just as difficult as sensation, memory, or volition: the interposition of an immaterial Soul is as necessary to vegetable life as to the human faculties. If this be denied, show me where and by whom they have been explained, or explain them if you can.

5. I appeal to any physician accustomed to cases of insanity, and I ask whether all the intellectual appearances in that disease are not manifestly the results of the morbid state of the bodily organs? Is not this the case from the most violent symptoms of mania to that almost imperceptible obliquity from which in some degree or other hardly any of us are free? In fact, such as is the state of our system, such are the mental phenomenon we exhibit; the latter are the result of the former. Can you put a male mind into a female body, or vice versa? Let a parent decide this question; he will answer at once, No. Can you put an old hit on young shoulders? No.

If a morbid intellect be the result of a morbid state of the encephalon, then is a saying intellect the result of a sane state, for like reason: and the intellect is what the encephalon is.

6. But there are no mental phenomena exhibited by the human species that are not also exhibited by the brute species. The difference is concomitant with difference of organization. The superiority of the human being arises from his larger and more expanded and more perfect cerebral apparatus, from his erect position, from the skill with which he can use his hands, and from the faculty of speech. These give rise to the manipulations of art, and to the preservation and propagation of knowledge. For want of these, one generation of brutes is little wiser than the preceding. There is with them no means of accumulating knowledge.

When a dog has lost his master, does he not seek him at the places his master has been accustomed to frequent? I know by oft repeated facts in my own case that he does. Does not this implied memory, ratiocination, volition? So many volumes of instances of the sagacity of animals, particularly of the canine species, have been collected, and the instances are so familiar, but I would not condescend to argue with the man who would have hardihood enough to deny it. All these are intellectual phenomena *of the same kind* with such as we exhibit; the difference is in complication and degree only. They are evidences therefore of an immaterial, immortal, distinct Soul producing them. What say you to the immortal Soul of an opossum or an oyster?

I see no possibility of denying the facts or avoiding the conclusions, and I leave the difficulty to be overcome by those who choose voluntarily to encounter it.

Finally, I say that the phenomena termed mental have been so well explained by Hartley, Cabanis, and Destut Tracey that no man conversant with their writings can hesitate to allow this. I say it is not possible for a fair man, conversant with physiology, to deny that a sensation from recent impression and an idea from recollection or motions in the brain (or common sensory) perceived. As all are intellectual phenomena consist of sensations or ideas which are the materials and substrata of memory, judgment, and volition, all of them consist in motions communicated to the corporeal nervous system – to the common sensory, whether by external impression, by association, or by internal sympathetic action (innervation). They are, therefore, corporeal phenomena, and no more. Destut Tracey has shown this so clearly and so well explained the phenomena of memory, judgment, desire, volition, as mere names given to various states and conditions of our brain, that I do not expect any refutation will or can be given to the view of the subject he has taken. Orthodox ontology is in the seat of authority now, but truth will prevail at last.

In speaking of the brain as the common sensory, I speak according to the language of physiologists of repute who seem not to be shaken by the anomalous cases to the contrary. Ferriar's collection is good for little because his authorities are sometimes deficient in accuracy of observation, and sometimes in credibility. Neurology in his day was very deficient, and still more so in the days of the authors he relies on. But whether the internal sentient extremities of the sensorial nerves terminate in the brain or elsewhere is of no moment whatever to the argument; they must terminate somewhere, and where they do terminate is, for my purpose, the equivalent to the brain; at this word may be used for the sensorium, wherever that may be.

In arranging the preceding arguments, facts are repeated; but the point of view in which they are placed authorizes me as I have thought to distribute them under distinct heads.

I know the obloquy to which Mr. Lawrence, the surgeon, has been exposed in consequence of his having advanced the opinion of the materiality of the Soul, or rather the singleness of human nature as consisting of the organized body only; but the obloquy that results from clerical persecution, popular bigotry, and professional jealousy, cannot detract from the reasoning of a man on all hands confessed to be among the most able and best informed anatomists and physiologists of the day. I give, therefore, the following extract copied with some few omissions and unimportant alterations from his lecture on the *Functions of*

the Brain. Mr. Lawrence's book has been widely disseminated in England, but it is comparatively unknown in the United States, for not one bookseller in the Union is hardy enough to publish it!¹³ Such is the state of the press in this country of boasted freedom, and such the tyranny exercised by the orthodox clergy over the minds of the people! A tyranny that I have a right to exclaim against, because I feel it, and have felt it.

"There would be little inducement to compare together the various animal structures, to follow any apparatus through the whole animal series, unless the structure were a measure and criterion of the function. Just in the same proportion as organization is reduced, life is reduced: exactly as the organic parts are diminished in number and simplified, the vital phenomena become fewer and more simple; and each function ends when the respective organ ceases. This is true throughout zoology: there is no exception in behalf of any vital manifestations.

"The same kind of facts, the same reasoning, the same sort of evidence altogether which show digestion to be the function of the alimentary canal, motions to be the function of the muscles, the various secretions of their respective glands -- proof that sensation, perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, thought, in a word, all the manifestations called mental or intellectual, are the animal functions of their appropriate organic apparatus, the central organ of the nervous system. No difficulty or obscurity attends the latter case which does not equally affect all the former instances; no kind of evidence connects the living process with the material instruments in the one which does not apply just as clearly and forcibly to the other.

"Shall I be told that thought is inconsistent with matter, that we cannot conceive how medullary substance can perceive, remember, judge, reason? I.e. knowledge we are entirely ignorant *how* the parts of the brain accomplish these purposes; we know only the fact: we are equally ignorant how the liver secretes bile, how the muscles contract, or have any other living purpose is effected: and so we are how heavy bodies are attracted to the earth, how iron is drawn to the magnet, or how salts decompose each other. Experience in all these cases are soul, if not sufficient, instructors, and the constant conjunction of phenomena, as exhibited in her lessons, is the sole ground for affirming a necessary connection between them. If we go beyond this, and come to inquire the matter how -- and attempt to discover the mechanism by which these things are effected, we shall find everything around us equally mysterious, equally incomprehensible: from the stone which falls to the earth, to the comet traversing the heavens -- from the thread attracted by amber or sealing wax, to the revolutions of planets in their orbits -- from the formation of a mite in cheese, or a maggot in putrid flesh, to the production of a NEWTON or a FRANKLIN.

"In opposition to these views it has been contended that thought is not an act of the brain, but of an *immaterial* substance residing in or connected with it. This large and curious structure, which, in the human subject, receives one-fifth of all the blood sent out from the heart; which is so delicately and peculiarly organized, so nicely enveloped in successive membranes, and securely lodged in a solid bony case, is by this supposition left almost without an office: being barely allowed to be capable of sensation. It has, indeed, under this hypothesis the easiest lot in the animal economy; it is better fed, clothed, and lodged, than any other part, and has less to do. But its office (only one remove from a sinecure) is not a very honorable one: it is a kind of porter, instructed to open the door and introduce new comers to the master of the house, who takes on himself the entire charge of receiving, entertaining, and employing them.

"Let us survey the natural history of the human mind -- its rise, progress, various states, and decay -- and then judge whether these accord best with the hypothesis of an immaterial agent or with the plain dictates of common sense, and the obvious analogy of every other organ and function throughout the boundless extent of living beings.

"But you must bring to this physiological question a sincere and earnest love of truth: dismissing from your minds all the prejudices and alarms which have been so industriously connected with it. If you enter

on this inquiry in the spirit of the bigot and the partisan -- suffering a cloud of fears and hopes, desires and aversions, to hang around your understandings, you will never discern objects clearly; their colors, shapes, and dimensions will be confused, distorted, and obscured by the intellectual mist. Our business is to inquire what is true, not which is the finest theory -- not what will supply the best topics of pretty composition and elegant declamation addressed to the prejudices, passions, and ignorance of our hearers. We need not fear the result of investigation: reason and free inquiry are the only effectual antidotes of error. Give them full scope, and they will uphold the truth by bringing false opinions and all the spurious offspring of ignorance, prejudice, and self-interest, before their severe tribunal, and subjecting them to the test of close examination. Error alone needs artificial support; truth can stand by itself.

“Sir *Everard Home*, with the assistance of Mr. *Bauer* and his microscope has shown us a man eight days old, from the time of conception; about as broad and a little longer than a pin’s head. He satisfied himself that the brain of this homonucleus was discernible. Could the immaterial mind have been connected with it at this time? Or was the tenement too small even for so ethereal a lodger? Even if the full period of utero-gestations, it is still difficult to trace any vestiges of the mind, and the believers in its separate existence have left us quite in the dark on the precise time when they suppose this union of soul and body to take place. Some endeavor to account for the entire absence of mental phenomena at the time of birth by the senses and brain *not having been yet called into action* by the impressions of the external objects. The senses and brain began to be exercised as soon as the child is born, and a faint glimmering of mind is dimly perceived in the course of the first months of existence, but it is as weak and infantile as the body.

“As the senses acquire their powers and a cerebral mass becomes firmer, the mind gradually strengthens, advances slowly with the body through childhood to puberty, and becomes adult when the development of the frame is complete; it is, moreover, male and female according to the sex of the body. (The propensities, the modes of thinking and acting, are manifestly influenced by sex.) In the perfect period of organization, the mind is seen in the plenitude of its powers; but this state of full vigor is short in duration both for the intellect and the corporeal fabric. The wear and tear of the latter is evidenced in its mental movements: with the decline of organization to mind the case; it becomes decrepit with the body; and both the one and the other are, at the same moment, extinguished by death.

“What can we infer from the succession of phenomena? The existence and action of a principle entirely distinct from the body? Or a close analogy to the history of all other organs and functions?

“The number and kind of the intellectual phenomenon in different animals appear to correspond closely to the degree of development of the brain. The mind (mental or intellectual faculties) of the Negro, Hottentot, Calmuck, and Carib is inferior to that of the European, and their organization also is less perfect. The large cranium and high forehead of the ourang-outang lift him above his brother monkeys; but the development of his cerebral hemispheres and his mental manifestations are both equally below those of the Negro. The gradation of organization and of mind passes through the monkey, dog, elephant, horse, to other quadrupeds: thence to birds, reptiles, and fishes; and so on to the lowest links of the animal chain.¹⁴

“In ascending these steps of one ladder, following in regular succession at equal intervals, where shall we find the boundary of unassisted organization? Where place the beginning of the immaterial principle called in aid? In that view which assimilates the functions of the brain to those of other organic parts, this case has no difficulty. As the structure of the brain is more exquisite, perfect, and complex, its functions ought to be proportionally so. It is no slight proof of the doctrine now enforced that the fact is actually thus: that the mental powers of brutes, so far as we can see, are proportional to their organization.

“We cannot deny to animals all participation in rational endowments without shutting our eyes to the most obvious facts; to indications of reasoning which the unprejudiced observation of mankind has not failed to recognize and appreciate. Without adverting to the well-known instances of comparison, judgment, and sagacity in the elephant, the dog, and many other animals, let us read the character drawn

by Humboldt of the South American mules: 'When the mules feel themselves in danger, they stop, turning their heads to the right and to the left. The motion of their ears seems to indicate that they reflect on the decision they ought to take. Their resolution is slow, but always just, if it be free; that is to say, if it be not crossed or hastened by the imprudence of the traveler. It is on the frightful roads of the Andes, during journeys of six or seven months across mountains furrowed by torrents, that the intelligence of horses and beast of burden displays itself in an astonishing manner. Thus the mountaineers are heard to say 'I will not give you the mule who step is the easiest, but him who reasons best.' 5 Pers. Narr. 111. If the intellectual phenomena of man require an immaterial principle superadded to the brain, we must equally concede it to those more rational animals which exhibit manifestations differing from some of the human only in degree. If we grant it to these, we cannot refuse it to the next in order, and so on in succession to the whole series; to the oyster, the sea anemone, the polype, a microscopic animalcules. Is anyone prepared to admit the existence of immaterial principles in all these cases? If not, he must equally reject it in man.

"It is admitted that an idiot with a malformed brain has no mind; that the sagacious dog and the reasonable elephant do not require anything to be superadded to their brains; it is admitted that a dog or an elephant excels inferior animals in consequence of possessing a more perfect cerebral structure; it is strongly suspected that a NEWTON and a SHAKESPEARE excelled other mortals only by a more ample development of the anterior cerebral lobes; by having an extra inch of brain in the right place;¹⁵ yet the Immaterialists will not concede the obvious corollary of all these admissions, viz. that the mind of man is merely that more perfect exhibition of mental phenomena which the more complete development of the brain would lead us to expect; but they still perplex us with the gratuitous difficulty of their immaterial hypothesis. Thought, it is positively and dogmatically asserted, can not be an act of matter. Yet no feeling, no thought, no intellectual operation has ever been seen but in conjunction with a brain; and living matter is acknowledged by most persons to be capable of what makes the nearest possible approach to thinking. The strongest advocate for Immaterialism seeks no further than the body for his explanation of all the vital processes of muscular contraction, nutrition, secretion, &c. operations quite as different from any affection of inorganic substance as reasoning or thought: he will even allow the brain to be capable of sensation.

"Who knows the capabilities of matter so perfectly as to be able to say that it can see, hear, smell, taste, and feel, but cannot possibly reflect, imagine, judge? Who has appreciated them so exactly as to be able to decide that it can execute the mental functions of a dog, an elephant, or an ourang-outang, but cannot perform those of a Negro or a Hottentot? To say of a thing known only by negative properties, that is, an immaterial substance, which is neither evidenced by any direct testimony nor by any indirect proof from its effects, that it does exist and can think, is quite consistent in those who deny thought to animal structures where we see it going on every day!

"If the mental processes do not constitute the function of the brain, what is its office? In animals which possess only a small part of the human cerebral structure, sensation exists, and in many cases is more acute than in man: what employment shall we find for all that man possesses over and above this portion – for the large and prodigiously developed human hemispheres? Are we to believe that these serve only to round the figure of the organ or to fill the cranium?

"It is necessary for you to form clear opinions on this subject, as it has a direct and immediate reference to an important branch of pathology. They who consider the mental operations as acts of an immaterial being, and thus disconnect the sound state of the mind from organization, act very consistently in disjoining insanity also from corporeal structure, and in representing it as a disease not of the brain, but of the mind (or Soul). Thus we come to a disease of an immaterial being! for which, suitably enough, moral treatment has been recommended.

"I firmly believe, on that contrary, that the various forms of insanity – all the affections comprehended under the general term, mental derangement – are no other than evidences of cerebral affections. They

are disordered manifestations of those organs whose healthy action produces the phenomena called mental; they are, in short, symptoms of a diseased brain. These symptoms have the same relation to the brain as vomiting, indigestion, heart burn, to the stomach; cough, asthma, to the lungs; or any other deranged functions to their correspondent organs.

“If the biliary secretion be increased, diminished, suspended, or altered, we have no hesitation in referring it to changes in the condition of the liver as the immediate cause of the phenomena. We explain the state of respiration, whether slow, hurried, impeded by cough, spasm, &c. by the various conditions of the lungs and other parts concerned in breathing. These explanations are deemed perfectly satisfactory.

“What should we think of a person who told us that the organs had nothing to do with the business: that cholera, jaundice, hepatitis, are diseases of an immaterial hepatic being; that asthma, cough, consumption, are affections of a subtle pulmonary matter; or that, in each case, the disorder is not in the bodily organs, but in a vital principle? If such a statement should be deemed too absurd for any serious comment in the derangements of the liver, lungs, and other organic parts, how can it be received in the brain?

“The very persons who use this language of diseases of the mind speak and reason correctly respecting the other affections of the brain. When it is compressed by a piece of bone, or by effused blood or serum, and when all intellectual phenomena are more or less completely suspended, they do not say that the mind is squeezed – that the immaterial principle suffers pressure. For the ravings of delirium and frenzy, the excitation and subsequent stupor of intoxication, they find an adequate explanation in the state of the cerebral circulation, without fancying that the mind is delirious, mad, or drunk. In these cases, the seat of the disease, the cause of the symptoms, is too obvious to escape notice. In many forms of insanity, the affection of the cerebral organization is less strongly marked, slower in his progress, but generally very recognizable, and abundantly sufficient to explain the diseased manifestations; – to afford a material organic cause for the phenomena – for the augmented or diminished energy, or the altered nature of the various feelings and intellectual faculties.

“I have examined, after death, the heads of many insane persons, and have hardly seen a single brain which did not exhibit obvious marks of disease. In recent cases, loaded vessels, increase serous secretions: in all instances of longer duration, unequivocal signs of present or past increased action; blood vessels apparently more numerous, membranes thickened and opaque; depositions of coagulable lymph forming adhesions or adventitious membranes; watery effusions; even abscesses. Add to this, that the insane often become paralytic, or are cut off by apoplexy.

“Sometimes, indeed, the mental phenomena are disturbed without any visible deviation from the healthy structure of the brain; as digestion or biliary secretion may be impaired or altered, without any recognizable change of structure in the stomach or liver. The brain, like other parts of this complicated machine, may be diseased sympathetically,¹⁶ and we see it recover. Thus we find the brain, like other parts, subject to what is called functional disorder; but although we cannot absolutely demonstrate the fact, we no more doubt that the material cause of the symptoms or external signs of disease is in this organ, than we do that impaired biliary secretion has its source in the liver, or faulty digestion in the stomach. The brain does not often come under the inspection of the anatomist in such cases of functional disorder; but I am convinced from my own experience that very few heads of persons dying deranged will be examined after death, without showing diseased structure or evident signs of increased vascular activity. The effect of medical treatment completely corroborates these views. Indeed they who talk of, and believe in, diseases of the mind, are too wise to put their trust in mental remedies. Arguments, syllogisms, discourses, sermons, have never yet restored any patient; the moral pharmacopeia is quite inefficient; and no real benefit can be conferred without vigorous medical treatment, which is as efficacious in these affections as in the diseases of other organs.¹⁷

“In thus drawing your attention to the physiology of the brain, I have been influenced not merely by the intrinsic interest and importance of the subject, but by a wish to exemplify the aid which human and

comparative anatomy and physiology are capable of affording each other; and to show how the data furnished by both tend to illustrate pathology. I have purposefully avoided noticing those considerations of the tendency of certain physiological doctrines which have sometimes been industriously mixed up with these disquisitions. In defense of a weak case, and in failure of direct arguments, appeals to the passions and prejudices have been indulged; attempts have been made to fix public odium on the maintainers of this or that opinion; and direct charges of bad motives and injurious consequences have been reinforced by all the arts of misrepresentation, insinuation, and innuendo.

“To discover truth, and to represent it in the clearest and most intelligible manner, seem to me to be the only proper objects of physiological, or indeed any other inquiries. Free discussion is the surest way not only to disclose and strengthen what is true, but to detect and expose what is fallacious. Let us not then pay so bad a compliment to truth as to use in its defense foul blows and unlawful weapons. Its adversaries, if it has any, will be dispatched soon enough, without the aid of the stiletto or the bowl. The argument against the expediency of divulging an opinion, although it be true, from the possibility of it being perverted, has been so much hackneyed, so often employed in the last resort by the defenders of all established abuses, that every one who is conversant with the controversy rejects it immediately, as the sure mark of a bad cause – as the last refuge of retreating error.”

So far Mr. Lawrence. Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man. 8 vo. London, 1819. Pages 105-115. I have already assigned my reasons for making this extract so long.

The following extract from Mr. Sawrey's edition of Dr. Marshall's *Morbid Anatomy of the Brain*, London, 1815, p. 209, will express my notion of the functions of the brain and nerves very well, except that he has omitted the sympathetic action of the nervous system as excited or depressed states of the parts destined to internal organic life, when different from their usual and natural states. A morbid excitement or derangement of any viscus will affect the state of the nerves belonging to it, and by sympathy (that is innervation) with them, the general nervous system. Hence the state of the brain, and the ideas that arise in it, will be more or less modified by the state of the organic and internal apparatus destined to keep up life. Hence dreams from indigestion. Hence hypochondria from morbid action of stomach and bowels. Hence the associations will, to a certain degree, be modified by and depend on the internal state of the body, as well as on external impressions; and the sensations arising from external impressions will, to a certain degree, vary with the general health or disease. Hence sensations, ideas, and associations may arise from the state of the internal organs, and are not exclusively dependent on external impression.

The following extract from Dr. *Andrew Marshall* will show the generally received doctrine relating to the functions and properties of the nerves, the brain, and the nervous system, and prove that my views on the subject are the same with that of all well informed physiologists of the present day: –

Observations on the functions of the Brain and Nerves, p. 209.

“The primary functions of the brain and nerves consist in their rendering us conscious of the existence and properties of surrounding objects: and while in this world, of the existence and properties of ourselves. For although things exist with all their properties independent of us, and therefore when a man perishes, not the smallest particle of surrounding nature is annihilated, or in the least unhinged by his dissolution, yet it is by our possessing brain nerves that the independent existence and properties of surrounding objects come home to our perceptions. Matter of the same form with that of the human body (except the brain and nerves) might exist and be animated, but without these organs, it would be unconscious of its present existence, or of the properties and various conditions of surrounding nature.

“Living systems destitute of brain show no signs of their being impressed with any feeling or consciousness. The polypus, according to the observations of Haller and others, has no brain or nerves: accordingly it appears to perform the motions requisite to its preservation by a necessity of which it seems

to be unconscious. Vegetables also are living systems, but having no brain they appear destitute of sense. They take in, assimilate, and apply nourishment, perform secretions, generate and separate heat, preserve their own substance from putrefaction, perform motions in consequence of irritations, and produce prolific seed. But all these actions seem to be performed from blind necessity, and without any sort of intelligent consciousness.

“But in living systems furnished with a brain and nerves, so long as they are entire, and in the condition which health gives and requires, the animal remains sensible of the existence of surrounding nature, or susceptible of that consciousness; but when injury is done to the brain, the consciousness of the impressions resulting from the contact of external matter (of which kind are both light and air) is, according to the degree of injury, perverted, suspended, or extinguished. Yet injuries inflicted on other organs of the body in no wise affect the sense, unless when they symptomatically involve the brain. The same comparison, leading to the same conclusion, may be made in respect to the diseases of the brain and other parts.

“It must be admitted that, in order to produce peculiar sensations, there must be the health and entire structure of the nerves in connection with the brain. For to destroy the extremities of nerves, destroys the peculiar sensations which these nerves exhibit while remaining sound. If the retina be injured or destroyed, vision is impaired or lost; if the ultimate distribution of the olfactory nerves be destroyed, there is no more smell.

“Although light should be properly refracted, yet if it should fall on the optic nerve before it expands into retina, it would not occasion any vision; nor would odors, if conveyed to the olfactory nerves within the skull, probably, given occasion to smell; nor is it probable that sapid substances would excite a sense of taste, if applied to any part of the nerves of taste other than the nervous papillae of the tongue.

“But necessary as the extremities of the nerves are to the production of peculiar sensations, they cannot be reckoned sentient: for if their connection with the brain be interrupted by compression, no peculiar sensation arises from impression on the extremities; but if the compression be removed, the power of giving the peculiar sensation returns. Yet though the compression of the nerves interrupts or destroys the peculiar sensations usually referred to their extremities, a sense of feeling in different modes subsists between the part compressed and the brain: so that the power of contributing to a certain degree of sense, which would be lost between the ligature and the extremities, survives between the seat of the injury and the brain. The sort of feeling so remaining is sometimes a sense of obscure touch, sometimes a sense of pricking or a sense of pain.

“We therefore conclude that there is no manner of sensibility in nerves but in connection with the brain. That the power by which we see, hear, feel, &c. is a power of the brain, the nerves being only a *conditio sine qua non* of particular sensations referred to nervous extremities, and the brain being rather the efficient cause of these sensations, and giving susceptibility to a certain degree at least to that portion of nerve left connected with it: – may it be added, that independent of any conditional impression on the nerves, the brain itself, from impressions immediately on itself, is sentient; for let any set of nerves whatever be destroyed, or let no particular impression whatever be made on the nerves, a sense of headache, vertigo, noise, colors, &c. may be, and often is, produced by disease.¹⁸

“The sphere of cerebral power exerted in conjunction with, or in consequence of impressions made on the nerves, is great. By the brain being affected through the medium of the eyes, we are made acquainted with the color, figure, magnitude, and motion of external things placed at a greater or less distance from us. This is the sense of seeing: an inlet to human knowledge, at once necessary to preservation, and to open a view of the striking and beautiful phenomena of nature.

“The existence, degree of distance, hardness, and several other interesting qualities of objects placed at a distance, seen or unseen, come home to our perceptions through tremors of the air affecting the brain

through the ear. This is the sense of hearing; by which we are warned of unseen danger, perceive operations of nature though unseen, and comprehend the signs or words employed by our fellow creatures to express their sensations and passions.

“The qualities of sapid substances which we are interested in perceiving, their sweetness, acidity, bitterness, saltiness, and aromatic nature, are perceived when these qualities, through the medium of the tongue, excite the proper sensations in the brain. This is the sense of taste. The qualities suggested by taste constitute a sort of index of the salutary, innocent, or pernicious nature of substances presented as food, rather than point out the actual composition of these substances. This sense seems given chiefly with a view to the preservation of the animal; for but it, man is induced to take in wholesome food, and to avoid improper and hurtful food: the former being in general agreeable, and the latter disagreeable, at least to a taste not corrupted by luxury. It is a common yet curious observation that the same nerves which are susceptible of impressions from sapid substances are also nerves of touch; so that a substance in the mouth is both tasted and felt; its superficial qualities of hardness, smoothness, &c. being also perceived. This conjunction of both senses seems requisite in the tongue, since a substance taken into the mouth may be as hurtful from its superficial qualities, as its roughness, angles, edges, &c. is from its acrid, saline, or putrid qualities.

“The nourishment and refreshment of the body are farther assisted by our being enabled to perceive certain qualities of sapid substances before we take them into the mouth. This is done by volatile particles of the substances affecting the internal parts of the nose, and through these the brain. Thus the sense of smelling is auxiliary to taste as it admonishes us of the quality of sapid substances before we use them too freely; as it induces us to take in proper food which is generally of a pleasant smell if it smells at all; and as it keeps us from unwholesome food, which is generally of a disagreeable odor. Odors are the object of this sense; and different odors affecting the brain through the nose produce different sensations of smell, as either pungent, sweet, or putrid, &c. These suggest in some degree what may be expected from swallowing or applying the substance; but express nothing concerning its internal structure or composition. Air is the vehicle of odor.

“To assist vision, and to make amends for its defects, there is a consciousness implanted in us of the contact of external things.¹⁹ The nerves that receive the impression from which this consciousness results are almost universally present in the body: and if they remain everywhere free and connected, in a healthy state, with an entire and healthy brain, the contact of external things, and internal changes, are perceivable in almost every part of the body. Several modes of feeling may be marked: 1st by the contact of external things with the extremities of the nerves of feeling, we acquire a perception of the hardness, softness, roughness, smoothness, heat, cold, figure, magnitude, pressure, and weight of whatever is in our reach. This is the sense of touch, properly so called; the most correct and extensive of all the senses, subservient to self-preservation, and supplying man with exact and enlarged conceptions of what takes place in nature.

“2dly. Certain parts of the body occasionally fall into a state which gives rise to a particular mode of feeling, followed by certain propensities. These give rise to actions, which being exerted, relieve the propensity. Thus a certain languid state of the circulation through the lungs gives a peculiar uneasy sensation that produces yawning. A sense of irritation in the nose gives rise to sneezing; a sense of irritation about the glottis to coughing; a sense of tickling of the skin to laughter, &c. Some of these peculiar modes of sensation have names, and some have not. Like other sensations, they admit of no definition. Their final intention is evident, since they tend to throw off the offending cause that produces them.

“3rdly. Certain parts of the body are constantly in a healthy state, peculiarly susceptible to impression, such as the glands of the penis, and some other parts; the final cause whereof is also evident.

“4thly. All the parts of the body supplied with nerves are susceptible of impression which gives occasion to sense of pain. The impression here arises from whatever hurts, destroys, or forms disease; and the sense excited by it makes us take pains to avoid injury, and get rid of disease. By-the-bye, taking man as he is, and admitting the laws of nature at present established to be wise and good, pain is not an evil, but the result of a wise and beneficent providence; since it tends to preserve our existence more unerringly and directly than any other mode of sense with which we are endowed. The exciting cause of pain is the impression of injury or disease: the efficient cause, the connection of the part so injured or disordered with the brain; and the final cause, the preservation of the animal. These are some of the modes of feeling: each of the other senses is also a genus, under which are included various modes of the sensation referred to the organ.

“When we compare the different senses together, two or three observations occur to us: one is that the first four senses take place only when certain due degrees of impression are made on the extremities of the nerves distributed to that organ. If the impression be too slight, no peculiar sense arises; if it exceed in measure, instead of the sense of seeing, hearing, &c. There is merely a sense of pain. Thus, the first four senses, when their organs are injured, agree with the sense of feeling. Another observation is that the sense of feeling arises from impressions made in those parts of the body, so it is more difficult to destroy than the other senses. When the extremities of the nerves of the other senses are destroyed, peculiar sensations connection with them also cease; but the remaining body of nerves retains a sense of feeling: and the extremities of the nerves of the nerves appropriated to feeling only, being destroyed, the extremities of the portion left resume the peculiar susceptibility of the original extremities: thus in the case of W. Scott, whose penis was carried off by a gun-shot, the stump of it, which was even with the skin of the pubis, resumed the peculiar sensibility of the glans penis: also the cicatrix of sores in other parts of the body becomes susceptible to impressions of touch.

“But extensive as the sphere of sensation is, and how much soever of the universe it unfolds to human comprehension, the powers of the brain are not confined to mere sensation. The brain is likewise the corporeal organ whose health and entire structure are necessarily connected with all intellectual powers, all internal senses, and all the passions.

“*Memory* depends on the brain. After living but a few weeks in the world, exposed to the contact of surrounding things, and to light reflected from their surfaces, we cannot avoid recognizing sensations as being mere repetitions of similar impressions from the same forms of matter. We recognize the similar sensations and feel within ourselves that formerly we were affected exactly in a similar manner by the impression on the organ of sense. This recognizing of sensations and belief of their being repetitions happens by the same physical necessity with which the first sensations of the kind we ever had arose from the original and first impressions. We cannot but taste when sapid substances are applied to the tongue; nor can we pass by the consciousness that there is a repetition when the same taste is renewed. This is the simplest form of memory: it occurs in an infant a month old when it begins to recognize its nurse. After living longer, continually affected with the true sense and impressions of external things, and after being masters of more certain experience, we naturally improve upon the simple memory of a single sensation, and acquire gradually a power of recalling a train of sensations, in the order and circumstances in which they were originally perceived. They are recalled with a belief that they were formerly impressed upon us by objects which do not now affect us. This is memory in greater perfection. A faculty which, spiritual as it may seem, is seldom exerted, but when it sets off from the vantage ground of some assembling, contrary, or otherwise related actual sensation of a present object.²⁰

“*Judgment* is another power naturally founded in sensation. For to compare two sensations together, to glide insensibly into a belief that they are compatible, or incompatible in the same subject, are as necessary consequences of having formed the sensation, as the sensations were the consequences of the brains having been affected by the impression. Thus if you present a red rose to a child who has never

seen one before, but who has seen a white rose, it has immediately the complete sensation of a red rose: and if it can speak it will express a judgment and belief that it is a red rose. This is the birth of judgment.

“The power of *reasoning* in like manner grows out of sensation. For let a youth after some experience of the properties of things be supposed master of two distinct independent perceptions, but not to have experience enough to incline him to a belief that they are naturally and properly compatible in the same object, what resource has he? If the determination interests him, he naturally and immediately recollects a known third perception, with which one of the two sensations is known from experience to agree: and with this third recollected perception he is insensibly drawn to compare the other perception.

“Let it be inquired, will the eating of the berries of the deadly nightshade kill me? I run back to some conception allied to the question; as that these berries poisoned one of my neighbors. I know that I am of the same nature with that neighbor; so that as the berries poisoned him, and I am of the same nature with him, I conclude, as a matter of experience, that they will kill me.

“In the same manner might we trace *fancy*; the power of *abstraction*; and the power of *classing* things to their origin from actual sensation;²¹ but that is at present declined. I would only remark that *all intellectual powers whatever depend as much on the brain for their exertion as simple sensation does*; for living system furnished with no brain discover as little reason, &c as they do sense: and injuries done to the brain of the nature of those enumerated above, while they hurt or suspend sense, hurt, suspend, or pervert the powers of memory, reason, judgment &c. Nay, in some injuries and diseases of the brain the powers of intellect are more deranged than those of pure sensation. Maniacs, in whom it has been proved that the brain is topically affected, and probably always in fault, are often exact in particular sensations, but err widely in judgment and reasoning. A sufferer too under the operation of the trepan is found sometimes possessing feeling, but erring in reason; and refers the whole operation and all that is said and done to some other person.²²

* * * * *

“All the internal senses also depend on the brain and on the perceptions we cannot help receiving, as we live under the continual contact and impression of external things. These are naturally stems, from which the various additional senses called internal branch off. We cannot hear sounds agreeable in combination without a sense of harmony. We cannot see the form of regularity of parts and the color of most flowers without believing them to be beautiful; nor understand the signs by which our fellow creatures express or betray their feelings without a belief that they in return comprehend our signs; nor witness their actions without approving some of them and blaming others. This is the physical birth of the senses called *internal*, which seem to be peculiar to man: and they also depend upon the brain. For not to dwell on other instances, if the most delicate and chaste female be seized with a phrenitis, she loses her habitual sense of delicacy: and if injury or disease in the brain induces mania, the maniac ceases to feel the obligations of morality.

“The distinction of sense into external and internal does not go to discriminate the two sets of sense, for they are equally internal and external. Nothing farther can be understood than that the one set of internal senses is excited when external things affect the organs of sense: but the other does not immediately require the impression of external things to produce them.

“Lastly, *all the passions and appetites* depend on the brain for their corporal organ. Objects whose properties come home to us through the primary sensations do not leave us in a state of indifference. The primary perceptions give birth to senses called internal; and the internal senses to appetites, passions, and volitions. These depend upon the brain: not only because they grow out of sense, which depends on that organ, but because when the brain is injured or diseased it is found equally or more severely to alter, pervert, or extinguish passions and appetites.

“In phrenitis, no alteration is more remarkable than alteration and disorder in the passions. This will appear from an unusual apprehension of imaginary evils, an unusual anxiety about friends, and unusual hatred against enemies. I once saw a phrenetic patient with Dr. Pritcairn; some of his senses were lost; taste in particular. But his regard for his wife was expressed in a tempest of passion; it was the rage of love: at other times he had the most delicate yet groundless jealousy. Maniacs in the exacerbation of their complaints are preternaturally irascible or furious; the go into fits of devotion with a fervor and religious awe of which sound reason is hardly susceptible.

“There is a remarkable peculiarity in the state of the brain observed as a law of the animal economy, which is that the exertion is subjected to a periodical suspension more or less complete called *sleep*. It is the complete suspension of the power of the five senses, and of the action of the voluntary muscles; for in sound sleep particular sensations do not occur, nor are the powers which grow out of sensations exerted. But in unquiet nights, though no actual sensation occurs, no immediate impression on any organ of a peculiar sense being perceived, the powers of memory, fancy, reason, and judgment, with various internal senses and passions, are differently exerted. They proceed in an unusual way, not for want of reason, but from want of actual sensations to correct wrong judgments and to direct all these powers according to the reality of things.²³

The effect of *sleep* is to restore the power of the brain and nerves. Independent of the sealing up of actual sensation, the muscular parts in themselves require periodical suspension or abatement of their energy. Long continued actual sensations, strong sensations lasting but for a short time, much thinking, pursuing a long train of abstract reasoning, great exertions of memory, &c gradually blunt the powers of the brain and nerves, and a cessation of actual sensation occurs: and if in this insensible state other powers of the brain be exerted, their exertion is less fatiguing than when we are awake, because in sleep their exertion is not fixed or regulated by attention, which is one of the most fatiguing powers of the brain. In like manner, long continued muscular action of the voluntary muscles induces a sort of inability in them, and in sleep their energy is restored. On awaking after a due length of time spent in sleep, all the powers of the brain and the energy of the muscles are restored in a proper degree.

“I cannot quit this part of the subject without observing that all the powers proved to belong to the brain are equally peculiar in their nature. To be conscious of the figure of a circle, of the color of a flower, is as refined and wonderful a power as reasoning is. Although these powers to the vulgar belief are a necessary consequence of an impression on the organ of sense, they have as little resemblance to such impressions as reasoning in an abstract manner has.²⁴

“There are yet two other questions which seem necessary to be considered. *First*, whether the brain properly so called and the cerebellum, medulla spinalis, &c. possess equal sentient powers?²⁵ No doubt can remain that they do, when we consider that injuries or disease, in whichever of these integrant portions of the whole mass they happen, equally occasion stupor and insensibility, or are accompanied by violent exertions of the muscular powers. But the muscular disorder is most obvious when those parts are affected which give origin to nerves that supply the involuntary muscles. Also, injuries or disease prove equally fatal whether in the brain, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, or medulla spinalis. A man is killed by being shot through the head. The fiercest bull is instantly killed by thrusting a knife through between the first vertebra, and the posterior edge of the foramen magnum occipitis into the beginning of the medulla spinalis.²⁶ An elephant is killed in the same manner. Robert Walker, a soldier, was killed by a shot through the cauda equina. Lastly, the equal sentient power of these different portions is evinced by their giving origin to nerves of particular organs of sense. The brain gives nerves to the nose and eyes; the cerebellum to the skin, muscles of the face, the tongue and the teeth. The medulla oblongata gives nerves to the ear; the medulla spinalis to the muscles and skin of most of the body.

“The *second* question is whether the whole substance of the brain, cerebellum, be equally sentient? The nerves proceed from the medullary, not the cineritious part. This continuity of substance, compared with the effects of tying, dividing, or destroying nerves, renders it probable that it is principally the medullary

parts of the brain which are the origin of the power ascribed to it.²⁷ The medullary substance of all the portions form one continuous mass, is apparently fibrous, the fibers being incredibly minute,²⁸ convolved with regular intricacy, apparently without beginning, and ending nowhere but in the extremities of the nerves. The two hemispheres of the brain communicate by transverse medullary bands, and by the union of their crura; while the medullary crura of cerebellum blend with the medullary crura of cerebrum, &c.

“In the next place, in Haller’s experiments on living animals instituted to determine the different degree of sensibility of different parts of the body, it appeared that the victim of his inquiry manifested most evident signs of pain and fell into the most violent convulsions when the medullary substance of the brain was pierced or broken down: but that these symptoms were less considerable when the injury was confined to the cineritious substance.²⁹ Accidental injuries seem also to hurt or disorder sense according as they extend their effects to the medullary substance. A blow on the upper part of the head does not stun so suddenly as a blow near the base of the skull; the cineritious substance abounding in the upper part; the medullary being exterior in the basis of the encephalum.

“If judgment may be formed from one or two cases, a fracture with depression of the os frontis causes less stupor than a fracture with depression of the parietal bones – the anterior lobes of the brain being supported on the orbital processes of the frontal bones: but the middle part of the hemispheres gravitating on the whole medullary substance below, the compression must extend its influence to the whole. These opinions are strengthened by the case of a soldier who recovered after being shot through the fore part of the cranium; and from another in whom a piece of the barrel of a gun was beaten into the fissura magna sylvii where it remained for two days without any violent symptoms, being lodged chiefly in the cineritious substance.

“From these circumstances it is concluded that the medullary substance at the origin of the nerves is principally concerned in the functions ascribed to the brain; and if it would throw greater light on the subject to determine the seat of the soul, we would allege that the whole medullary substance is that seat.³⁰

“So much we have advanced respecting the precise functions of the brain. It is established, we hope beyond all doubt, that the brain so far as a corporeal organ is concerned gives sensation, intellect, volition, appetite, and passion. Beyond these, its powers seem not to extend as we shall endeavor to show. By the brain, man is rendered speculative and capable of understanding, and at the same time inclined to action: and is thus fitted for the place he holds in the system of nature.³¹

“It is unnecessary, we presume, to guard the account given by subjoining that when we call the brain the sole organ of sensation and of all the powers superadded to sensation, we only mean the sole corporeal organ. For reason and the testimony of God declare that in man there is an immaterial substance which has a share in perception, thinking, and reasoning &c – a mind united with the brain. But an inquiry into the human Soul is not within the design of this paper. In this account of the brain, no mention is made of the Soul, because it is only the corporeal organ of the powers explained that we are considering. That there is a soul within us, as well as an omnipotent spirit that fills, sustains, and actuates the universe, I firmly believe. No less do I believe so from reason than from the sacred monuments of divine inspiration. But it is to be observed that in this state of our existence no act of the mind can be or ever is exerted without a corresponding condition of power in the brain. Brain and Soul, though it is unknown to us how they are united, are joint agents in this world. The power and health of the former, in every exercise of sense, judgment, memory, passion, &c. is indispensably necessary, and equally so with the presence of the mind. Besides, the brain, and not the Soul, is the proper object of medical or surgical treatment. Had we introduced the mind into our discussion, we must have thrown the brain into the background, or have encumbered the narration with a constant coupling of brain and mind.³² – p. 244

Thus far, Dr. Marshall, on the functions of the brain and nerves. It is manifest that he, like Dr. Rush, and many others, was a materialist; but was restrained by popular prejudice from bringing the whole truth into

open day. I cannot blame him. Who can see the obloquy connected with the character of Mr. Lawrence, notwithstanding his eminent learning, industry, and professional skill and knowledge, without excusing the writers who shelter themselves from the yellings of the bigots, set on by priests whose interest it is to cry out "Great is Diana of the Ephesians?" If the present clerical combinations in which all sects join, however discordant on other subjects, should succeed to bring on again the night of ignorance (which I much fear will be the case), the advocates of truth must rest contented with having deserved the success they could not obtain.

Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, March 29, 1824.

TH: JEFFERSON TO DR. COOPER.

I received, a day or two ago, a small pamphlet on Materialism, without any indication from what quarter it came: but I knew there was but one person in the United States capable of writing it, and therefore am at no loss to whom to address my thanks for it and assurances of my high esteem and respect.

MONTICELLO, March 29, 1824

To Any Member Of Congress

To
ANY MEMBER
Of
CONGRESS

By A Layman

MAGNA EST VERITAS ET PREVALEBIT

PRINTED FOR THE PUBLISHER,
BY S. J. M'MORRIS

1831

A LETTER TO ANY MEMBER OF CONGRESS

BY A LAYMAN

You will have petitions again about stopping the mail on a Sabbath day because the Christian religion ordains the Sabbath day to be kept holy. That is, because the priests will permit nobody to make hay when the sun shines on a Sabbath but themselves. They claim the day as their own day of labor, and will suffer no body but a parson to work on that day; and they take care that if it be to them a day of godliness, it shall also be of great gain.

A few questions, if you please – not that I am very anxious to please you, nor would I willingly offend. You are welcome, however, to be displeased, if you are determined to be so, and to burn this paper; but some of you will read it.

Whether the observance of our Sunday as a Sabbath day is of religious obligation among Christians is a disputed question, for which we must appeal to the Christian scriptures. What part of the constitution has authorized Congress to decide a *theological* question? If it be expedient as a civil municipal ordinance to appoint a day of relaxation from labor, is not each state as competent for this purpose as you are? What have you to do with it? You have quarrelsome questions enough before ye – let religion alone.

“Oh! But the laws of Congress must be conformable to the divine commands! This is a Christian country, and the observation of the Sabbath is of divine ordinance!” Is it so? Who says this is a Christian country? Not the constitution; for *that* embraces under one system of equal rights Jew, Turk, Infidel, and Heretic. Not old Mr. John Adams, who, as President of the United States, assured the Dey of Algiers, “that the constitution of the United States was in no sense founded on the Christian religion.” The base lie of the law judges, that Christianity is part and parcel of the common law, has been so completely put down by Mr. Jefferson that it can never be repeated, except for purposes of fraud.

That head repository of antiquated decisions (Judge Story’s head) has lately sent forth a contrary doctrine on the authority of Justice Park (*Smith and Sparrow*, 4 Bingh. 84, 88). Did this man never read the Year book cited by Mr. Jefferson, which shows the barefaced, wilful ignorance of the English Bench, and of Judge Story? This judge either has read *Prisot’s* opinion, or he has not. If not, he is grossly ignorant: if he has, he has asserted what he *knows* is not law. I give him notice – the Year book is before me (34 H.6 fol. 38-40) and I know he dare not meet the discussion. Is he prepared to allow what he cannot deny, that the Christianity of Prisot’s day was the grossest form of Popery? Is this the religion which is part and parcel of the common law, or is it Judge Story’s Unitarianism? Or is it that paragon of Christian meekness and mildness, John Calvin’s “sweet and comfortable doctrine” (17th art. of the 39) of predestination to eternal damnation and eternal brodings on Satan’s gridiron? God forgive these ignorant and rancorous bigots, who form God after man’s image, and choose the very worst model they can find, themselves!

This base subserviency of the judges to the priests is most degrading. But supposing Christianity is part and parcel of the law of England, does it follow that this is the law here? Sir, you are a Papist; what is Christianity? Sir, you are a Calvinist; what is Christianity? Sir, you are an Arminian; what is

Christianity? Sir, you are a Unitarian, an Universalist, an Arian, a Sublapsarian, a Superlapsarian, a Baptist, a Hopkinsian, a Quaker, a Shaker, a Harmonist, a Moravian, a Swedenborgian, a Hutchinsonian, a Muggletonian, a Wilkinsonian; what is Christianity?

Judge Story I fancy is Unitarian; he stops at the half way house; he is wise; he may go farther and fare worse, as the Catholic said to the Protestant who disliked purgatory. I know not an historical fact so disgraceful to the pretended honesty of the bench, English and American, as this wilful perversion and mistranslation of Prisot's expressions. It is evidence how ready even judges are to connive at forgery (for such the translation is) rather than give up their obsequiousness to the priesthood. I wonder Judge Story did not cite *The People v Ruggles* in his favor.

"But the Sabbath is of divine authority and obligation." Is it so? Who made it so? Assuredly not Christ, or his apostles. Let us see. To the law and to the testimony.

Christ was opposed to the Sabbath; by precept; by practice.

By *precept*. 2 Mark 27. "The Sabbath was made for man; not man for the Sabbath." 2 March 28. Luke, ch. 6, v.5. "The son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath." Luke 13, v. 15. "Thou hypocrite! Doth not each one of you, on the Sabbath, loose his ox or his ass from the stall? And his adversaries were ashamed." 12 Matt. 11. "Which of you, if a sheep fall into a pit, will not life him out on the Sabbath day?" See also 14 Luke, 5.

By *practice*. See the last mentioned practices. Also 5 John, 16, 18. "Therefore the Jews sought to slay him, because he had done these things on the Sabbath day, and had broken the Sabbath." Christ, then, never acknowledged the divine origin of the Jewish Sabbath, which was the *last* day of the week. Did he ever ordain the Christian sabbath, the *first* day of the week? No; he did not. Not a text can be produced in its favor. Produce it if you can. Did the apostles sanction a Sabbath of any kind? We know they were Jews; that they observed the Jewish Sabbath, as well as other Jewish rites; that they scolded St. Paul for neglect of them; but they did not impose them on their followers. When they met together for the purpose of determining what part of the Jewish law the Gentiles ought to observe (15 Acts 25, 29) they omitted the Sabbath, and recommended no substitute. St. Paul treated it very unceremoniously. 2 Col. 16. "Let no man judge you then, in meat or in drink, or in respect of a holy day, or of the *Sabbath* days."! 5 Gal. 1. "Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made you free."

Does any person say the apostle ordained the Christian Sabbath, the first day? Let him show his text; his authority. The Bible does not contain it. If it be sanctioned, therefore, neither by Christ or his apostles, can the commandments of men confer divine authority? Who ordained the Sabbath? Those avaricious, ambitious, fraudulent and impudent imposters, the Christian priests. For what purpose? To create business for themselves: to obtain influence: to get money: to make their services necessary to the ignorant; and by the bigoted violence of the blockheads, to terrify and rule the wise – and well have they succeeded. But *free discussion*, holding in her hand the spear of Ithuriel, is abroad.

ALL PUBLIC PRAYER is forbidden by Christ; *expressly*, in words, as well as by his uniform and regular *practice*. I am obliged to give you the trouble of reading the passages here, because I know you re too indolent to look them out. Here they are; and if you are a Christian, say if you can that public worship is of divine appointment. The fraudulent priests indeed say so; Christ says otherwise. Where he sets an example, Christians are bound by it. 1 Pet. ch. 2, v.21. 6 Matt. 5, 6, 7, 8. – "When thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues, and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, they shall have their reward. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut the door, pray to thy father which is in secret; and thy father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly."

Is it possible for command to be more plain, direct, and unequivocal? We shall now see that this practice uniformly coincided with his precept. 14 Matt. 23. "And when he had sent the multitude away, he went

up into a mountain apart, to pray.” 23 Matt. 14. “Wo unto you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites, who for a pretense make long prayers!” 26 Matt. 36. “And he saith unto his disciples, sit ye here while I go and pray yonder.” 6 Mark, 46, 47. “And when he had sent them away, he departed into a mountain to pray.” 14 Mark 32. “And he saith to his disciples, sit ye here while I pray.” 5 Luke 16. “And he withdrew himself into a wilderness and prayed.” 9 Luke 29 “And he went up into a mountain to pray.” 22 Luke 41. “And when he was withdrawn from them about a stone’s cast, he kneeled down and prayed.”

Such are the *precepts* and the *practice* of Christ. He never practiced; *he expressly forbade all public prayer*. He preached, indeed, and taught in the synagogue; he never prayed there. All prayer is ordered to be private; and he who orders it to be public is no Christian, if the command of Christ, the example of Christ, and the directions of the scripture have any authority. Public prayer and Sunday preaching are the inventions of the clergy; they are no part of Christianity. They were brought into vogue to enable the clergy to find profitable employment for themselves, and a plausible pretense for swindling the people out of their money. The necessity for preaching is superseded by the gospels. Show, as I have now shown, that the Christian Sunday is a clerical imposition, not countenanced by any part of the scripture; show, that among Christians who reverence the precepts and example of Christ, public prayer is inconsistent with that humble, unpretending, devotional spirit which Christ requires – show this, and where is the use for the order of men called the clergy? An order of men raised up by the money-making speculations, self-created, who take up religion as a trade, who dispense it for pay, and to which the history and the precepts of the New Testament afford no countenance, but otherwise. Christianity is a very doubtful religion at the best, as these quibblers teach and preach it; and they disqualify themselves from being competent witnesses in its favor by hiring themselves out for money to give testimony.

The clergy are a mass of men who, in direct contradiction to their master Christ, ordain the observance of forbidden practices that they may live in ease and luxury by this gross and manifest imposition. Sunday is their day of labor; of earning money; but they forbid anyone else to do so. This is harsh language; but why is imposture and avarice, and falsehood, and fraud to be treated with respectful deference?

You employ chaplains to pray for you during the session; a practice which nine-tenths of you believe to be farcical, useless, and know to be a mere popularity-hunting ceremony. Few of you attend it; none of you care for it. Why do you not pray silently, seriously, and shortly, each for himself? Is God Almighty such a proud and overbearing despot that he must not be addressed unless by means of some third person, some official and accredited agent, hired and well paid for being the go-between? Is this not another barefaced, clerical pretension, for swindling the people out of their money; which *you*, their representative, dishonestly countenance and support?

But if you must intermix religion with politics; if the people’s understanding must be gulled and cheated; why pick their pockets? If you will have some hired prayer-monger to do for you that duty that you ought to do for yourselves, why do you not hire and pay him at your own expense for doing *your* duty? Why rob the public treasury? Do you suppose God Almighty will be pleased at this act of folly and fraud? Is not this a shameful misapplication of the public funds levied on the people for far different purposes? By what authority, in this country of religious freedom, do you intermix religion with politics, or tax the man who is not a Christian in support of any sect or any form of Christianity? A precious set of representatives you are, who acknowledge the necessity of having your memories jogged every morning before you are able to do your duty; and of hiring a parson to do this in some sort of theology fashion! While he, good man, always takes care to foist in some petition for “the good of the church;” although he knows you have nothing to do with any such topic. But the whole ceremony is a farce, and you know it. The ignorance, the folly, and the credulity of the people tempt you thus to impose upon their understandings, and pick their pockets. Methinks you ought to be satisfied with the wanton waste committed upon time and upon money by talking, day in and day out, upon exhausted subjects, and draining the cup of wordiness to the very dregs. to this source of enormous expense, in printing speeches

spoken to blind your constituents by a semblance of business, the pay of your chaplains is comparatively nothing; but both the one and the other are indefensible. If the people were wise, which Heaven knows is very far from being the case, they would allow you no pay at all; and then half an hour's good sense would be the length of tether allowed to your womanly propensity for incessant chattering. It will come to this at last.

I well know that talking spins out the *day*, without spinning out the period of *final adjournment*; that is settled on other principles. Back country members are too fond of \$8 a day to give it up, till they can find no excuse for receiving it. The day of breaking up, therefore, is protracted as far as possible, and settled at the beginning of the sessions, which no talking extends or hastens. Talking is desirable; it fills up the hours of the day, and prevents too early an adjournment to dinner. No one is compelled to listen. Nothing but no pay, or a fixed salary, or a day for adjournment fixed by law, will remedy this evil. The talking answers no purpose but the please the constituents. The members care nothing what is said, or who says it.

It is high time for men of talent, and men of honesty, to renounce this playing into the hands of the selfish priesthood. The conventional simulation and dissimulation involved in the usual shallow pretenses to religion do little credit to your moral honesty, or your moral courage. It is a disgrace for you to be actuated either by fear of the clergy or fear of the ignorance of the people. Your high station ought to put you upon high ground, and to resist in every case these persevering, never ending encroachments of the clergy on political rights.

After all, what is prayer? What does it amount to? What does it imply? You pretend that the God you worship is all good, all knowing, all foreseeing, all wise, all powerful. You approach him and you say, "It is true, O Lord God, thou art infinite in wisdom and knowest all things; thou art all bountiful and all good; and desirous of supplying all our wants; but thy memory is apt to be deficient occasionally, and thou forgettest what a set of poor miserable wretches we are, the work of thine Almighty hand, formed in thy own likeness, but perpetually in need of thy assistance. We are ill fashioned, imperfect, and ill going machines, needing thy perpetual interposition. We acknowledge thou knowest every thing, but after all, we know our wants best. Permit us, therefore, to refresh thy memory as to the following particulars, which we have hired and paid one of thy own appointed servants to lay before thee in due form, lest, in the multiplicity of business that presses on thee, we may chance to be forgotten." Such is all prayer in substance; but the best of it is that the clergy cajole us with the expectation that prayer, offered up by their intervention, will induce the Almighty to change his purposes and predeterminations; to interfere miraculously in all our petty concerns; to become of our party in all our mad disputes; and be influenced by these our inconsistent ravings.

At any rate, I hope I have proved, 1st, That no clergyman, no conscientious Christian, can countenance public prayer, because it is positively prohibited by Jesus Christ. 2d. That although oral preaching was necessary in the very early times of Christianity, before any accounts of Christ were published, it cannot be necessary since the universal publication and wide diffusion of the gospels, unless the preacher can correct the inaccuracies and mistakes, and add something to the omissions of which the Evangelists were guilty, or explain what these inspired writers were too ignorant to dictate intelligibly.

If the clergy are not wanted for preaching or for praying, for what purpose are they wanted? A clergyman to each 1000 persons will amount to 13,000 for the United States. At \$1000 a year on the average, these men take the people \$13,000,000 a year. This is a great deal of money, and it will double every 22 years. For 1850 it will be 20 millions at least. Is not this great sum obtained under false pretenses? If so, what is the *legal* name appropriated to this conduct? Can this army of expounders be really necessary to the word of God?

Gentlemen of the Bible Society: you say the scriptures are the infallible dictate of divine inspiration, given for the instruction of mankind. Be it so. If these scriptures contain, in plain and intelligible

language, all that is necessary to faith and practice here, and to salvation hereafter, where is the use of 20,000 persons, members of the church militant, paid at the expense of 20,000,000 a year, to explain these dictates of divine inspiration?

If these pious commentators *are* necessary, what becomes of inspiration? Why do you propagate this book which is so obscure and unintelligible that a thousand quarrelsome commentators and a thousand conflicting comments are needed to make it still more unintelligible? *Obscuram per obscurius*. The only true answer is that you are the willing tools and dupes of the clergy, whose real motive is to gull the people and pick their pockets.

The parsons will cry out against this as an attack upon religion. This is their usual subterfuge. They palm upon us their doctrines for God's doctrines, and their cause for God's cause, and their treasury for the Lord's treasury. Their good friend, the devil, stands by and laughs in his sleeve at the dexterity with which they persuade their credulous follows that all men who tell the truth are God's enemies! THIS IS NOT AN ATTACK UPON, BUT A DEFENSE OF SCRIPTURAL CHRISTIANITY. I appeal to the gospels; and I call upon ye to examine for yourselves. *There is not one text* which countenances the clergy as a separate order of men necessary to Christianity.

The clergy, more especially the Presbyterian clergy, for these last 50 years, have been aiming by all methods direct and indirect to acquire political influence in this country, and to inculcate the necessity of a provision for the priesthood, independent of the people; principally by insisting on their favorite doctrine, the divine obligation of *tythes*. Over and over they have been checked, but they persevere with an obstinacy worthy of a better cause; and they are now accumulating immense funds to bribe popular opinion when they cannot gain it over to their purpose in any other way. All this is well known to every member of Congress, who, with disgraceful timidity, yields to their insolence and their popular influence, and adopts that prudent time-serving hypocrisy which is the besetting sin of the day; thus sacrificing his own honest opinion, the interest of his constituents, and the good of his country, to the insinuated but insolent threats of an avaricious, and ambitious, and a daring combination.

A class and order of men whose character, from the earliest history to the present moment, is that of subjugating the minds and preying upon the substance of the people; who govern in each family by their influence over the females; and who govern in society by employing the ignorant and bigoted to threaten, to worry, and subjugate the wise. Such, in sum and substance, has ever been, and still is, the character of *a hired and paid priesthood*. Has not Dr. Ely very lately recommended his sect to unite, and turn out every political candidate, from the President downward, who was not an orthodox communicant; so as to force themselves on the public as a political sect?

I shall be abused for an impudent, intermeddling blockhead; perhaps justly. But I have not picked *your* pocket, as you and the parsons pick the peoples. These few pages cost you little or nothing; burn them if you please. I have not told you lies; I have not taxed you, either in money or in time. You need not buy this; you need not read it. But I like in hopes – Truth never takes a walk without meeting and making some friends. It is possible, if I should be encouraged, that I may repeat this offense next year. Pray order your Chaplain to reply to these observations. Mark me: he will say it is not worth any one's while to reply to such infidel trash. (N.B. – Every objection the clergy are unable to answer, they call infidelity.) This may serve his purpose for the present; the time is coming when something more will be expected.

A LAYMAN

P.S. To the Chaplain – Reverend Sir: If a man be hired, and paid, and bribed to teach and preach certain facts and doctrines, is he an independent, unimpeachable witness in support of these facts and doctrines? In support of what you call gospel truths? Would any witness in a court of justice be heard for a moment if he should declare upon his *voir dire* that he was hired to appear and give testimony in a certain way? What right has a clergyman to ask for credence who is hired and paid for asserting what he asserts?

Pray tell us, Rev'd Sir, what worldly motive the persons called skeptics and infidels can have to profess their opinions, unless it be the claims of truth, and the honest dictates of an unbending conscience? Do they gain in reputation? Do they acquire friends and supporters by their unpopular opinions? is it any pecuniary gain to them? Unless indeed they be printers or editors; which is not the case with one in thousand – not with half a dozen in the whole United States. Are they not exposed to the obloquy and reproach of all the time serving, worldly minded, hypocritical members of society – of all the ignorant and the bigoted, set on to abuse them by the *odium theologicum* of the clergy, whose craft is endangered by these opponents?

On what pretense can a hired and paid priest put himself on an equality with the bold and fearless honesty of the men whom he abuses as infidels? Can you tell us?

A LAYMAN

**Thomas Cooper To Thomas Jefferson. Columbia, South Carolina, Oct. 18th,
1822.**

DEAR SIR, - I spent the three months of vacation at this college in an excursion to various parts of the State of Pennsylvania, chiefly for the purpose of attending to some land concerns in which I am interested. I write to you now for the purpose of giving you some idea of the progress of fanaticism, which I could not have figured to myself if I had not had the advantage of extensive personal observation.

When I lived at Northumberland with Dr. Priestley, a more social place could not well be imagined. The harmony of private society was hardly interrupted by politics, and not at all by religion. Presbyterians, Methodists, Seceders, Baptists, Unitarians, and Episcopalians lived together, and mixed freely in society. At present, owing to the predominant influence of the Presbyterian preachers, over the women particularly, whom they tempt out to nightly sermons & prayer meetings, I was invited to, and compelled to visit my old friends, not collected in social parties, but in detail. The heads of families of one sect keep aloof from those of another; and the bitterness & intolerance of theological hatred reigns in full force. I found this the case at Northumberland, at Sunbury, at Reading, at Harrisburgh, and in every place without exception wherever I enquired into the fact.

At Harrisburgh these religious parties occupy every evening, and the meeting houses are crowded with women, while the taverns are equally crowded with such of their husbands as revolt at these works of supererogation. Judge Franks, who boarded at the same tavern at Harrisburgh that I did (for he was there holding his courts at the time), told me that he was induced not merely to subscribe to each of these fanatics, but to attend frequently their meetings, lest a character for irreligion should attach to him as judge. He told me that a short time before I saw him he had heard a sermon one evening at Harrisburgh, from a Mr. DeWitt, a Presbyterian clergyman from New York, in which the preacher declared that a man might be a good citizen, a good father, a good husband, a good neighbour, charitable, benevolent, and observant of every moral duty, - nay, he might sedulously & conscientiously attend all the ordinances of religion as a means of saving grace, but if he were not one of the elect according to the foreknowledge of God before the foundations of the world were laid, all his endeavours were not only unavailing, but savoured of sin. I well know this is in conformity with Puritan orthodoxy, and is to be found in the articles of the Church of England as well as among the Calvinistic Presbyterians; but if there be any doctrine calculated to demoralize society, to make the good bad and the wicked worse, it is such a doctrine as this.

The same tenets and the same practices prevail all through North Carolina & the upper parts of this State, and very strongly indeed in the town of Columbia where I live. Our college has two Presbyterian and one Roman Catholic professor, and I go regularly to the Episcopal Church with my family. But because the professors here live in mutual tolerance and harmony, this college is openly and publicly denounced as void of all religion. Yet I know not where prayers are more enforced morning or evening among the students, or attended more regularly by the faculty. I go now to prayers every morning, but not in an evening, as my lectures are not over till 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I find in New York State everywhere where I have been or from whence I have received information, that there is a public, avowed, persevering attempt among the Presbyterians to establish a system of tythes; this is brought forward in many publications; at Utica, in N. Y. State, and in South Carolina, as well as intermediate places. Equally decided and persevering is the attempt of the same sect to acquire the command over every seminary of education, and finally to attempt, in favour of the Presbyterians, a Church establishment. Of these designs on the part of that sect I am as fully persuaded as I am of my own existence; and what is worse, I

greatly fear they will succeed. The people, not aware of the frauds committed, are the gross dupes of missionary societies, Bible societies, and theological seminaries; and every head of a family of a religious turn, or in any way connected with that sect, must submit to the power these parsons have acquired, – acquired by making the females of the families which they are permitted to enter the engines of their influence over the male part. I foresee another night of superstition, not far behind the Inquisition; for so rancorously is every opponent calumniated that the persecution becomes gradually irresistible, and the men who hate these impostors & their frauds are actually compelled to bow down to them. I look around me, and knowing, as I do, the general prevalence of liberal opinions on religious subjects among well educated men, I regard with absolute horror the system of simulation and dissimulation which they are compelled to adopt; and I cannot help exclaiming with Lucretius: -

“Tantum haec religio potuit suadere malorum!”

In the college here, the industry of the faculty is exemplary, their competence undeniable, but the cry is gone forth, "There is no religion among them," & I greatly fear it will make the college totter to its fall; for utterly false as it is, the want of prayer meetings and religious revivals will be accepted as undeniable evidence of the charge. In hopes of hearing that things are not quite so bad in Virginia, I sit down to communicate my fears and forebodings. In the State of Pennsylvania I see no prospect of amendment; for the prevailing doctrine is that a collegiate education is good only for the rich, and they ought to obtain it at their own expense without any legislative aid. M. Correa, I find, is compelled to fly to Paris, being too much attached to the royal cause for the present crisis. I hope your health keeps yet good, and that you still enjoy enough of life to make it desirable.

May God bless you.

THOMAS COOPER.

S. Carolina College.

CONSOLIDATION
AN
ACCOUNT OF PARTIES
IN THE
UNITED STATES,
FROM THE
CONVENTION OF 1787,
TO THE
PRESENT PERIOD

By
Thomas Cooper, M.D.

“The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the
sovereignty of the people over constitutions, are truths which
are at all times necessary to be kept in mind,
and at no time perhaps more necessary
than at the present.”

Columbia, S.C.
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1824

CONSOLIDATION.

PREFACE.

What is meant by *Consolidation*? What are the distinctive characters of the FEDERAL and ANTI-FEDERAL parties? Many persons use the words without any accurate ideas annexed to them. To throw some light on the subject, I have drawn up a brief history of the two parties, which I submit to the reader's consideration; assuring him that, however I differ from the politicians who have been, and usually are, called Federalists, I concede the same right to them that I take to myself. I firmly believe the majority of that party are as intelligent, as honest, and as patriotic as their opponents; and that the ultimate good of the country is the object of both. The mode of pursuing it makes the difference in opinion, and in conduct.

The following is a statement of an Anti-Federalist; who believes it to be true, and submits it to the consideration of his fellow citizens. He disapproves of the measures, but gives full credit to the motives of those who differ from him. The tribunal of the public is the proper court of appeal.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

We, the Representatives of the United States, in General Congress assembled,***do solemnly publish and declare, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be free, sovereign, and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.
1776.

This language was adopted by the Confederation of 1777, which called itself the *United States of America*, and which declares that each state retains its sovereignty; adopting as the end and design of their meeting, "the common Defense and general welfare" of the states thus united. The proceedings of the Confederation of 1777, were not to be valid till they were confirmed by the several legislatures of all the United States. The probability that this might not be finally obtained to an instrument containing so many provisions occasioned the subsequent agreement in 1787, that the Constitution then adopted should be valid when ratified by nine out of the thirteen United States.

In each of these cases, the Confederation of 1777, and the convention of 1787, consisted of delegates or representatives, not from the people of the United States, but from the several and respective states, in their capacity of states, free, sovereign, and independent of each other, as of all the rest of the world. The people of the respective states chose that this should be the mode of transacting the business of the Confederation, and they acceded to it when finished. Had they chosen to send representatives in their character of the people of the U. States, or of North America, or of the heretofore British Colonies, they might have done so; but they directed or permitted their state representatives to send delegates representing each separate, sovereign, and independent states; and to ratify the Constitution thus considered, framed, and adopted, in their character as representatives of states, and not as representatives

of the people.

The *independence* and separate sovereignty of each State of the Union; therefore, never was any moment conceded, or in any manner or degree renounced. The Confederate states consented that this sovereignty should not be exercised on the objects committed exclusively to the federal government by the Constitution of 1787. These objects are separately stated, defined, and limited by the Constitution: many powers and objects proposed during the debates on the Constitution were rejected; and finally, by the 10th article of the amendments to the Constitution, it is declared that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Demonstrating beyond all doubt that the Constitution of the United States was an instrument conveying specific, express, and limited powers, and those only; that the federal government was a creature of the several independent states that consented to it; and that so far from being sovereign, independent, and uncontrollable, it was originally created, is now kept in force, and may be altered, Ltd., controlled, or annulled, at the will of the several independent states or sovereignties who united to give it existence.

All this agrees with the plain and obvious meaning of the state instructions to the deputies from the twelve states who met in Philadelphia to form the Constitution of the United States; and particularly with the language of South Carolina, whose delegates were instructed to meet on that occasion and "devise such alterations as maybe thought necessary to render the federal constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation and future good government of the Confederate states." None of the credentials contained a word of a *national* government, or national union. This delegation of state (not national) representatives met and was organized at Philadelphia on the 29th of May, 1787. There were at that time three distinct parties in the delegation, as we learned from the propositions actually made and debated in Mr. *Justice Yate's* account of their proceedings, and the notes taken and published by Mr. *Luther Martin*, of Baltimore, which are the only authentic documents of the proceedings of that assembly now extant; Major Jackson's and Mr. Madison's notes will probably be published after their decease. Many accounts and anecdotes might be obtained from private recollections, but they do not exist to the public. Lloyd's Congressional Register embraces an early period of congressional debates after the Constitution was adopted. Indeed, so fearful were the members of that federal delegation of their proceedings and designs alarming the people, who were at first the majority, particularly the Consolidation party, that "the members were prohibited even from taking copies of resolutions on which the convention were deliberating, or extracts of any kind from the journals, without formally moving for, and obtaining a vote of permission for that purpose." *Martin's Secret Proceedings of the Convention*, p.12.

The three parties were these:

One whose object was to abolish and annihilate all state governments, and to bring forward one general government over this extensive continent, of a monarchical nature, under certain restrictions and limitations. The characteristic expression and countersign of this party was "NATIONAL." The leaders of this party were Col. Hamilton, whose plan of government to this purpose was read and proposed by him in convention on the 18th June. It was too coercive, and did not succeed. Mr. Randolph, Mr. Pierce Butler, Mr. Gouverneur Morris, Mr. Charles Pinckney, Mr. Madison, were in favor of establishing a NATIONAL government in lieu of a federal union; of giving to this government supreme power; and of annulling every state law that interfered with the acts of the supreme and paramount general government; not much differing from Col. Hamilton's proposal, which converted the several states into provinces. The leading opponents of this plan, and the defenders of state rights, were Mr. John Dickinson, author of the Farmer's Letters, and Mr. Patterson. The consolidation members were at first six out of eight. Mr. Dickinson's plan of a *federal* government was rejected the day after Col. Hamilton's project was read, viz. June 19th. His party was characterized by the word "Federal."

By this time 11 states had appeared, and the *federal*, or state party, had increased to five, the *consolidation*, or national party, remaining six. The deputies from New Hampshire came in on June 23rd.

The great question came to issue on June 25th, when it was proposed and seconded to erase the term NATIONAL and to substitute the word UNITED STATES which passed in the affirmative: this ended the struggle between the party of Col. Hamilton, of Messrs. Randolph, Butler, Morris, Pinckney and Madison -- and that of John Dickinson and his adherents, who were in favor of the preservation of state independence, state sovereignty, and state rights, in every case not specifically and clearly conceded in the instrument then under debate called the Constitution.

The second party did not advocate the abolition of state sovereignty, or state rights; but they wished to establish such a system as would give their own states some preponderance. This party and the first coalesced for the most part.

The third party consisted of the real friends of a federal, not a national consolidated government; to be instituted as the creature of the several states, acting in their sovereign and independent characters; and conceding so much power, and no more, as was necessary to promote the general welfare of this union of states: expressing, limiting, and defining the specific powers so conceived, as cautiously as the occasion seemed to require.

We have seen that this party (until about the year 1790, called the Federal party) succeeded on the 25th of June. The term *national*, the watchword of the party in favor of consolidation, was therefore relinquished in all the subsequent proceedings of the convention. On the 18th of August it was proposed to empower the legislature of the United States to grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public good may require them and the authority of a single state may be incompetent; and to establish an University. These, with some other similar proposals made by the consolidation party, were referred to a committee which had been raised on 23rd June. The two propositions above mentioned were debated and finally negatived on the 14th September. Affording a full and decisive proof that the powers conceded the Congress are specific, limited, and enumerated powers that do not emanate as of course from any abstract principle of what the public good may require; but from the deliberate concessions and absolute will of the sovereign and independent states, who then met in convention to define and declare how many and what powers were *required* by the public good. If Congress acts upon this vague and comprehensive principle of the general welfare, it assumes a power not delegated; and it usurps the authority of the convention by whose will it was created. The object of the convention was to ascertain what kind and degree of authority the public good actually required to be delegated to congress. The members of that convention met for that purpose, and for that purpose only; they deliberated, they settled, and acted what ever they thought necessary for that purpose, and they committed to congress no part of their own peculiar power. If Congress do exercise the authority of a convention, it is exercised by usurpation; and whether it be done by the ingenious subterfuge of implication and construction -- by management and contrivance -- in any covert and indirect way -- or openly, boldly, and directly, it is in either case a fraud on the community. Congress was created and appointed, not as a supreme, but subordinate authority; to put in force the powers committed to its charge by the Constitution -- not to delegate at its own will and pleasure new powers to itself, unknown to, unthought of, unexpressed, and unsanctioned by the framers of that instrument -- a body of men certainly paramount and authority to congress, which owes its powers, properties, and existence to that convention.

The secrecy enjoined on the members of the convention at the early period of their meeting, and when the national, or consolidation party, were six to two, was a most suspicious circumstance. For who would desire to keep the public in ignorance but those who wish to take some advantage by means of secrecy? It is clear that the propositions made in the early part of that convention were deemed unpopular by the proposers, or their conduct would have challenged public inquiry, instead of shrinking from it. For all these facts, and the correctness of the preceding statement, I appeal to the minutes of that convention published by Judge Yates, the notes taken by Mr. Luther Martin, and of remarks founded on them by the late John Taylor, of Caroline, in his new views of that Constitution. Colonel Hamilton and Mr. Madison, notwithstanding their dissonance, very honorably signed the Constitution. Mr. Randolph took time for the purpose. Congress first met in March, 1789. Before this, the series of papers called the *Federalist*

was published, written chiefly by Colonel Hamilton, partly by Mr. Madison, and partly by Mr. John Jay for the purpose of reconciling the people to the new constitution which the convention had framed in 1787. As we might expect, the party distinctions that took place in the convention are rather concealed than brought into view in that work. It was a conciliatory publication, and the motives of the authors did them honor. But it is ridiculous to cite them as authority for the real views of the prevailing party; to which Colonel Hamilton and Mr. Madison did not at that time cordially accede. After this period, the appearance of Col. Hamilton and the consolidation party gradually assumed a denomination of federalists, hitherto applied with great propriety to their opponents: and the real "federalists," the supporters of the independence of the respective states that form our federal union, have been at different times since branded with the appellation of anti-federalists, Jacobins, Republicans, Democrats, and radicals. Of the fraternity of politicians that is variously designated by the ingenious maneuvering of the federal leaders, who well knew the force and value of the nickname, the writer of these pages requests to be considered as a member: stating it as an historical fact within the knowledge of every man conversant with the history and progress of our republican government that the distinctive character of the two great leading parties in the United States, usually known as Federalists and Democrats, are these:

The *Federalists*, approving rather of an American Nation, than of the United States; of a consolidated and single, than a limited and federal government: of increasing the military and naval establishments of the United States; of augmenting the salaries, the rank and popular estimation of all public functionaries; and of putting the United States into a situation to take part, if necessary, in European politics, and of making them a great and energetic nation, one and indivisible. Hence they would repress the interference, and depress the influence of state authorities, and keep state rights and pretensions in subordination to the powers of the general government. Hence also they are advocates for the extension of the general, or what is now called *federal* authority, by any means of implication and construction, rather than by an appeal to the states under the prescribed form of an amendment of the Constitution; their policy being to keep state interference as much as possible out of view in theory and in practice. Hence also, the absolute and dangerous control exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States over state laws and state decisions. Hence also the power formally assumed by this party, when the reins of government were in their hands, of limiting the rights of the people and checking the inconvenient practice of free discussion by alien and sedition laws. Hence also their dislike, not merely to the horrid practices to which the French people were driven or tempted during the French Revolution, but also to the principles of that revolution; and their predilection for the British government and its forms. Hence also, some of the prominent federalists were, and still are, admirers of a limited monarchy; and advocates of course for Colonel Hamilton's energetic plan of government, the President and Senate eligible during good behavior, an absolute veto over all state proceedings, and a President over each state, to be appointed by the general government.

This party, however, neither is, or was numerous; the far greater portion of federalists being real friends to a republican form of government, but with a tendency to consolidation as the leading trait in it: the whole of their policy tending to establish one consolidated national government, under the control of one system of authority, instead of a mere confederation of separate states, delegating expressed and limited powers, for expressed and limited purposes.³³ The origin of modern federalism, the distinctive character of the party and its commencement and in its progress, was consolidation of the states under one government, paramount in all respects; and to this object all their proposals lead. For want of an accurate knowledge of the history of parties in our Republic, and the leading objects of the two great divisions, many of the Republicans have been tempted to coincide with federal politics, and many of the Federalists are found in the ranks of their usual opponents. Indeed party divisions are productive of consequences so unpleasant that good men of all sides are desirous of forgetting and dropping political differences; especially when Federalists and Republicans, the more they see of each other in common society, the more they are inclined to respect each other's motives, and to approve of each other's general conduct, the public good being indubitably the object of the great majority of both parties. Still it is the duty of a good man, whether of the one party or of the other, to adopt those political measures, and to support that class

of public men, whose general opinions and line of conduct tend to advance the public welfare, according to the leading principles which he deems best calculated to promote it. These leading principles will, on examination, be found to *be a single consolidated national government, at the expense of state sovereignty, or a federal government, with powers strictly limited, under the authority delegated by Independent states; and to be altered and amended by an appeal to them, and in no other way.*

In examining therefore the character and conduct of public men, we must supply this test to their doctrines and practices. So far as they tend to exalt or increase the character, the powers, and the patronage of the General Government, at the expense or beyond the control of, and without appealing to the state governments, they bear clearly the features and physiognomy of federalism, whoever be the proposer, or whatever may be his professions.

The *Antifederalist*, Republican, Democrat, Radical (*quocunque nomine gaudeas*) is of opinion that as history clearly shows the tendency of all power to exceed its proper limits, no more power should in any case be delegated than the circumstances imperiously require to produce the goods intended. That the holders of all power should be responsible for the use of it to those who gave it. That if any excess be excusable on either side, it is better to concede rather too little than too much, as it is much more easy to add than diminish. They are of the opinion that the people and the state governments of this country never meant to institute a magnificent, imposing, expensive, *national* government, with extensive powers and high prerogatives, calculated to control or prostrate the quiet, unpretending, cheap and salutary governments of the separate states -- but a government with so much power, and no more, as might be necessary to manage the political transactions of common and general interest in which each and every state had the same common concern; interfering with state authorities as little as possible. That the more simple the apparatus, the fewer the officers of government, and the less they required state rights to be conceded, the better. That if power sufficient be not conceded, it ought not to be boldly seized by direct usurpation, or clandestinely obtained by taking advantage of verbal ambiguity, by implication and construction, but applied for by submitting the case under the constitutional form of an AMENDMENT to the legislatures of the respective states; this being the mode of proceeding specially designated by the framers of our Constitution to meet the case. They are of opinion that although parsimony be one thing and frugality another, the cheapest government is the best government if it answers the purpose in other respects. They particularly object to expensive standing armies, and even to a great extent of naval power in time of peace,³⁴ not that these institutions should be reduced to insignificance, but kept under cautious control. They hold that the public character and conduct of all public men and public bodies, from the President to a Tide Waiter, is fair subject for temperate remark; that nothing brings a government so surely into contempt as its dread of discussion and examination, and that in all such cases the verdict on trial ought to be with the jury on the law and on the fact, uncontrolled by the court. They adhere to the principles of public liberty as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, and in the Federal Constitution, particularly claiming a free press, untrammelled by any previous restriction, and extending to every subject of human investigation, as the dearest and most valuable characteristic of a truly republican government.

For my own part, I go farther, and reviewing the events of the last thirty years, I am decidedly of opinion that the Republican Party has forgotten, in great part, the principles that originally characterized it; and they have permitted and acquiesced in one encroachment after another, till the power of the President of the United States, the power of the Congress of the United States, and more than all, the power of the Supreme Court of the United States (the most dangerous body in the Union) HAS INCREASED, IS INCREASING, AND OUGHT TO BE DIMINISHED. But on the present occasion, I must abstain from the detailed investigation that would establish my opinion; an opinion, however, which no man who has observed the progress of our government as long and as anxiously as I have done will be inclined to deny.

The former opposers of a *federal* and advocates of a *national* government, now seized upon the name by which the series of essays was designated containing a defense of the Constitution of 1787 and an exposition of the principles on which it was founded. An exposition not likely to be in all respects

accurate and authentic when made by gentlemen who had opposed its leading features and principles; and who were induced to defend it from the truly honorable and disinterested motive of promoting obedience and acquiescence in what had been settled upon the best and most deliberate views that could be taken of a very difficult and complicated subject. Mr. Madison, I believe, gradually changed his views of a national government, and came around to the sentiments of the majority of the republican leaders of his own state. Colonel Hamilton, and Mr. John Jay, continued of the "national party," who, from 1788 to 1790, gradually assumed to their modern appellation of FEDERALISTS. In all Colonel Hamilton's papers, in the "Federalist," the expression of *national government* is sedulously preserved, and he expressly declares, in number thirty-three, that the principal aim of that series of papers was to inculcate the danger which threatens our political welfare from the encroachments of the state governments. To which he might have added, the labored justification of the extended powers given to the national government and the formation of treaties, the regulation of commerce, the imposition of taxes, and the maintenance of a standing army and navy. To the equality of power among the states he was strenuously opposed.

Mr. Madison, in numbers forty-five and forty-six, is of the same opinion as Colonel Hamilton as to the power and influence of the state governments. These were wise and honest men, but I think experience has shown that they were bad prophets. The publication called the Federalist is of a complexion truly federal, in the modern sense of that word, but it did much good at the time, and strongly tended to reconcile the people to a Constitution which contains, after all, but one capital defect, viz: the want of a clause appointing a periodical revision of it every 30 years. See numbers forty-nine and fifty of the "Federalist." The Pennsylvania Council of Censors had an admirable effect, and I think should never have been dropped.

General Washington, whose services to the United States were probably more than any man had ever rendered to a nation, and whose motives and intentions were out of reach of suspicion, manifestly leaned toward a strong executive. All his officers of government, Colonel Hamilton at their head, were more or less at the same opinion, and of the *national* party. The military habits and character of General Washington had probably no small share in giving this bias to his opinions, and the superior talents of Col. Hamilton added weight to the party. Nor is it any wonder that a President should be in favor of a strong executive, or that persons in power should be inclined to extend their authority. The Federalists, *as they were now called*, became therefore, the prevailing, the fashionable party. The funding system, the manufacturing and tariff system, were introduced by Colonel Hamilton, and with the Treaty of commerce with Great Britain, were carried successfully against the opposition of the republican, democratic, or (now) anti-federal party. Every man pretending to good society was expected to be of federal politics, and the opposition was considered as chiefly confined to the ignorant and turbulent mass of the people. The excise upon whiskey, and the termination of an ill judged insurrection, gave the federalists (or court party, as there were sometimes called) a decided preeminence over their opponents; possessing, as the federalists certainly did, in a considerable degree, the countenance and confidence of the first man in the nation, General Washington.

The banking interests, the Mercantile importing interest, the military, all the dependents on government, and all those who sought to be such, were decidedly of the same party; which had undoubted control from Virginia northward. Great force also was given to anti-republican tendencies by the excesses consequent on the breaking out of the French Revolution. These excesses produced in many an abhorrence for the *principles* of that revolution, as if they were different from our own, and as if the excesses of the exasperated and misguided mob of the Fauxbourgs were the necessary consequences of an opposition to the execrable tyranny, political and clerical, by which that nation had been so long degraded and weighed down. The federal party made a skillful use of the circumstances; they excited to a very great degree a hatred against French principles, and against the nation itself; and brought about a strong inclination to admire, to praise, and to imitate the monarchical forms and principles of the British government.

The republicans, democrats, or anti-federalists were now put under the ban of all fashionable society, and

everywhere denounced as Jacobins. By degrees the principles of our own revolution, and our separation from Great Britain, were attacked, and every man who did not profess to admire the British constitution was regarded as an enemy to our own existing government, and beyond doubt, a disorganizer and a Jacobin. The great mass of the people, however, felt that all this was wrong: they knew that our own revolution, and the French Revolution, arose from similar causes and were based on similar doctrines. They revolted at the notion of giving preference to the monarchial principles and forms of Great Britain, which in their operation had forced upon this country the American Revolution; and although the men of superior situation, and of comparative wealth, soon after the accession of President Adams, began to exclaim without ceasing and abuse without discrimination all revolutionary principles as Jacobinical, the *people* of America thought otherwise, and felt otherwise. But the violence of the federal party about this time, aided by the political character and complexion of the existing government under General Washington's successor, and by their coincidence with British mercantile agents, importers, and their numerous connections among retailers indebted to them, gave them in the great cities an undoubted predominance and produced that state of things about two years after the retirement of General Washington which was not improperly or inappropriately denominated *the reign of terror*. The real republicans who are now living, and are old enough to remember the state of the parties on the retirement of General Washington, and the administration of Mr. John Adams, *know* the expression was well applied, and that this is not a false and fanciful, but a fair and faithful representation of the public feelings of that day, and I can with perfect safety appeal to them, for the honesty and accuracy of this sketch. The conduct of a Mr. Fitzhugh, to General Sumter, in the Theatre, at Philadelphia, in the summer of 1798, may be taken as a sample.

On the retirement of General Washington, the federal party put in Mr. John Adams as president. This gentleman was known to be ultra-federalist: the advocate of a strong executive, in which no other branch should have any participation.³⁵ He had written a defense of the American Constitution, as the title of his book imports, but a defense of the British Constitution in reality. It was a thing of checks and balances, with monarchy as an essential part; in which the admiration of the writer for the British system was glaring. Mr. Adams was deemed a fit person to carry on the views of the federal party; and was generally understood to have been chosen by the influential men of that party because he was likely to be led by Colonel Hamilton and his adherents. Col. Hamilton is now dead. The animosities of party as to him are gone by. I did not, and do not coincide in opinion with that gentleman on any subject within my present recollection; but he was at heart a friend to his country, a man of sterling talent, a bold and fearless politician, of great ambition, above all suspicion of pecuniary bias, and I believe as honest in his motives as he was daring in his measures. He deserved to be considered as the leader of his party; and it was no arrogance to expect that a man so inferior as Mr. Adams in practical information, in resources, character, should be led by him. Of Mr. Timothy Pickering, and the other minor officers of government, I know nothing that can be said in commendation; they were entitled to no praise but for zeal in support of their party.

Mr. J. Adams, however, would not be led. He was irritable, conceited, and deficient in practical knowledge. He went with his party for some time, to the utmost length of their views and wishes. He ardently longed for a rupture with France, and he was the devoted admirer of everything British. The alien law, giving power to the President to banish at its pleasure any foreigner, whether alien friend, or alien enemy, whom he deemed obnoxious; and the sedition law, checking all freedom of discussion, and protecting all political delinquency from investigation anywhere but within the walls of congress -- forbidding the people to speak or to write in disapprobation of the conduct of their rulers -- the violence of the federal judges in putting that law in force -- the exclusion from office of every description of all persons whose politics were not ultra federal, (a measure advocated as equally wise and necessary by every federal Representative in Congress, in full debate) -- the gross and fulsome adulation that disgraced the addresses to Mr. Adams, and his corresponding replies, equally arrogant and bombastic, at length completely disgusted the sober part of the nation, and prepared the way for that revolution in public opinion which ultimately took place. It was manifest that all the barriers of republican government were

to be thrown down -- that state rights were to be trampled on -- that all opposition was to be suppressed by violence -- that the federal judiciary was expected to be the mere instruments of governmental vengeance -- that doubt and hesitation about the measures of government were to be treated in all companies as disaffection and sedition, and the spirit of the nation to be broken down.

Mr. Pickering,³⁶ as Secretary of State, exhibited in his communications an overbearing insolence of language which has no parallel but in the violence of the present secretary of state, in his communications with Spain. These gentlemen forgot that all attempts at fine writing on grave subjects, and all intemperance of language on any subject, are marks of an inferior character, producing no effect but ridicule or irritation, and always operate as obstacles to conviction. The essential character of dignity of mind is mildness, clearness, and simplicity, in acting, in speaking, in writing. Col. Hamilton could understand this; but it would be a sentiment unintelligible to Mr. John Adams, or Mr. Pickering.

Fortunately, the necessities of government required an additional revenue, and a system of *assessed taxes* was resorted to, with a host of assessors, inspectors, supervisors, receivers, and collectors, in the pay and under the control of government throughout the Union. The people dislike direct taxes of all kinds, and on whatever pretense. They preferred that mode of taxation which would put into every man's power, and remit to his own discretion, how much he would pay, by using or abstaining from the article on which an impost was levied. The murmurs of the agriculturists therefore became loud and general.

About this time a quarrel arose in the administration. Mr. John Adams had revolted at the guidance and control of Colonel Hamilton and Mr. Pickering. Indeed, the latter gentleman was Mr. Adams' equal in no respect but petulance, violence, and overbearing -- a man of small information and great vanity. I refer in proof to his communications and dispatches on French affairs in particular. No wonder Mr. Adams felt disgust at the imperious manner of a person so ill qualified to direct. Be the causes what they may, the President threw off all deference for the opinions of Colonel Hamilton, Mr. Pickering, and their friends; he dismissed Pickering and McHenry from office, and determined to act for himself. Forsaken by his party, the object of profound dislike to the whole body of republicans, he was compelled to quit the presidential chair, and retire to a private station. His affecting afterward to be an anti-Federalist and republican, and his lately published letters to Mr. Cunningham, have not enabled him to regain one particle of his lost reputation: nor has Colonel Pickering's attack upon him produced any other affect that to show that however irritable and ill tempered Mr. Adams may be, Colonel Pickering is not less so. Whatever bad qualities, politically, these gentlemen may respectively possess, it must at least be allowed that they merit Dr. S. Johnson's commendation of being "*good haters*."

During General Washington's administration three questions arose, which called forth and brought into discussion the *distinctive* doctrine of the federal party, viz. That congress out to be considered as a national legislature, empowered to enact, and carry into effect all objects which in the opinion of that body were expedient to the general welfare, and to make the necessary appropriations for the purpose.

The three points to which I allude were the proposal to establish a manufacturing system; the proposal to establish a national bank; and the discussions on the treaty-making power.

Colonel Hamilton, as secretary of state, made a report to congress in favor of the manufacturing system on the 5th of December, 1791, in which he insists (in conformity to the consolidating notions which he never relinquished, even in his defense of our present federal constitution) "that it belongs to the discretion of the national legislature to pronounce upon the subjects which concerned the GENERAL WELFARE, and for which under that description an appropriation of money is requisite and proper." And there seems to be no room for doubt that what ever concerns the general interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce, are within the sphere of the national councils, as far as regards an appropriation of money."

From this passage it is evident that Mr. John Quincy Adams, a thorough-going pupil of the same school, is mistaken in supposing that he was the original propagator of this doctrine, which in the polished

language, so peculiarly his own, he insinuates a man must be "ineffably stupid" to deny.

I should wonder at Colonel Hamilton's venturing this broad assertion, when he knew that the convention, of which he was a member, formerly and by express vote refused to give to congress the power to erect a national university, if I were not well acquainted with the boldness, pertinacity, and decisive character of Colonel Hamilton.

Even in his defense of the present Constitution -- the present *federative* constitution -- in his own publication, the "Federalist," he never desists from the NATIONAL expressions which were on debate and by formal vote rejected in the convention by which the Constitution was framed.

This doctrine was adopted to its full extent by a committee of congress in January 1797, the first year of Mr. John Adams' administration.

This creed of the federalists was discussed when the question of the United States' Bank was first agitated. I have not the debates by me, and we labor under great inconvenience for want of a repository of these most interesting discussions. Col. Hamilton's influence prevailed. This was the first great practical inroad on the plain meaning of the Constitution.³⁷ Colonel Hamilton's extended views of the great effect of this powerful machine in aid of his favorite measures will undoubtedly prove correct. Under such managers as Mr. Cheves and Mr. Biddle we have not yet had much to harm us. But no man can view its progress and reflect on its power without being satisfied that, like the serpent of Aaron's rod, it is destined to swallow up all the minor establishments of a similar description. The debate on the treaty-making power involves the question of the ultimate concurrence of the house of representatives by means of their conceding or refusing the requisite appropriations. The consolidation question had its secret influence on this debate, which ended without settling the principle.

The only question is of importance during the administration of Mr. Madison which involved the leading doctrines of the two parties was the bank bill, with the internal improvement clause in 1817, and the establishment of the present Bank of the United States a year after. To the bank bill of 1817, a clause was added (I think by Mr. Calhoun) appropriating the gains of the bank to internal improvements. Mr. Madison gave the bill his decided negative on the grounds that congress had no power to legislate on internal improvements. This was March 3, 1817. The national bank was carried through afterwards by the great talents of Mr. Dallas, one of the ablest men this country has seen. Mr. Dallas was led away by his duty as financier, and by his long connection with the great mercantile interests of Philadelphia, with whom a national bank was a favorite measure; or he never would have been the advocate of that measure himself. But the sanction given to this chartered monopoly by a series of decisions implying its constitutionality rendered by the supreme court made it extremely difficult for congress to decide otherwise. So it is: let in but the giant foot of usurpation, and the whole body of the monster will soon force its way. Good citizens, accustomed to reflect, have long viewed with silent horror the portentous progress of the federal judiciary. This body is now, has from the beginning it has been, the strong right arm of consolidation. The judges of that court are as wise, as learned, and as honest, as any other judges constituting any other court. They are men like other men. They are creatures of the executive; judges, whose motto is *ampliare jurisdictionem*, to extend their authority, and they have faithfully pursued it. When have they ever doubted the constitutionality of an act of congress? And what occasion have they passed over of deciding on the constitutionality of state laws? They seem to regard themselves as an insulated body, far above all state authorities, whose proceedings they have a full right to annul or control. The doctrines of that court, I regret to say, are fashionable among the members of the bar; and I think, having given a federal leaning -- a propensity to defend the consolidation measures, to very many of the best heads of their country.

During the administration of Mr. Monroe, much has passed which the republican party would be glad to approve, if they could. But the principal feature and that which has chiefly elicited these observations is the renewal of the SYSTEM OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. The scruples of this gentleman on the subject of the Cumberland Road, have subsided; and for reasons and for motives of very manifest

operation, he has become a thorough convert to the doctrines of his ancient enemies. Mr. Calhoun, I daresay, had little difficulty in overcoming the doubts of the president when he set before his eyes the glittering prospect of ten millions to be distributed in jobs to fortification contractors, and as much in the construction of roads and canals throughout every part of the union except in those states which chiefly contribute to supply the funds. Those splendid projects of Mr. Calhoun coincided also with Mr. Monroe's favorite plan of fortifications on every part of the coast, requiring of necessity a considerable increase of the standing army to man them. But the main objects are the power and patronage -- the prodigious influence that the President for the time being and the Secretary of War would acquire by controlling the expenditure of every cent that would otherwise form a surplus revenue. It is hardly one time in ten that the ostensible reason of a public proposal is the real one. Let every man look at Mr. Calhoun's report on fortifications in which he proposes to lay out about one million of dollars *south* and nine and a half million dollars *north* of the Potomac, and one main object of this project will start up undisguised and stare him in the face. When Mr. Jefferson proposed to abolish the internal taxes, it was not on account of the burden of taxation, from which the people would be just relieved, but to take away the executive influence over a host of dependents in the pay and under the control of that department. But Mr. J. was a *Radical* at that time, and report says he is so still. He may well know the use that might be made of this executive influence, and he needed it not. Indeed, no man ought to be President who does need it,³⁸ or who wishes to administer the fashionable folly of the day, a PATRONIZING GOVERNMENT.

In January 1824, Mr. Smith and Mr. Findlay, of the Senate, moved separate resolutions, in substance, that the committee of roads and canals do report on the expediency of requesting the President to employ a part of the engineer corps to ascertain the practicability of uniting the Schuylkill and the Delaware, and the Allegheny and the Susquehanna, in Pennsylvania. Which on the application of the Pennsylvania delegation to Mr. Calhoun had been extended to the Susquehanna and the Chesapeake, and to several places in the middle, the Northeastern states, and in Florida; upon pretenses and for purposes not yet, so far as I know, developed. The application of the Pennsylvania delegation was cordially received and instantly granted; and Mr. Calhoun, himself, has been lately surveying some of the creeks in the Allegheny Mountains, no doubt for some great national object hereafter to be explained. The influence of the Pennsylvania delegation was to be expected.

This power assumed by Congress to make roads and canals through the states at their will and pleasure was regarded as an usurpation by the Democratic Party, who called on their opponents to point out what clause in the Constitution contained this power expressly or from what express grant it was derived by necessary implication.

This was attempted to be done by some:

From the power given to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states.

By others for the power given to raise and support armies, to which military roads were necessary.

By others, from the power given to establish post offices and post roads

These pretenses were so discordant, so manifestly strained, and forced into the service, and one might say without much danger of departing from truth, so observed, that the speeches of Mr. Holmes of Maine, and Mr. Barber of Virginia, in the senate were triumphant in point of argument.

On the 16th of February, the bill to obtain the necessary plans and estimates in relation to roads and canals was carried in the House of Representatives 115 to 86 -- 16 members absent. Seven out of 24 from New York voted against it. South Carolina voted four and four, one member absent. Among the minor objections to the bill, were:

1st. They contemplated no equitable principle of expending the public money, neither in any ratio of taxation, or of representation.

2d. That the states which had already meritoriously expended their domestic revenues in public

improvements, like New York and South Carolina, were for that very reason to be left out, and their taxes appropriated to supply and make good the parsimonious or negligent deficiencies of the states which had done nothing for themselves.

The pretenses of deriving this assumed authority on which the bill in question was based from the military clause, or the regulating commerce clause, or the post road clause, were seen to be not merely weak but farcical. Which of them, for instance, will apply to Mr. Calhoun's frolic to Deep-Creek, on the top of the Allegheny? Who can read the account of his journey for this purpose with any gravity? In the House of Representatives a broader position was taken; viz. *That Congress had a right to pass any measure conducive to the general welfare*. This is the true and only ground which furnishes anything like a defense of the bill in question, or that can be argued with due seriousness.

Mr. McDuffie's speech on this occasion in favor of the bill comprises everything that can be urged in its defense, and was, beyond all doubt, the most able and eloquent support of that measure which had been heard in either house.

We have now come to the broad and ancient line of discrimination between the federal and republican parties; between the advocates for a consolidated, national government, and the defenders of state rights and limited powers. From the very opening of the debates in the convention of 1787, through every period of political discussion to the present day, the position taken by the friends of the internal improvement bill, in the last Congress, has been the distinctive, the characteristic, the exclusively appropriate doctrine of the consolidating or federal party. For if congress may adopt any measure, or pass any act, which to a majority of that body may seem conducive to the general welfare, what can they not do? *Who* is to limit them, or *where* is the limitation? All the barriers of the Constitution are thrown down; all state rights are prostrated, as a minor consideration; all the powers which the convention *refused* to grant are claimed over again as of right; all the conclusions that are deducible from this Constitution, being a compact for mutual benefit between confederated states, conceding so much power and no more as was necessary to the purpose of the Confederation, are at one breath annulled and annihilated.

This was the position taken by Colonel Alexander Hamilton, in the debates and convention; this was the position taken by him in his report on manufactures; this was the position assumed by the ultra-federal committee of the House of Representatives in 1797; no other position is necessary to convert these United States into one national government under one hereditary chief and one hereditary Senate as Mr. John Adams urged on Messrs. Taylor and Giles. No not one. The warmest friend of the Holy Alliance would not desire safer or broader ground to stand upon. If congress may enact whatever it may deem expedient for the general welfare, its power is unlimited, absolute, and despotic.

Mr. John Q. Adams, Mr. J. C. Calhoun and his partisans, assumed this ground. The former gentleman had boasted of being the first person to urge it, but he was mistaken. The honor belongs to Col. Alexander Hamilton. The following letter, however, of Mr. J. Q. Adams, will serve as a proof of his seal in the cause, and furnishes some elegancies of expression, and samples of moderation in style, that may be inserted among the beauties of his diplomatic correspondence.

The opinion of John Quincy Adams on the subject of Internal Improvements:

“The question of the power of Congress to authorize the making of internal improvements is, in other words, a question whether the people of this Union, in forming their common social compact, as avowedly for the purpose of promoting their general welfare, have performed their work in a manner *so ineffably stupid* as to deny themselves the means of bettering their own condition. I have too much respect for the intellect of my country to believe it. The first object of human association is the improvement of the condition of the associated. Roads and canals are among the most essential means of improving the condition of nations, and a people which should deliberately, by the organization of its authorized power, deprive itself of the faculty of multiplying its own blessings would be as wise as a creator who should undertake to constitute a human being without a heart.” – *Ohio National Crisis*

The following are the remarks of the Richmond Enquirer on the above quotation:

“These doctrines may be calculated for the meridian of Ohio -- but surely not of Virginia.

“We shall not examine the opinion of Mr. Adams as to roads and canals only -- but we would throw out a few suggestions as to the main principles itself. Can Mr. Adams be a friend to a limited construction when he *goes thus for the whole*? Can one who takes such broad ground be considered as of the old republican school of ‘98 and ‘99? Whatever promotes ‘their *general welfare*’ -- whatever betters or is supposed to be ‘the means of bettering their condition’ -- whatever ‘improves the condition’ of the nation -- is according to him within the purview of the powers of the general government. Where then is the limitation? When can we say ‘thus far and no further?’ What cannot the federal government do? What power is denied to them, which they may suppose calculated to *better the condition* of the nation?”

“Is it not enough to say, as the old republicans said, is this particular power given -- or if not given, is it the means necessary and proper for carrying any particular given power into execution? --but we are now to arrive at the true reading of the constitution by a much shorter process. We are only to ask, does a particular power better the condition of the nation? If so, it follows of course -- and the man is ‘*ineffably stupid*’ who will not immediately admit it. If Mr. A. is to be believed, we need no longer trouble ourselves with any inquiry as to the terms on which these separate states have associated together -- for the very object of the association cancels all limitations and endows the government with undefined and undefinable powers. If the United States can do anything to better their condition, whether the states have conceded the power are not, there was no necessity for a ‘particular enumeration of powers’ in the constitution. They may establish roads and canals *ad libitum* - universities, colleges and schools -- in fact, where is the limitation?

“When the Virginia legislature adopted Madison's report in 1800, they were ‘ineffably stupid.’ This ‘ineffably stupid’ report demonstrated that the phrase ‘general welfare’ was to be found in the ‘articles of confederation’ and that the phrase in this very limited instrument was surely not understood to be either a *general grant of power* or to authorize the requisition or application of money by the old congress to the common defense and general welfare, *except in the cases afterwards enumerated which explained and limited their meaning.*”

“How ‘ineffably stupid’ was the Federalist (1st vol.) when it asked ‘what would have been thought of that assembly (the Federal Convention) if attaching themselves to these general expressions and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare?’”

“How ‘ineffably stupid’ was James Madison, when on the 3rd of March, 1817, he ‘was constrained by the *insuperable* difficulty (he felt) in reconciling (the internal improvement bill) to the Constitution of the United States, though to negative that bill, he admits its capacity to ‘better the condition of the people?’”

“If these doctrines be so ‘ineffably stupid,’ we are content to abide by them. But at least let us hear no more of John Q. Adams being of the Virginia school of politicians. Can the Constitution be safe in his hands? It would be a nose of wax -- moved this way or that, as EXPEDIENCY might point out!”

Mr. McDuffie is willing to qualify this unlimited claim of power by confining it to those objects which can be affected by *an appropriation of money*, concerning which, the Constitution, according to him, makes no limitation whatever on the discretionary power of Congress. The position he assumes therefore is that Congress may adopt any measure whatever that they may deem necessary to the “common defense and general welfare” if money be necessary to carry into effect, and appropriate any sum of money whatever for the purpose.

He justifies this by three cases of legislation that he thinks can be justified on no other principle. Congress appropriated a sum of money for the relief of the French emigrants from St. Domingo, who were compelled to take refuge here in a very destitute condition. And they appropriated another sum for

the relief of the sufferers by an earthquake at the Caraccas. I reply that Congress did not stop to inquire whether they had an indisputable right to indulge this honorable feeling, and perform these urgent acts of charity at an expense too insignificant to be an object of debate. Neither will I.

But Mr. Jefferson, by treaty, purchased Louisiana for “the common defense and general welfare,” and Congress appropriated the money. Well: could they avoid it? Is it not the received opinion that the House of Representatives are *bound* to make the appropriations necessary to carry into effect a treaty agreed to by the executive and ratified by the Senate? I express no opinion of my own on this question, but this, the common opinion, has always been acted upon. At any rate, even those who deny it to be the duty of the House agree that there is no objection to their doing so if they see fit. This case then is involved essentially and forms a part of one of the powers expressly vested in and delegated to Congress by the Constitution. The abstract principle of its being a duty or not a duty was discussed, but not settled, in the debates on Jay’s Treaty, but the right of appropriating in such a case was never for a moment denied then or anytime since. Mr. McDuffie, therefore, must look out for some other precedent equally in point to support the stand he has taken.

In fact, I see no difference between Mr. J. Q. Adams and Mr. McDuffie. For does not absolute power reside in the purse of the nation and with him who has absolute control over the contents? What federalist would not embrace Mr. Adams’s proposition with Mr. McDuffie’s limitation? If you are left at full liberty to do whatever can be done with money, what is it you cannot do? If Mr. Monroe and Mr. Calhoun can place at their own disposal ten millions to be expended in jobs for fortifications, and as much in jobs for post-roads, and military roads, and commercial roads, and post canals, and military canals, and commercial canals, in every corner of the Union, where influence is to be acquired, I believe the less we say about the “public welfare” the better.

I am by no means an enemy to internal improvements, but much otherwise, if they are executed upon some plan of equality among their respective states. But no system of expenditure is proposed which shall contain the principles of equality and equity, and a more wanton dissipation of the money of the United States I can hardly suggest than the projected improvements in the state of Pennsylvania. Every exercise of usurped power is tyranny. Every assumption of power by Congress not *clearly* and *indubitably* conceded is a fraud on the several states. Do you want the power to make internal improvements? Take the constitutional mode of obtaining it and apply for an amendment to your Constitution. Why do you refuse to so to do? Because you are in doubt whether you can fairly and honestly convince the several states of the necessity for it -- because you distrust your own cause, and dare not confide in your arguments.

But such is now the case, and the leading characteristic doctrine of ultra-federalism and consolidation is now the fashionable doctrine in Congress; and one half, at least, of the South Carolina representation are the advocates for it! Very many of our young politicians seem inclined to favor the pretensions of power and patronage, and to enlist under the banners of ultra-federalism.

Fellow-Citizens, it is in vain to talk of an amalgamation of parties while the dividing line of 1787 has continued to be the dividing line from thence forward to 1825. Is South Carolina destined to be a federal state? Do you mean to join the ranks of that party? If you do, so be it. Things must take their course, and the friends of state rights must be content to remain in their minority. If not, the politics of Mr. Adams, Mr. Calhoun, and General Jackson are not the politics of the state; for these gentlemen supported to the utmost of their power a principle and a measure which from the very moment of party difference has decidedly characterized the federal party. Consolidation is the motto of their flag.

This accusation will involve some of the most honorable, some of the most able, some of the most zealous, and useful sons of South Carolina. Men, who with industry, perseverance, knowledge and ability, worthy of all praise, defended the rights of the South against the ignorant and selfish speculations of the tariff-men. But it is remarkable that neither Mr. Webster, Colonel Hayne, Mr. Poinsett, or Mr. McDuffie advocated the rights of the South *on principle*. Maj. Hamilton, of Charleston, alone, in his very

able view of that question, went into the *right* claimed by Congress to legislate the money of the planter into the coffer of the manufacturer. Yet, I see not how that gentlemen could, on principle, take the ground he so ably supported: for if Congress has a right to pass any act which they may deem conducive to the general welfare, why may they not pass an act to protect domestic and prohibit foreign manufactures? Why may they not legislate on the Missouri question? In half a dozen years Arkansas will apply to be a state; suppose Mr. John Q. Adams, elevated to the presidency, with his known views on that subject; - will it not encourage the enemies of the South to bring it up again? Surely it will.

Fellow-Citizens, it is in vain to say the monster "*party*" may be destroyed: people who honestly, and with views and intentions equally honest, *differ on principle* must ever remain two parties. There need be no animosity because going both of us to the same point C you prefer the road A and I think better of the road B. Still the difference of opinion must and will remain; nor do I believe the country would gain much by amalgamation. It is well for both of us to be watched.

The question here discussed is a very leading and important one. The tendency to consolidating opinions among all our *young* politicians is manifest; the road to hereditary office is breaking upon the view, and a monarchy is dimly seen at the end of the vista.

I close these remarks; submitting them under the sanction of the following opinions on the subject by James Madison, our former president:

*Proceedings in the Virginia assembly passed in December 1798 with the review of the committee thereon, presented Tuesday, January 7, 1800*³⁹:

The other questions presenting themselves are – 1. Whether indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases copied from the "articles of confederation" so as to destroy the effect of the particular enumeration explaining and limiting their meaning. – 2. Whether this exposition would by degrees consolidate the states into one sovereignty. – 3. Whether the tendency in result of this consolidation would be to transform the Republican system of the United States into a monarchy.

1. The general phrases here meant must be those "of providing for the common defense and general welfare."

In the "articles of confederation" the phrases are used as follows, in article VIII, "all charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred *for the common defense and general welfare* and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of all land within each state; granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint."

In the existing constitution, they make the following part of section 3. "The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and exercises to pay the debts and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States."

This similarity in the use of these phrases in the two great federal charters might well be considered as rendering their meaning less liable to be misconstrued in the latter, because it will scarcely be said that in the former they were ever understood to be either a general grant or power, or to authorize the requisition or application of money by the old Congress to the common defense and general welfare except in the cases afterwards enumerated which explained and limited their meaning; and if such was the limited meaning attached to those phrases in the very instrument revised and remodeled by the present constitution, it can never be supposed that when copied into this constitution a different meaning ought to be attached to them.

That notwithstanding this remarkable security against misconstruction, a design has been

indicated to expound these phrases in the constitution so as to destroy the effect of the particular enumeration of powers by which it explains and limits them, must have fallen under the observation of those who have attended to the course of public transactions. Not to multiply proofs on the subject, it will suffice to refer to the debates in the federal legislature in which arguments have on different occasions been drawn, with apparent effect, from these phrases in their indefinite meaning.

To these indications might be added, without looking farther, the official report on manufactures by the late Secretary of the Treasury, made on the fifth of December, 1791; and the report of a committee of Congress in January 1797, on the promotion of agriculture. In the first of these, it is expressly contended to belong “to the discretion of the National legislature to pronounce upon the objects which concerned the *general welfare*, and for which, under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems to be no room for a doubt that whatever concerns the general interests of *learning*, of *agriculture*, of *manufactures*, and of *commerce*, or within the sphere of the national councils, *as far as regards an application of money*.” The latter report assumes the same latitude of power in the national councils, and applies it to the encouragement of agriculture, by means of a society to be established at the seat of government. Although neither of these reports may have received the sanction of a law carried into effect, yet, on the other hand, the extraordinary doctrine contained in both has passed without the slightest positive mark of disapprobation from the authority to which it was addressed (*Congress*).

Now whether the phrases in question be construed to authorize every measure relating to the common defense and general welfare as contended by some,⁴⁰ or every measure only in which there might be an application of money, as suggested by the caution of others,⁴¹ the effect must substantially be the same in destroying the import and force of the particular enumeration of powers which follow these general phrases in the Constitution. For it is evident that there is not a single power whatever which may not have some reference to the common defense or the general welfare; nor a power of any magnitude which in its exercise does not involve or admit an application of money. The government therefore which possesses power in either one or other of these extents is a government without the limitations formed by a particular enumeration of powers, and consequently the meaning and effect of this particular enumeration is destroyed by the exposition given to these general phrases.

This conclusion will not be affected by an attempt to qualify the power over the “general welfare” by referring it to cases where the *general welfare* is beyond the reach of *separate* provisions by the individual states; and leaving to these their jurisdictions in cases to which their separate provisions may be competent. For as the authority of the individual states must in all cases be incompetent to general regulations operating through the whole, the authority of the United States would be extended to every object relating to the general welfare which might by any possibility be provided for by the general authority. This qualifying construction therefore would have little if any tendency to circumscribe the power claimed under the latitude of the terms “general welfare.”

The true and fair construction of this expression, both in the original and existing federal compacts, appears to the committee too obvious to be mistaken. In both, the Congress is authorized to provide money for the common defense and *general welfare*. In both is subjoined to this authority an enumeration of the cases to which their powers shall extend. Money cannot be appropriated to the *general welfare* otherwise than by an application of it to some particular measure conducive to the general welfare. Whenever therefore money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied to a particular measure, a question arises whether the particular measure be within the enumerated authorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money requisite for it may be applied to it; if it be not, no such application can be made. This they are an

obvious interpretation coincides with, and is enforced by, the clause in the Constitution which declares that “no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations by law.” And appropriation of Money to the general welfare would be deemed rather a mockery than an observance of this Constitutional injunction.

2. Whether the exposition of the general phrases here combated, would not, by degrees consolidate the states into one sovereignty is a question concerning which the committee can perceive little room for difference of opinion. To consolidate the states into one sovereignty, nothing more can be wanted than to supersede their respective sovereignties in the cases reserved to them by extending the sovereignty of the United States to all cases of the “general welfare,” that is to say, to *all cases whatever*.

3. That the obvious tendency and inevitable result of a consolidation of the states into one sovereignty would be to transform the republican system of the United States into a monarchy is a point which seems to have been sufficiently decided by the general sentiment of America. In almost every instance of discussion relating to the consolidation in question, its certain tendency to pave the way to monarchy seems not to have been contested. The prospect of such a consolidation has formed the only topic of controversy. It would be unnecessary therefore for the committee to dwell long on the reasons which support the position of the General Assembly. It may not be improper, however, to remark two consequences evidently flowing from an extension of the federal powers to every subject falling within the idea of the “general welfare.”

One consequence must be to enlarge the sphere of discretion allotted to the executive magistrate. Even within the legislative limits properly defined by the Constitution, the difficulty of accommodating legal regulations to a country so great in extent, and so various in its circumstances, has been much felt; and has led to occasional investments of power in the executive which involve perhaps as large a portion of discretion as can be deemed consistent with the nature of the executive trust. In proportion as the objects of legislative care might be multiplied would the time allowed for each be diminished, and the difficulty of providing uniform and particular regulations for all be increased. From these sources would necessarily ensue a greater latitude to the agency of that department which is always in existence, and which could best mould regulations of a general nature, so as to suit them to the diversity of particular situations. And it is in this latitude, as a supplement to the deficiency of the laws, that the degree of prerogative materially consists.

The other consequence would be that of an excessive augmentation of the offices, honors, and emoluments depending on the executive will. Add to the present legitimate flock all those of every description which a consolidation of the states would take from them and turn over to the federal government, and the patronage of the executive would necessarily be as much swelled in this case as his prerogative would be in the other.

This disproportionate increase of prerogative and patronage must, evidently, either enable the chief magistrate of the Union, by quiet means, to secure his re-election from time to time, and finally, to regulate the succession as he might please; or, by giving so transcendent an importance to the office, would render the elections to its so violent and corrupt, that the public voice itself might call for an hereditary in place of an elective succession. Whichever of these events might follow, the transformation of the republican system of the United States into a monarchy, anticipated by the General Assembly from a consolidation of the states into one sovereignty, would be equally accomplished; and whether it would be into a mixed or an absolute monarchy might depend on too many contingencies to admit of any certain foresight. (*So far Mr. Madison.*)

UPON THE WHOLE, it appears that the Convention of 1787, who framed our present Constitution, were

of the politics now sneered at as *radical*; that our present Constitution is *radical* in all its principles, that our oldest and best tried politicians were and are *radicals* in their politics; attempting so far as they could first see to lay the axe to the root of all useless expense, and of all constructive usurpation; averse to all measures that might tempt us to engage in national quarrels which could be prudently and honorably avoided. They were no friends to magnificent, expensive, and dazzling forms and principles of government; to governments aiming at extensive patronage; to needless grants of power or of money, which is synonymous with power; being well persuaded that the difference between a good and bad government is, that the last is expensive beyond necessity, while frugality without parsimony is the characteristic of the former. The principle is universally true that the cheaper we can purchase what we really want, and the less we expend on what we do not want, the greater surplus remains at our disposal; whether we apply it to a form of government, or a yard of muslin.

Such are the political tenets of the men who are stigmatized as “penny wise and pound foolish” -----, of Anti-Federalists, Republicans, Democrats, Levelers, Disorganizers, Jacobins, and RADICALS; names attempted at various periods of political warfare to be affixed to the leaders of that party which after all seems to me to be the PARTY OF THE PEOPLE. Whether they be so or not, let the people judge.

FINIS

¹ The exception to this, as will be discussed in notes below, is that Cooper's devotion to the idea of the soul as being born and dying with the body seems to have led him to accept, in at least some of his writing, a form of determinism. This is a hazard that Epicurus specifically warned against, but which does not seem to be addressed or explained in Cooper's extant works. Related to this is Cooper's explicit acceptance of the "blank slate" theory, which is also referenced in notes below.

² With the provision that it appears that Cooper accepted the "blank slate" theory of John Locke, rather than the intuitionist view that Epicurus apparently held in his concept of Preconceptions / Anticipations. The reader is referred on this point to the work of Norman Dewitt, and to the "Dialogue on Innate Principles" by Jackson Barwis, for the alternative viewpoint that is more consistent with Epicureanism.

³ Dr. Magee of Trinity College, Dublin, has published a thick octavo in defense of the orthodox doctrine of the vicarious suffering and atonement, crowded with learned references and quotations. If such a book be necessary to prove the doctrine, then the Scriptures are insufficient for the purpose, and the doctrine is not worth the pains taken with it. Besides, can a doctrine be essential which after near 2000 years of discussion requires at this day learned volumes to establish it? The modern doctrine of atonement and vicarious suffering succeeded after and in place of the Roman catholic doctrine of indulgences. Moreover, no doctrine can be essential of which the clergy would prohibit the discussion; nor is it likely that an opinion is well-founded when they denounce those who controvert it. Like other men, they are timid where ever their cause is weak; and when they want to scare away discussion, it is a sure sign that a dread it.

⁴ Father of the late Lord Ellenborough, Chief Justice of the King's Bench.

⁵ The French writers call it conscience, *consciousness*. The English adopt *perception*.

⁶ Feeling, Sensation, Consciousness, are synonymous terms. T.C.

⁷ EDITOR'S NOTE: The assertion that Locke "has shown that we have no innate ideas" was not shared by Cooper's mentor, Jackson Barwis. As Barwis explains in "*Dialogues on Innate Principles*," there is a critical difference between "innate ideas" and "innate principles." In this paragraph Cooper follows Locke in overgeneralizing, and thus goes too far in concluding in this section that "*In fact, people begin to doubt whether a man can by any possibility receive satisfactory evidence of the existence of any thing whatever not cognizable by any of the human senses.*" See the introduction to this volume, Barwis' *Dialogues on Innate Principles*, and Norman Dewitt's *Epicurus and His Philosophy* for a view of what this editor holds to be Epicurus' correct position on this issue. – C. A.

⁸ That the best informed of *modern* writers hold the same doctrine, and that the whole phenomena termed mental are merely excitations of the nervous system perceived, I assert, on the authority of Cabanis, of Bichat, of Blumenbach, of Richerand, of Majendie; as well as Hartley, Darwin, Priestley, and Lawrence. The elementary works of Bichat, Richerand, Blumenbach, and Magendie, being usually read in all our medical schools, I subjoin the references.

See Bichat, Phys. Res. (Dr. Watkins' Edit. 1809. Philad.) p. 105, prope finem. Richerand, (Dr. Chapman's Edit., 1813, Philad.) p 390-392 and p. 400. Blumenbach (Dr. Caldwell's Edit. 1795, Philad.) p 195 of Vol. 1. Magendie, (Dr. Revere's Edit. Baltim. 1822), p. 102, 103. Broussais' sur l'irrit. et la Folie, p. 448.

The reader will find that the best informed and most approved elementary writers on physiology adopt the Latin axiom in the text, verbatim, or in substance. So Haller, Phys. §556, describes a sensation as an affection of the brain perceived. *Primae Lineae*, Edinb. 1767.

No man is qualified to write on metaphysics and the phenomena of intellect who is not well versed in physiology, a branch of knowledge in which the Scotch school of metaphysicians are sadly deficient.

I would not willingly include Dr. T. Brown in this tirade against his superficial and dogmatic predecessors. I agree with him that power and causation are words only, and inseparable from the real and actual antecedence of like consequents on like antecedents, under like circumstances, is rather intuitive than a process of reasoning. I much fear, however, he has not succeeded in obviating the difficulty of Hume's argument against miracles; for all that writer's argument applies to the introduction of new antecedents, the permanent character of the usual and natural course of phenomena, and the difficulty of establishing this introduction by testimony which remains just as before. Dr. Brown has substituted one form of defense for another, but he has not substantially altered the state of the case. Brown, however, is a clear sighted and able metaphysician, but of the Scotch school, whose characteristic is a dreadful ignorance of all physiological facts. T.C.

⁹ EDITOR'S NOTE: In his translation of Broussais' *On Irritation and Insanity*, Cooper wrote as a footnote on page 125: "*Nil unquam fuit in intellectu, quod non prius erat in sensu*, is an axiom true at this day, as well as in the days of Aristotle, taking the word *sensu* to designate, as it ought, the internal as well as external senses."

¹⁰ The reader will recollect Gil Blas' Archbishop of Toledo.

¹¹ Crystallization, chemical affinity, polarity of light, electrical, and magnetic attractions and repulsions are all active properties. T.C.

¹² How this is done, we know not, and perhaps never shall know. But the fact is not less a fact because we cannot explain it. T.C.

¹³ It has been published since. T.C.

¹⁴ This is well illustrated, so far as the facial angle is concerned, in the plate at the beginning of Mr. White of Manchester's Essay on the Gradations of Man. His plate is taken from Camper and Blumenbach. Lawrence's plates are also from the same sources. T.C.

¹⁵ I do not think with Mr. Lawrence that the mere size of the brain is alone sufficient to account for the difference in intellect: the greater or less irritability of the whole nervous system – the aptness of the nervous system to admit associations – the facility with which ideas of former impressions are called up by association – the greater permanence and more extensive associations of particular classes of impressions and ideas &c. &c. Are probably powerful sources of difference. T.C.

¹⁶ As in puerperal cases. To this reasoning of *Lawrence*, I would add, that diseased brain may depend on the connection between the brain, the stomach, and the bowels. Thus, we see diseased digestion and morbid action of the intestines produce hypochondria and melancholy; such is often the case from worms. Drunkenness affects the brain by means of the stomach, and prussic acid kills by destroying the functions of the nervous system. The as yet untraced connection of all the parts of that system, by means of which, when one part is disordered, a distant part becomes disordered also, is physiologically termed sympathy. Thereby intending that the connection is as yet only known by its effects, and not anatomically shown. Dr. Haslam's publications on insanity corroborate strongly all Lawrence's reasoning. T.C.

¹⁷ Moral medicine can only act by introducing and exciting new trains of ideas and of thought

¹⁸ The experiments of Sir Everard Home and M. Flourens show this. Moreover, as I have observed before in this tract, the organic functions, which in a healthy state go on without producing sensation, in a diseased state, or in a state of great excitement, do produce sensation, by affecting generally the whole nervous apparatus. In a state of over healthy excitement (if I may so express myself) dreams are sometimes more intensely vivid than their analogous waking sensations. So, deranged stomach and bowels, and worms, may produce hypochondria, idiocy, and even mania. T.C.

¹⁹ That is, we feel them when they approach us near enough to give rise to this sensation. There is no consciousness different from feeling or perception. When the retina is excited by the light of a candle, and the motion is propagated along the optic nerve to its extremity within the brain, I feel, I perceive, I am conscious of the impression. We cannot be conscious of the actual contact of the bodies because no particles of matter are in absolute contact. They recede without solution of continuity by heat, they contract by cold. A ray of light impinging on a looking glass is reflected, as Sir Isaac Newton has shown, at the 127th part of an inch previous to contact. All this is well illustrated by the diagram of Father Boscovich. T.C.

²⁰ *Hume*, in his Essay on the Connection and Association of Ideas, and Lord *Kane* in his Elements of Criticism (Chapter on Ideas occurring in a train) have seen the same facts and reasoned in the same way. But Dr. *Hartley* has treated the subject so plainly, and yet so profoundly, that he has, in my opinion, exhausted it: the objections of modern sciolists to that great man notwithstanding. T.C.

²¹ Destut Tracey has done this. T.C.

²² I have omitted here a disquisition of about a page and a half on the nature of our sense of beauty, which did not appear to me necessary to the chain of reasoning.

²³ The brain, as the chief seat of the nervous apparatus, is liable to be affected by impressions made by external objects on the senses – by any preternatural or morbid state of the organ itself – by any sympathetic affection with the internal organs or viscera – and by the state in which it is put by the various associations of past impressions. Hence when morbidly excited, as in the lower states of phrenitis, apoplexy, or gout, sensations arise both sleeping and waking that would not occur in its common state; the impressions and associations are altered and modified, and all intellectual processes are correspondently deranged. Why? Because according to the acknowledged axioms of the schools, the character of the recipient determines the mode of reception of the thing received: *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*. Hence Mr. Owen of Lanark is right in supposing that man is the creature of the circumstances in which he is placed. Suppose four human beings

with organs similarly constituted in all respects at ten years of age, one bred up among the Brachmins of Hindustan, one as a Musselman at Constantinople, one among the strictest sect of Calvinistic Seceders, and one among the Savans of Paris: it is manifest the impressions and associations to which the nervous systems of these beings would be respectively exposed from the age of ten to the age of fifty would be extremely different: their intellectual powers would be different, and the effect of motives and of evidence upon them would be as various as their various educations. For I submit the following reasoning is unanswerable. The brain (place the seat of sensation wherever you please) is subject to the laws of the animal economy: it is passive in receiving impressions: the state of the brain is modified by the impressions it receives: the state of its associations of impressions with ideas, of ideas with ideas, depends upon the actual state of the brain, however produced: all the intellectual powers and processes, whether *in potentia* or *in actu*, are dependent on the state of the brain or seat of sensations; and therefore on the circumstances which have produced this involuntary state of the organ whatever those circumstances have been. But let us take for granted a Soul. Then if the brain can thus modify the Soul, and the Soul thus modify the brain, are not both the one and the other material – subject to the laws of organic matter? What then do you gain by introducing this creature of metaphysical fancy – this hypothesis which adds no force and removes no difficulty? Which must act upon matter, and be acted on by matter, to make its existence evident? Which those who believe in it acknowledge to be a mere *ens rationis*? Which has never been seen, felt, heard, or understood? Which is not cognizable by any human inlet of knowledge? Whose introductions and pretensions can be well traced to the power it affords the clergy over the conduct and belief of their fellow creatures? And which can derive no countenance from the words or actions of Christ or his Apostles, or the general belief of the Christian world for at least four centuries after Christ? T.C.

²⁴ This passage seems to allude favorably to Berkely's hypothesis. In fact, the external world is an hypothesis to account for our sensations; but an hypothesis to which we are irresistibly driven by the laws of the animal economy, which compel us to resort to it. Doubtless as our author says, there is as much difficulty involved in the fact of sensation or perception as in any process of reasoning. They are both processes depending on the properties of the bodily organ employed in them: properties which we can no more explain than we can explain the cause of life, electricity, or gravitation. These are all properties belonging to the substance with which we find them connected. If the latter require a Soul to explain them, so do the former; no good reason exists in one case that does not in the other. If gravitation be an essential property of any given mass or matter, so is perception and the thought of the nervous apparatus of the human being; and for the like reason in both cases, viz: we see them constantly accompanying each other. T.C.

²⁵ Further experiments are necessary to determine this. Those of Sir Everard Home and M. Fleurens, if followed up, would assuredly throw light on the functions peculiar to the various parts of this organ. T.C.

²⁶ This experiment of Vesalius, Dr. W. Hunter used to exhibit to his class on a jackass. It is the Spanish mode of killing, not only at their bull fights, but among their butchers; and it is doubtless a humane one. T.C.

²⁷ There are some facts of lesions of the brain that have not yet been explained. Many are collected on dubious authority by Dr. Ferriar, in his letter to Th. Cooper, Esq. in the fourth volume of the Manchester Transactions; and many on better authority by Sir Everard Home. Anatomists and physiologists, however, agree in considering these anomalies as not militating against their general position. Future experiments may well explain them. We are in the infancy of medullary physiology as yet. T.C.

²⁸ Gall & Spurzheim's anatomical exhibitions of the structure of the brain, I apprehend, have settled the fibrous nature of the medullary substance in the way nearly as Marshall has stated it. The other parts of their craniology are not yet so clear. T.C.

²⁹ I refer to Sir Everard Home's experiments before alluded to. T.C.

³⁰ He says well *if it would throw greater light on the subject*. What light can be thrown on the functions of the brain by the supposition of its connection with a being totally and essentially dissimilar in nature, and having no common property with the matter of which the brain is composed? But if the seat of the Soul be in the medullary substance, then has the Soul all the properties of matter, and is material. For having relation to and occupying space, and space too of a determinate form, then has the Soul solidity, extension, and figure: and as the Soul is placed there to act upon the brain, she has the common properties of all matter, attraction and repulsion, into which all action upon matter (by common consent) can be resolved. T.C.

³¹ Here ends the physiology of this sensible writer; to all of which (subject to the limitations which I have expressed in these notes) I subscribe, as an excellent compendium of that branch of Metaphysics called Ideology; and beyond all comparison conveying that real knowledge which Dr. Dugald Stewart, with his metaphysical predecessors of the same school at his heels, was so grossly deficient in. More is to be learnt from this summary of Dr. Marshall of genuine physiological metaphysics than from all the pages of inanity of the writers so much in vogue among those who read without thinking. A man who will separate metaphysics from physiology is not to be reasoned with.

³² I consider all the follows of Dr. *Marshall* from the end of this paragraph as a sacrifice on the alter of prudence to popular prejudice. *Lawrence* is cried down for refusing to pay this homage to the priesthood; and most disgraceful it is to *Abernethy* to have encouraged this hue and cry of ignorance and bigotry against a fellow professor, in practical knowledge of his profession at least his equal, and in professional reading so decidedly his superior. T.C.

³³ “It is high time, said Mr. Fenno (government printer during the reign of Mr. J. Adams) that we should get rid of this huge sow with her farrow of pigs” - alluding to the general government and the thirteen states.

³⁴ Naval power. The principle of the Democratic Party, was, not to keep up such a military or naval establishment as might tempt us into any contest that could be prudently avoided. But the circumstances of Europe have shown that we cannot avoid a naval establishment on a more extended scale that was contemplated any commencement of Jefferson's administration.

³⁵ John Langdon, senator from New Hampshire, and afterwards Governor of that state, in a letter to Samuel Ringold, esq. dated October 10th, 1800, declared that Mr. John Adams, in his presence, expressed a hope or expectation to see the day when Mr. J. Taylor, of Caroline, and Mr. Giles, (to whom he was then speaking) would be convinced that the people of America would not be happy without a hereditary chief magistrate and Senate, or at least, for life.

Mr. Taylor, on the trial of *Calendar*, attended in court and was sworn, ready to prove this fact; but Judge Chase would not permit him to give it in testimony.

³⁶ This gentleman is said to be a leading member of the Essex Junto, a club of ultra-politicians strongly suspected of being far more devoted to the institutions of Great Britain than of their own country. The Essex Junto begat the Hartford Convention, which Mr. Otis of Massachusetts has lately attempted to defend; but he has completely failed in their attempt to watch the Blackamoar white.

³⁷ Chief Justice Marshall, in his life of Washington, vol. 5, p 295 to 299, gives a brief account of this debate (1791) and delineates the characters of the two great parties in the union substantially as I have done. He has also given in the notes to that volume, p. 3, a short account of the arguments used by the opponents and supporters of the Bank bill. This gentleman is a Federalist, with a decided leaning to the NATIONAL politics of Colonel Alexander Hamilton. Yet I think it is impossible to read the plain, unvarnished arguments of the anti-federal minority onto blank question, as Marshall has stated them, and the more labored account of the reasoning of their opponents (notes, p. 6 and 7) without giving a preference to the intelligible simplicity of the first over the metaphysical and wire-drawn deductions of the federal party on that occasion.

All the difference between Chief Justice Marshall and myself in our views of the characters of the two parties is that he insinuates a design on the part of the anti-federalists to encroach on the power of the general government in favor of state authorities. I reply – 1st. Every political event bearing on the question from the year 1790 to the present day has shown not only that his representation is not accurate, but that the reverse is; 2dly. It is manifestly impossible for the states to encroach, because the powers conceded are fully expressed and cannot be recalled while the present constitution is in force; 3dly. The quibbles of implication and construction have given rise to the usurpation of power on the part of the general government which can never arise in favor of State pretensions; and have never, indeed, in any instance, been set up. I conclude, therefore, the danger is all one way, and experience shows it to be so.

³⁸ In 1817, Mr. J. C. Calhoun was a strenuous advocate for reimposing the long catalogue of internal taxes abolished by Mr. Jefferson.

³⁹ See also to the same purpose Mr. Madison's paper in the *Federalist* on the public welfare, No. 23, No. 41, and on construction No. 33.

⁴⁰ John Q. Adams's position.

⁴¹ Mr. McDuffie's position.